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SUMMARY 
As the world’s premiere supranational 
political and economic organization, the 
European Union’s (EU’s) symbolic power 
with respect to action on climate change 
and global warming is immense. In this 
regard, the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package, introduced by the European 
Commission on January 23rd, 2008 
represents an important and historical 
step in the direction of responding to 
the climate challenge and potentially 
even in the direction of renewing the 
original Kyoto Protocol signed by the 
EU and several other states in 1997.  
At the same time, the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package represents a 
genuine challenge to the economic, po-
litical and social resources of individual 
EU member states. In particular, for the 
EU’s less advanced new member states 
(NMSs), the 2020 Climate Change Pack-
age effectively raises the question 
whether the goals of economic conver-
gence with the more advanced EU 
member states are compatible. Given the 
record of the more advanced EU mem-
ber states under the Kyoto Protocol 
framework, very few of the old mem-
ber states (OMSs) have so far been 
able to demonstrate any effective “de-
coupling” of economic growth and ris-
ing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
More distressing still, in seeming disre-
gard of the EU’s Kyoto Protocol, the 
former “cohesion” countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) along with 
Austria, Italy and the Netherlands have 
all dramatically increased their CO2 
and/or GHG emissions through 2005. 
More troubling still, for the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, many 
individual features of the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package seem ill-suited 
to the goals of reversing climate change 
or fairly representing NMS interests. For 
one, the adoption of the new 2005 base 
year completely erases the previous 
good “performance” of the NMS and 
rewards those OMS noted above who 
failed to make real progress over the 
period 1990–2005. For another, the 
2020 Climate Change Package ultimately 
disposes of one of the few mechanisms 
providing states with genuine incentives 
to make real progress in reducing GHG 
emissions outside the EU emission trad-
ing system (ETS) sector. Without more 
flexibility across EU ETS and non-ETS 
sectors and without more state-centred 
control of the distribution, sale and 
resale of unused carbon allowances, it 
is less likely that states will provide 
adequate incentives for reducing build-
ing and transport-related emissions. 
Such incentives are of particular interest 
to the NMS who currently exhibit far 
greater emission-reducing potential in 
this area. Finally, the guarantee of ori-
gin (GO) green certificate system cur-
rently proposed as a model for trade 
across states in renewable potential re-
quires modification in order to ensure it 
will promote the development of a di-
verse range of renewable resources. 
As an exercise in Community-based 
decision-making, the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package exhibits serious flaws. 
Principal among these is the failure to 
provide an adequate framework for 
real public policy consultation and dis-
cussion. The most serious policy trans-
gression in this regard is the failure to 
provide full public disclosure of all the 
available data and calculations used to 
arrive at the proposed GHG emission 
and renewables targets and that also 
build the substance of the Commission’s 
Impact Assessments of the 2020 Climate 
Change Package. Based on proprietary 
data and mathematical formulae, all 
background analysis and data remains 
unavailable to the public. Though such 
practices are not unheard of concerning 
high security measures and policy-
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making, the decision not to make this 
data available for public scrutiny and 
discussion concerning the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package of policy pro-
posals seriously undermines both the 
adequate and meaningful discussion of 
public policy strategies and goals, as 
well as the sufficient building of public 
consensus and legitimacy both at the 
member state level and in the European 
Union at large. 
Such obstacles not-withstanding, this 
report endeavours to provide a thor-
ough analysis of the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package. The general conclusion 
on the potential effectiveness of the EU 
policy package – in its current form – 
is not favourable. As suggested above, 
though the general intent of the Euro-
pean Commission’s policy proposals is 
commendable, elements of the individual 
policy proposals still require significant 
adjustment before they will respond 
adequately to the needs and require-
ments of individual member states. In 
what follows, the main conclusions of 
this report are briefly outlined and 
summarized. 
The first main conclusion concerns 
the shift from the 1990 to the 2005 
base year. While the choice of the 2005 
base year is logical from the perspective 
of providing a sound and reliable statis-
tical foundation from which to calculate 
progress in GHG emission reductions, 
this policy choice has the most negative 
impact on the NMS (except for Slove-
nia). Though many are inclined to pass 
of the “past performance” of the NMS 
as merely the result of the collapse of 
heavy industry, this observation ignores 
all the positive changes that have oc-
curred in these countries since 1989. To 
enumerate a few of the more positive 
changes, the switch from coal to natu-
ral gas use for heating purposes, the 
conversion from coal to biomass in 
some power plants, the decommissioning 
of the least efficient coal-based power 
plants, the stronger regulation of new 
production plants, the introduction of 
some renewables and the regulation of 
large combustion plants – all of these 
changes have had a very positive impact 
on reducing GHG emissions in Hungary 
and elsewhere. 
The decision to adopt the 2005 base 
year and base new GHG reduction tar-
gets on this number explicitly disadvan-
tages the NMSs who have made the 
most progress in reducing GHG emis-
sions over the period 1990–2005. 
Moreover, this decision inexplicably ad-
vantages those countries that have made 
the least progress over the same period, 
thereby rewarding them for policy fail-
ures during the first Kyoto period. 
Though this decision is, in part, influ-
enced by international negotiations – 
other countries such as Japan are also 
promoting the 2005 base year as a 
means of making GHG emission reduc-
tion targets more credible – the Euro-
pean Union has thus far relied on an 
internal burden-sharing agreement 
across member states in order to meet 
a Community-level commitment to the 
international community. This framework 
provides ample room – even with the 
choice of a 2005 base year – for ad-
justing individual member state targets 
for previous performance. Countries 
that have a strong interest in economic 
convergence – and every right to 
achieve it – should presumably not be 
indiscriminately disadvantaged by the EU 
policy-making process. 
The second main conclusion concerns 
the structure and framework of the 
EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and 
the potentially related goal of reducing 
energy use by 20 per cent by 2020. 
The EU’s three principal tools for pro-
moting the reduction of CO2 and GHG 
emissions in the 2020 Climate Change 
Package are a 20 per cent reduction in 
GHG emissions by 2020 – primarily 
through the EU emission trading system, 
reducing energy use by 20 per cent 
and increasing the share of renewable 
energy production by 20 per cent by 
2020. The 2020 Climate Change Pack-
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age also introduced a biofuels target of 
10 per cent in the fuel-mix; however, 
this last target has come under increas-
ing scrutiny and is not likely (at least 
in its current form) to survive the legis-
lative process. 
The general weakness in the EU 
model is its peculiar emphasis on elec-
tricity-generating and ETS sector firms. 
Though in some respects this focus has 
predominated across the Kyoto Protocol 
and post-Kyoto Protocol periods, two 
important changes will result from cur-
rent policy efforts related to the 2020 
Climate Change Package:  First, the de-
cision to require the auction of all car-
bon allowances going to electricity-
generating installations imposes a far 
heavier burden on the electricity-
generating sector. Second, the failure to 
reach a Kyoto II-type agreement will 
result in the fact that states no longer 
retain the right to sell unused carbon 
allowances. This right was (and still is) 
permitted under the original Kyoto Pro-
tocol. So-called AAUs (assigned amount 
units) or carbon allowances that re-
mained unused by individual states 
could be sold on the international trad-
ing market. Without the ability to sell 
or redistribute AAUs, states will face 
dramatically reduced incentives to pro-
mote GHG-reductions outside the ETS 
sector. The result will be to focus – 
even more than was previously the case 
– most efforts at GHG emission reduc-
tions on electricity-generating firms and 
other ETS sector firms. 
Due in part to these changes, two 
weak points in the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package can be easily identified. 
First, and potentially the most important 
among these, is the failure to extend 
the EU ETS system to include all aspects 
of national emissions (in particular 
buildings, transport, forestry and agri-
culture) and to allow for far greater 
flexibility across the EU ETS and non-
ETS sectors. One reason for this sharp 
separation between ETS and non-ETS 
sectors has been the relative simplicity 
of accurately recording and verifying 
emissions. However, EU member states 
currently report relatively small margins 
of error in the reporting of total CO2 
and GHG emissions. Thus, while under 
the original Kyoto Protocol “hot air” 
threatened to diminish carbon prices, 
under the 2013–2020 phase, such 
threats are greatly diminished. However, 
the potential failure to negotiate and 
sign a replacement to the Kyoto Proto-
col has unintentionally resulted in the 
loss of the option to sell unused carbon 
allowances resulting from emission re-
ductions outside the ETS sector. Thus 
far, no mechanism has been established 
to replace it. 
As argued herein, the EU’s ETS 
framework should be conceived far 
more broadly than is currently the case. 
Ideally, the EU ETS system should en-
compass all segments of member state 
national economies, including not only 
current ETS sector firms, but also 
buildings, transport and ultimately for-
estry and agriculture. A number of EU-
wide and also national-level observations 
provide the justification for this shift. At 
the domestic level, for one, due in no 
small part to the rapid rise of energy 
costs associated with the transition to a 
market economy, many or most of 
Hungary’s ETS sector firms have al-
ready undertaken considerable invest-
ments in energy efficiency. For another, 
a very significant share of the potential 
for making energy saving investments 
lies in reducing building-related energy 
use. For the most part, however, this 
segment of energy-use lies outside the 
officially defined ETS sector. At the EU 
level, rather than imposing the brunt of 
the emission-reducing burden on elec-
tricity generation and ETS sector firms, 
such an extension of the policy struc-
ture would facilitate the promotion of 
those policy strategies most suited to 
individual countries. 
The second weak point concerns the 
fact that the target of reducing energy 
use by 20 per cent by 2020 is not 
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formally integrated into the 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package. The supporting 
legislation – in particular EU Directive 
2006/32/EC on Energy End-Use Effi-
ciency and Energy Services – operates 
primarily as a guideline for member 
states to follow. The only way in which 
member states will be be required to 
bear the costs of failure to comply is 
presumably through sanctions imposed 
on the failure to reduce overall GHG 
emissions by the required 20 per cent 
between 2013 and 2020. Thus far how-
ever, the relevant sanction mechanism 
has not been identified. Moreover, past 
efforts to impose ceilings on rapidly 
growing EU member states have failed 
miserably, as witnessed by the case of 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Some 
states, for example Germany, have al-
ready called for a more rigorous inclu-
sion of the 20 per cent energy effi-
ciency goals into the 2020 Climate 
Change Package. Without renewed in-
ternational cooperation on some type of 
Kyoto II agreement, the AAU-piece of 
the international trading scheme will go 
missing, EU member states will not be 
permitted to sell or re-distribute unused 
carbon allowances within or across 
borders and they will ultimately face 
far weaker incentives to promote emis-
sion reductions outside the ETS sector.  
As a general strategy, the EU ETS 
system is well-designed to reduce GHG 
emissions, both from electricity genera-
tion and from ETS sector firms (e.g. 
cement, steel and other high emitter 
firms). The full auctioning of carbon 
allowances in the electricity-generating 
sector that will presumably be intro-
duced from 2013–2020 should have a 
significant impact on raising the price 
of fossil fuel-based (including natural 
gas-based) electricity generation and 
reducing the price of renewable and 
nuclear power-based electricity genera-
tion (in relative terms). Moreover, these 
incentives will be strongest for those 
power plants (and ETS sector firms) 
that are the most carbon intensive: these 
firms will have to purchase the largest 
number of carbon allowances, thus cre-
ating powerful incentives to reduce 
emissions. Assuming there are no fur-
ther collapses in carbon prices, this tool 
provides an excellent mechanism for 
promoting GHG emission reductions in 
the electricity-generating and ETS sec-
tors. 
The great weakness in the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package then is not the 
ETS sector model per se, but rather the 
failure of the policy package to provide 
an adequate mechanism for incentivizing 
states to promote emission reductions 
outside the ETS sector. Given that some 
40-50 per cent of EU energy use (and 
thus GHG emissions) is related to build-
ing use, this fact cannot be ignored. 
Moreover, the more countries have suc-
cessfully reduced the relative carbon 
intensity of electricity generation (Iceland 
or Sweden, for example, emit almost no 
CO2 or GHG’s from electricity genera-
tion due either to their exclusive use of 
renewable or renewable and nuclear 
power-based or energy sources, respec-
tively), the less important electricity gen-
eration becomes a policy target. The 
remaining targets (building energy use, 
transport, agriculture and other ETS 
sector firms) on the other hand become 
increasingly important. For Hungary, the 
relative carbon intensity of electricity 
generation (ignoring variation in the 
relative thermal efficiency of electricity 
generation) is lower than that the rela-
tive carbon intensity of natural gas use, 
suggesting that a focus on the reduc-
tion of natural gas use could have a 
significant impact on Hungary’s total 
GHG output. 
Though natural gas – which accounts 
for some 70-85 per cent of building-
related energy use – is considered the 
“clean fuel” it is not well recognized 
that heat generation from natural gas 
can ultimately be more (sometimes sig-
nificantly more) carbon intensive than 
the national average carbon intensity for 
electricity generation. Heating oil – simi-
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lar in many of its uses to natural gas 
– is even more carbon intensive. 
Though much depends on the relative 
thermal efficiency of the heat-generating 
installation (power plant, industrial 
smelter, hot water heater or household 
furnace), significant reductions in natu-
ral gas use can likewise bring signifi-
cant reductions in CO2 and GHG emis-
sions. More importantly, where the rela-
tive carbon intensity of electricity gen-
eration is low (as for example in the 
Swedish and Icelandic cases), invest-
ments that reduce the use of natural 
gas (or heating oil) are potentially far 
more “efficient” (in terms of total GHG 
emission reductions) than further reduc-
tions of the relative carbon intensity of 
electricity generation. Though such a 
strategy is not meaningful for all coun-
tries or segments of the economy (Swe-
den, for example, uses almost no natu-
ral gas), for Hungary and other Central 
and East European countries, there is 
reportedly far more room for emission-
reducing investments in the non-ETS 
sector, related in particular to natural 
gas use. 
The EU’s emphasis on electricity-
generation and ETS sector firms dis-
tracts attention from the role of build-
ing-related natural gas use. Moreover, 
while the EU ETS model, in part, func-
tions by raising the price of electricity, 
thereby sending appropriate signals to 
consumers to reduce energy use, no 
such signal is generated with respect to 
building-related natural gas use. While 
ETS sector firms that are significant 
natural gas users will of course feel the 
pinch from the carbon price-setting 
mechanism, no such “carbon price” is 
established for building-related natural 
gas use. Why this is so is not immedi-
ately obvious. One simple answer, of 
course, is that it is more difficult to 
impose a carbon price on natural gas 
in the same way it is imposed on elec-
tricity: natural gas distributors are not 
high GHG emitters and thus cannot 
easily be required to purchase carbon 
allowances. But the consequence of the 
current EU policy structure creates per-
verse incentives to ignore building-
related natural gas use and focus pri-
marily on the reduction of electricity 
use. This fact represents a potentially 
serious policy failure and requires at-
tention. 
The EU’s 2020 Climate Change Pack-
age, at least in its current form, thus 
fails to promote truly efficient energy 
saving investments, in particular where 
the non-ETS sector and building-related 
energy use is concerned. In order to 
rectify this situation, the EU would need 
to introduce a model that (re-
)incentivizes states to actively promote 
energy efficiency and GHG emission 
reductions in the non-ETS sector. This 
report argues that the best way to do 
this is to give EU member states the 
right to sell and redistribute unused 
carbon allowances from the non-ETS 
sector to other member states or ETS 
sector firms. Currently this is only per-
mitted for unused carbon allowances in 
the ETS sector. This model has few dis-
advantages and many advantages. For 
one, it would permit states to reap po-
tential benefits from promoting energy 
efficiency investments in building energy 
use. For another, it would allow states 
to pursue energy saving investments 
where these are most efficient (i.e. in 
the ETS or the non-ETS sector or both).  
The increased flexibility resulting 
from this type of arrangement would 
permit states to re-allocate some carbon 
allowances from the non-ETS to the ETS 
sector where this is meaningful. While 
many ETS sector firms compete fiercely 
in the international marketplace, thus 
limiting their potential to undertake 
GHG reducing investments (except 
where these result in significant cost-
savings), the non-ETS sector for the 
most part is not subject to the same 
competitive requirements and thus is 
better able to assume at least a share 
of the costs of reducing GHG emissions. 
Moreover, to the extent that the room 
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for energy saving is greater in the non-
ETS sector, such investments are likely 
to have a significant cost-saving impact 
on this sector as well. 
The failure of the EU policy strategy 
to promote energy saving investments in 
the non-ETS sector – in particular with-
out the conclusion of any Kyoto-II type 
agreement – is likely to have a negative 
impact on the overall efficiency of the 
EU’s 2020 Climate Change Package. Not 
only will it then promote energy saving 
investments where these are potentially 
less advantageous, it will further create 
negative incentives for states to promote 
energy saving investments in the non-
ETS sector and lead to potential diver-
sions or misallocations of funds toward 
the ETS sector. More importantly how-
ever, as long as electricity generation 
remains the principal target of GHG-
reducing policy in the EU – and in 
particular as long as there is no carbon 
price on natural gas – a significant 
share of EU GHG emissions will be ne-
glected. Given the relative degree of 
energy dependence resulting from natu-
ral gas use – and not only in Hungary 
– this strategy makes little sense. 
The third main conclusion concerns 
the promotion of a GO (guarantee of 
origin) green certificate system and the 
introduction of a new renewables target 
in the EU’s 2020 Climate Change Pack-
age. This report argues that, as cur-
rently conceived, the EU’s GO green 
certificate system will fail to promote 
the required diversity of renewable re-
sources and will favour the development 
of the cheapest renewable resources 
wind power and biomass – in particu-
lar in Hungary. Oddly, the Commis-
sion’s proposal for a GO green certifi-
cate system is at odds with its own 
recommendations appearing in document 
SEC(2008)57 – The Support of Electric-
ity from Renewable Energy Sources – 
which argues in favour of the feed-in 
tariff systems currently in place in a 
good number of EU member states.  
On the other hand, a large number 
of EU member states strongly support 
the introduction of some kind of certifi-
cate trading system at the EU level. If 
successful, it could ultimately have the 
impact of favouring renewables invest-
ments in those locations where they are 
likely to have the greatest potential re-
turn. Thus the emphasis in this report 
is not on rejecting the green certificate 
system per se, but rather on providing 
a model that would facilitate both the 
goals of certificate trading at the EU 
level and of preserving the potential to 
promote a diversity of renewable re-
sources both at the national and EU-
levels. In this regard, the feed-in tariffs 
systems present in Germany and other 
EU member states provide a good 
foundation upon which to build. This 
report thus proposes a GO green cer-
tificate system that allow for the sale of 
green certificates based on varying 
amounts of energy produced by differ-
ent types of renewable energy sources. 
For example, a far smaller share of 
electricity produced by solar power 
could be required for the right to sell 
one green certificate, while a much lar-
ger share of wind power would be 
required. 
Several important advantages emerge 
from the model proposed in this report. 
For one, no initial interim periods (such 
as the 2-year periods currently pro-
posed) would be required for firms or 
private individuals to be able to sell 
green certificates. Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, such a model would 
neither threaten national level incentive 
systems (the principal concern of states 
using feed-in tariffs systems), nor would 
it require that states themselves adopt 
any one specific national-level strategy 
for promoting renewables. States would 
remain free to choose their own na-
tional-level incentive systems and these 
could diverge from the EU level model 
wherever necessary. Thus this model 
would allow individual countries to 
promote tidal, concentrated solar or 
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other forms of electricity/energy pro-
duction wherever necessary. 
With respect to the renewable re-
source targets proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission, this report argues 
that 13 per cent (or even more than 
this) is not an insurmountable target for 
Hungary. For the most part, this report 
argues that the principal obstacles to 
achieving this share of renewable energy 
production result from national level 
strategies that are not optimal and po-
tentially also from the overly “bundled” 
structure of state ownership and close 
ties to privately-owned power producers 
in the Hungarian energy sector. Thus 
this report argues that Hungary should 
adopt a far more differentiated feed-in 
tariff system similar to the one used in 
Germany and recently exported with 
great success to a number of other EU 
member states (e.g. Portugal and Spain). 
This system currently amounts to a very 
small share of energy costs but has 
been by far the most successful at 
promoting renewable energy use across 
a wide range of renewable energy re-
sources. Moreover, a differentiated feed-
in tariff system offers the opportunity 
to favour the use of some renewable 
resources over others where this is po-
tentially beneficial. 
For Hungary and most other Euro-
pean countries, the particular advantage 
of a more differentiated feed-in tariff is 
the opportunity to develop not only 
wind power, but also a more diverse 
range of renewable energy sources. 
There are many reasons why this 
should be done: For one, the need to 
balance wind with more constant forms 
of base load power raises important 
questions about how this can be done 
with renewable energy sources. Though 
not so frequently discussed, several 
forms of renewable energy can and do 
create viable sources of base load 
power: geothermal power plants, hydro-
power, tidal power and biomass power 
plants. While tidal energy is not avail-
able in Hungary, all three of the re-
maining sources of base power are 
available. Given the cost differences 
across these technologies however, a 
comparatively undifferentiated feed-in 
tariff structure will favour the cheapest 
sources of renewable energy – in par-
ticular wind and biomass – thereby 
ignoring Hungary’s geothermal and hy-
dropower advantages. For another, dif-
ferentiated feed-in tariffs can be used 
to promote reduced demand on the 
energy grid by favouring more decen-
tralized forms of energy production – 
e.g. local, municipal or building-based 
electricity generation based in particular 
on solar or wind energy. Differentiated 
feed-in tariffs are an effective and 
comparatively inexpensive way of pro-
moting such investments and rapidly 
pushing individual consumers to shift to 
more renewable energy use and genera-
tion. 
Additional problems emerge however 
with the current structure of the energy 
sector in Hungary. These domestic is-
sues also need to be resolved in order 
to make it possible for the EU’s policy 
strategy to have a positive impact on 
Hungarian GHG emissions. As supported 
by a recent conclusion from the Euro-
pean Commission, the energy sector in 
Hungary exhibits overly strong ties be-
tween private power producers and the 
principal state-owned managers of the 
electrical network (MVM and MAVIR). 
In this regard, the combination of the 
European energy sector liberalization 
and the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package offer an explicit opportunity to 
rethink the overly monopolistic structure 
of much of the Hungarian electricity 
(and ultimately natural gas) sector(s) 
and to unbundle all or most of the 
existing binding relationships across 
firms. 
In particular, this report argues that 
Hungary should immediately divest from 
the existing long term power purchas-
ing agreements (so-called LTAs or PPAs) 
between the Hungarian-owned MVM 
and privately-owned power producers. 
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The principal reason for this arises 
from the structure of the EU’s ETS sys-
tem, which essentially imposes a price 
or tax on carbon-based emissions. This 
system will only push power producers 
to reduce GHG emissions under specific 
conditions: as long as the resulting in-
creased price of production has a po-
tential effect on the profit margins of 
individual power producers. Under the 
existing LTAs, however, this is not pos-
sible for the following reasons: 1) the 
LTAs guarantee explicit 8 per cent 
profit margins to those power produc-
ers who still enjoy such contracts, and 
2) there is inadequate competition or 
energy market liberalization in Hungary 
to allow for adequate price competition 
across power producers. In fact, the 
LTAs operate as direct disincentives to a 
further opening of energy sector com-
petition, since in any reduction in the 
competitiveness of the existing domestic 
LTA producers must be compensated by 
the MVM (or the state budget). 
Without the dissolution of the re-
maining LTAs in Hungary and the fur-
ther liberalization of the Hungarian en-
ergy sector, the effect of the EU’s ETS 
system is likely to be substantially dissi-
pated. The reason is that the imposition 
of a carbon price on fossil fuel-based 
energy generation will either be passed 
along to consumers or absorbed by the 
state but will have no notable effect on 
the bottom line of the more carbon 
intensive power producers. Unless the 
explicit profit guarantees in the LTAs 
are effectively neutralized and greater 
competition in the Hungarian energy 
sector is both permitted and facilitated 
with appropriate improvements in the 
existing infrastructure to facilitate ac-
cess, the EU ETS system will have only 
a marginal impact on GHG emissions. 
The structure of the Hungarian en-
ergy sector further imposes potential 
limitations on the adoption of renewable 
energy sources. The principal reason for 
this is the fact that increases in the 
share of energy supply threaten to re-
duce prices. Limiting the growth of en-
ergy supply to the grid (whether from 
new renewable energy sources or other 
fossil fuel sources) keeps the price of 
electricity high and reduces the potential 
cost of the LTAs to the MVM (and 
thus the state). Though the 330 MW 
ceiling imposed on wind power in Hun-
gary by the MVM is hotly contested, 
this is at least one possible explanation 
for why there is such resistance to fur-
ther raising the ceiling. 
Finally, this report further argues 
that the state ownership “bundle” of the 
MVM, MAVIR and Paks is not condu-
cive to stronger support for renewable 
energy use in Hungary. The principal 
reason for this is that the link of state-
ownership is likely to favour the pur-
chase of energy from Paks rather than 
from other energy sources – in particu-
lar once (and if) the LTAs are dis-
solved. This is likely to be true for a 
number of reasons. For one, other than 
renewable energy producers, Paks is the 
only state-owned carbon-free energy 
producer in Hungary. For another, the 
EU’s ETS agreement only permits the 
sale of unused carbon allowances in the 
ETS sector. There is a danger that – 
due to potentially strong ties between 
state-owned firms – the principal way 
to do this will be to draw as much 
energy as possible from Paks and only 
secondarily from the remaining renew-
able energy producers. This report rec-
ommends that Hungary use the EU’s 
energy liberalization initiative as an op-
portunity to further “unbundle” the 
Hungarian energy sector and reduce 
the potential for collusion across energy 
generation and transmission networks. 
Furthermore, 100 per cent purchase 
guarantee for all renewable energy 
should be immediately introduced. 
The fourth and final conclusion of 
this report concerns the economic im-
pact of the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package. This is clearly the most com-
plicated and difficult part of the pack-
age to assess – in particular because so 
11 
much of the final outcome depends en-
tirely upon which model or models are 
finally agreed. As has been argued 
throughout, just how favourable and 
efficient the EU policy strategy is de-
pends quite dramatically on whether or 
not many of the individual elements of 
the policy package are adequately 
amended. How Hungary and other 
states will react to the range of issues 
raised in this report and whether the 
resulting consensus will support the 
changes recommended herein is un-
known. In many senses, far greater 
economic risks to the economy stem 
from such factors as changing oil and 
other energy sector prices, budgetary 
imbalances associated in particular with 
election-year spending, austerity policies 
linked to the drive for Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), mismanagement 
of the electricity market and the threat 
to economic stability arising from the 
turmoil in world credit markets. 
In general, this report argues that 
there are potentially significant and 
positive multiplier effects resulting from 
expenditure on the promotion of energy 
efficiency and the greater adoption of 
renewable energy. These arise in par-
ticular from the improved productivity 
resulting from more efficient energy 
use, from the positive impact on jobs 
resulting from additional public and 
private sector expenditure and from the 
incentives for the development of new 
technologies created by increased ex-
penditure on renewables and energy 
efficiency. 
This does not mean that the overall 
impact of adjustment to the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package will be neutral. 
In particular, this report suggests that 
if the current EU policy strategy is 
adopted without amendment, the costs 
could be substantially higher and the 
benefits of the EU policy strategy sig-
nificantly less in terms of actual GHG 
emission reductions. The disadvantages 
of the current model include, in par-
ticular, a less efficient focus on the ETS 
sector and the failure to adequately 
promote potentially advantageous reduc-
tions in natural gas and building-related 
energy use more generally in Hungary 
and elsewhere. Moreover, the failure to 
pursue adequate energy sector liberali-
zation and to create the appropriate 
setting for increased renewable energy 
use in Hungary is further likely to have 
a particularly negative impact on energy 
costs in the Hungarian economy. With-
out appropriate changes in the struc-
ture of the Hungarian energy sector, 
the EU ETS system is likely to lead to 
further cost increases and to a gener-
ally negative impact on international 
competitiveness – both with respect to 
firms in the ETS sector and beyond. 
That said, a number of observations 
can also be made about the potential 
impact of the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package on ETS sector firms. 
For one, if the base year issue is not 
resolved, it is likely to have a negative 
impact on the Hungarian position. For 
another, the lack of flexibility across the 
ETS and non-ETS sectors has direct im-
plications for the share of the burden 
placed on ETS sector firms. Given that 
these firms face direct competition in 
the international marketplace, any ineffi-
ciency in the allocation and structuring 
of GHG targets will weigh most heavily 
on these firms. For another, all of the 
arguments made so far about building-
energy use in general and the reduction 
of natural gas use in particular also 
apply to the ETS sector. However, it 
remains unclear to what extent the ETS 
sector model takes such emissions into 
account (this requires some verification). 
In any event, to the extent that such 
emissions are not included in the ETS 
sector model, firms are potentially con-
strained to focus on energy and emis-
sion-saving investments that may not be 
the most efficient.  
In particular for those ETS sector 
firms that encounter strong international 
competition, several concerns result 
from the changes being introduced with 
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the EU’s 2020 Climate Change Package: 
rising energy (in particular electricity) 
costs, rising direct costs related to re-
quirement to purchase a gradually in-
creasing share of carbon credits, limited 
room for further energy saving invest-
ments and the threat of carbon leakage. 
In particular, full-auctioning in the elec-
tricity-generating sector is likely to have 
a significant impact on the already sig-
nificantly high cost of electricity in 
Hungary. Further, the ETS sector re-
quirement to purchase 20 per cent (in-
creased annually by 1.74 per cent after 
2013) of required the carbon allowances 
represents a significant shift that will 
further heighten competition with firms 
beyond the borders of the EU ETS. 
Given that many or most firms in the 
ETS sector have already undertaken 
considerable energy saving investments 
and are already comparatively energy 
efficient, remaining room for improve-
ment is limited. This means that many 
firms will be required purchase the 
required carbon allowances, leading to 
a substantial increase in costs. In the 
long run, particularly in that part of 
the ETS sector that fiercely competes in 
the international marketplace, the poten-
tial for carbon leakage (the relocation 
of GHG-producing plants and firms 
beyond the borders of the EU) is a se-
rious concern.  
In closing, many things could be 
done to improve the quality and overall 
efficiency of the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package. Considering the time-
frame within which the EU member 
states – in particular in order to be 
prepared for the Copenhagen negotia-
tions on a renewed Kyoto-II type 
agreement in November 2009 – the EU 
and its member states must act quickly. 
If they succeed, the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package could indeed ultimately 
represent a significant step in the direc-
tion of combating global climate change. 
However, a significant amount of work 
and a considerable number of amend-
ments to the current policy package are 
required before it will represent an 
optimal solution for Hungary and many 
other EU member states. 
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INTRODUCTION
*
 
This report responds to a request from 
the Hungarian Ministry of the Economy 
and Transport (GKM – now the Minis-
try of Transport, Telecommunication 
and Energy, KHEM and the Ministry of 
National Development and Economy, 
NFGM) for a review and critique of the 
European Commission’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package introduced on January 
23rd, 2008 and its related Impact As-
sessments. As is well known, the EU’s 
climate change package calls for a 20 
per cent reduction in GHG emissions by 
2020 (30 per cent with the support of 
a renewed international Kyoto Protocol 
extending until 2020). In addition, the 
climate package calls for a 20 per cent 
increase in the use of renewable energy 
sources and a 20 per cent reduction in 
energy use (potentially from increased 
energy efficiency). Finally, the climate 
package calls for a 10 per cent in-
crease in the use of biofuels. 
As the world’s premiere suprana-
tional political and economic organiza-
tion, the European Union’s (EU’s) sym-
bolic power with respect to action on 
climate change and global warming is 
immense. In this regard, the 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package represents an 
important and historical step in the di-
rection of responding to the climate 
challenge and potentially even in the 
direction of renewing the original Kyoto 
Protocol signed by the EU and several 
other states in 1997.  
At the same time, the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package represents a 
genuine challenge to the economic, po-
litical and social resources of individual 
                                                            
* This is a revised and mildly updated English 
version of Ellison and Hugyecz (2008). The 
authors would like to thank Tamás Fleischer for 
helpful comments. 
EU member states. In particular, for the 
EU’s less advanced new member states, 
the 2020 Climate Change Package effec-
tively raises the question whether the 
goals of economic convergence with the 
more advanced EU member states are 
compatible. Given the record of the 
more advanced EU member states under 
the Kyoto Protocol framework, very few 
of the old member states have so far 
been able to demonstrate any effective 
“decoupling” of economic growth and 
rising greenhouse gas emissions. More 
distressing still, in seeming disregard of 
the EU’s Kyoto Protocol, the former 
“cohesion” countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) along with Austria, 
Italy and the Netherlands have all dra-
matically increased their CO2 and/or 
GHG emissions through 2005. 
More troubling still, for the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, many 
individual features of the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package seem ill-suited 
to the goals of achieving real climate 
change or a fair representation of NMS 
interests. For one, the adoption of the 
new 2005 base year completely erases 
the previous good “performance” of the 
NMS and rewards those OMS noted 
above who failed to make real progress 
over the period 1990–2005. For an-
other, the 2020 Climate Change Pack-
age ultimately disposes of one of the 
few mechanisms providing states with 
genuine incentives to make real pro-
gress in reducing GHG emissions outside 
the EU ETS sector. Without more flexi-
bility across EU ETS and non-ETS sec-
tors and without more state-centred 
control of the distribution, sale and 
resale of unused carbon allowances, it 
is less likely that states will provide 
adequate incentives for reducing build-
ing and transport-related emissions. 
Such incentives are of particular interest 
to the NMS who currently exhibit far 
greater emission-reducing potential in 
this area. Finally, the guarantee of ori-
gin green certificate system currently 
proposed as a model for trade across 
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states in renewable potential requires 
modification in order to ensure it will 
promote the development of a diverse 
range of renewable resources. 
As an exercise in Community-based 
decision-making, the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package exhibits serious flaws. 
Principal among these is the failure to 
provide an adequate framework for 
real public policy consultation and dis-
cussion. The most serious policy trans-
gression in this regard is the failure to 
provide full public disclosure of all the 
available data and calculations used to 
arrive at the proposed GHG emission 
and renewables targets and that also 
build the substance of the Commission’s 
Impact Assessments of the 2020 Climate 
Change Package. Based on proprietary 
data and mathematical formulae, all 
background analysis and data remains 
unavailable to the public. Though such 
practices are not unheard of concerning 
high security measures and policy-
making, the decision not to make this 
data available for public scrutiny and 
discussion concerning the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package of policy pro-
posals seriously undermines both the 
adequate and meaningful discussion of 
public policy strategies and goals, as 
well as the sufficient building of public 
consensus and legitimacy both at the 
member state level and in the European 
Union at large. 
That we are standing on the edge of 
an important historical moment and 
decision requires little debate. While the 
time to act is clearly now, attention 
should be paid to previous difficulties in 
reversing EU legislation once initiated 
(e.g. the CAP). Member states (in the 
Council of Ministers) and the European 
Parliament must agree on the energy 
and climate change package by March 
2009 so that Europe is in a strong 
position at global climate change nego-
tiations in Copenhagen in November 
2009. The decisions made in the next 
year will set EU member states on a 
specific development path that will be 
difficult to alter in future years. The 
element of potential irreversibility in the 
climate change policy strategies to be 
adopted by December 2008 should be 
carefully weighed while considering the 
different options present in the EU’s 
future climate change strategy. 
The analysis of the EU’s 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package is organized as 
follows. The first section addresses the 
basic background of climate change 
policy in the European Union. The sec-
ond section discusses problems of 
transparency and methodology in the 
European Commission’s assessments of 
the impact of EU policy. The third sec-
tion provides a general discussion of 
some features of the policy package. 
The fourth section addresses the choice 
of the 2005 base year. The fifth section 
provides an extensive analysis of the 
problems arising from the rigid division 
between ETS and non-ETS sectors. This 
section discusses in particular the issue 
of energy efficiency and the failure of 
the EU policy guidelines to promote 
investment in one of the highest poten-
tial GHG reduction sectors. Further, a 
model is proposed for addressing this 
problem and integrating the EU ETS 
and non-ETS sectors. The sixth section 
discusses problems associated with the 
GO green certificate proposal, proposes 
an alternative model and provides a 
discussion of the EU’s 13 per cent RES 
target for Hungary. The seventh section 
discusses the economic impact of the 
2020 Climate Change Package and the 
eighth section provides a set of domestic 
level policy choices that could potentially 
lead to a more advantageous outcome. 
The final section concludes. 
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1) GENERAL BACKGROUND: 
GLOBAL WARMING AND      
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY     
IN THE EU 
Politics lie at the centre of the allocation 
process for CO2/GHG (carbon dioxide 
and greenhouse gas) reduction targets 
and quotas in the European Union (EU). 
Though most presumably agree that EU 
allocation of CO2/GHG reduction tar-
gets and quotas should both equalize 
(burden-sharing principle) and minimize 
the impact across individual states, the 
process by which state-by-state quotas 
are allocated is anything but transpar-
ent. Moreover, judging by the response 
of 8 of the 10 new member states to 
the CO2/GHG quotas allocated for the 
2008–2012 period,1 or by the response 
of most of the NMS to the current 
country-level GHG emission reduction 
targets proposed as part of the Euro-
pean Union’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package introduced on January 23, 
2008, the process appears tilted toward 
the interests of the old member states. 
The veracity of this claim aside, the 
relative lack of transparency in the de-
cision-making process begs the question 
both of whose interests are most 
strongly represented in the final bur-
den-sharing and quota allocation and 
why this is so. 
In the political science and interna-
tional relations literature, transboundary 
pollution is frequently seen as a force 
capable of overpowering the self-
interested behaviour of states and en-
couraging them to cooperate by adopt-
ing more international and universal 
policy goals. Taking such events as the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Bali discussions 
as examples, the evidence that states 
can find common terms for cooperation 
                                                            
1 Several of the NMS’s have filed claims against 
the European Commission before the European 
Court of Justice. 
and agreement is at best mixed. While 
global warming and climate change 
have contributed to the assembly of 
nation states in single locations to dis-
cuss and negotiate environmental trea-
ties – as witnessed in particular by the 
signing of formal agreements on CO2 
emission reductions (the Kyoto Protocol) 
– the degree of real success in reduc-
ing CO2/GHG output is slim. 
In the EU, political cooperation at the 
supranational level was supposed to 
enable states to share their burdens and 
find “community” solutions to common 
problems. Though possessed of an insti-
tutional structure that – at least in 
principle – makes it possible to identify 
“Community” goals and formulate 
common “Community” solutions, there is 
a long literature suggesting most EU 
decision-making continues to be domi-
nated by the interests of states and in-
tergovernmental principles.2 
The EU’s approach to climate change 
policy encompasses both the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the 
current 2020 Climate Change Package 
introduced by the European Commission 
on January 23rd, 2008. Though the ini-
tial policy goals agreed in the Kyoto 
Protocol represent a significant reversal 
of world trends – in contrast to most 
other major countries of the world, the 
EU agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by 
8 per cent by 2012 – overall EU per-
formance in meeting these targets has 
to-date been lackluster. On paper, the 
EU will manage to meet its Kyoto re-
quirements due to the Eastern Enlarge-
ment, not state performance. 
Diverging from the general parame-
ters of the Kyoto Protocol, EU member 
states chose to “more fairly” redistribute 
the burden of CO2 emissions reductions 
across countries. Performance however 
bears no resemblance to initial targets
                                                            
2 The current author has also contributed (in 
particular Ellison, 2006a). Much of the relevant 
competing literature is also cited in that article. 
See also Moravcsik (1999, 1997, 1991). 
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(see Table 1 for data on individual 
country performance).3 As illustrated by 
Figures 1 and 2, the lion’s share of 
successful emission reductions occurred 
in the CEEC’s. Western EU member 
states managed to reduce total GHG 
                                                            
3 A few countries were able to deviate from the 
1990 base year by choosing base years in the 
mid- to late 1980’s in which CO2 and other 
GHG emissions were highest. Thus for example, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slove-
nia benefited significantly from this choice of 
base year (see also Ellison, 2006b:21). The effect 
of deviation in the choice of base year is re-
flected in the numbers in the last column of 
Table I. 
emissions by only 2 per cent (when 
individually selected base years are used 
for this calculation) and 1.5 per cent 
when the originally proposed 1990 base 
year is used. These figures disguise the 
more favourable performance of a few 
Western countries – in particular in 
Denmark and Sweden and to some ex-
tent Germany and the UK. In general 
however, the CEE NMS’s – by joining 
the EU – make it possible for the EU as 
a whole to appear to meet its Kyoto 
requirements. Put differently, a set of 
countries representing 20.8 per cent of 
the EU population are responsible for 
Table 1
Change in CO2 and GHG Output 
 
 
CO2 GHG Kyoto 
1990/1980 2005/1990 2005/1980 2005/1990 2005/BY Target (2012)
Bulgaria -19.2 -31.2 -44.4 -40.0 -47.2 -8.0 
Czech Republic 
  
-62.7 
  
-25.8
  
-8.0 
Estonia -26.1 -50.9 -8.0 
Hungary -20.0 -9.3 -27.5 -18.2 -30.7 -8.0 
Latvia 
  
-33.6 
  
-58.9
  
-8.0 
Lithuania -38.6 -54.1 -6.0 
Poland -21.8 -13.9 -32.7 -17.8 -32.0 -6.0 
Romania 2.5 -42.9 -41.5 -38.2 -45.6 -8.0 
Slovakia 
  
-12.6 
  
-33.6 -8.0 
Slovenia 33.7 10.0 0.4 -8.0 
Austria -4.7 43.0 36.3 18.0
  
-13.0 
Belgium -9.3 9.5 -0.7 -1.3 -7.5 
Denmark -15.8 -9.9 -24.2 -7.0 -21.0 
Finland -5.7 -1.5 -7.1 -2.5 0.0 
France -24.0 13.3 -13.9 -1.6 0.0 
Germany -6.9 -13.9 -19.8 -18.4 -21.0 
Greece 47.3 28.2 88.8 26.6 25.0 
Ireland 15.7 71.0 97.8 26.3 13.0 
Italy 12.7 12.9 27.3 12.1 -6.5 
Luxembourg -8.9 17.1 6.6 0.4 -28.0 
Netherlands 7.6 30.7 40.7 -0.4 -6.0 
Portugal 85.6 48.6 175.8 42.8 27.0 
Spain 15.0 64.5 89.1 53.3 15.0 
Sweden -38.2 9.3 -32.5 -7.3 4.0 
UK -1.6 -3.6 -5.1 -14.8 -12.5 
Cyprus 70.9 76.6 201.7 63.7
  
0.0 
Malta 74.3 27.4 122.1 54.5 0.0 
EU 15 -3.4 18.0 14.1 -1.5 8 
EU 27   6.5 -8.0 -10.7   
Sources: own calculation base on CO2 from Eurostat’s online database and reported UNFCC GHG 
data. GHG data for Cyprus and Malta is from Eurostat’s online database. 
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Source:  graphs taken from the European Environment Agency UNFCC reports (EEA, 2007:10–11). 
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approximately 75 per cent of EU CO2 
emission reductions over the period 
1990–2005 – about 3.6 times the rela-
tive contribution of the OMS’s. 
How things will look in the next 
round up to 2020 is anybody’s guess. 
Negotiations on the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package are in their initial 
stages. The conclusion of the EU’s 
March 2007 Summit called for the fol-
lowing features:  (1) a 20 per cent re-
duction in GHG emissions by 2020 (30 
per cent with the support of a renewed 
international Kyoto Protocol extending 
until 2020), (2) a 20 per cent increase 
in the share of renewable energy 
sources, (3) a 20 per cent reduction in 
energy use (potentially from increased 
energy efficiency) and (4) a 10 per cent 
increase in the share of biofuels in the 
general fuel mix. 
Member states and representatives in 
the European Parliament must agree on 
the energy and climate change package 
by March 2009 to place Europe in a 
strong bargaining position at global 
climate change negotiations in Copenha-
gen in November 2009. The forthcom-
ing decisions will set EU member states 
on a development path that will be dif-
ficult to alter in the years that follow. 
The element of potential irreversibility in 
these climate change policy strategies 
will weigh heavily on the individual 
countries and representatives in the 
European Parliament choosing from 
among the different options present in 
the EU’s future climate change strategy 
and additional strategies. 
The notion that there is one country 
position driving the 2020 climate 
change policy package forward is per-
haps untenable. However, countries cer-
tainly strive to put their mark on the 
2020 policy package. For one, Germany 
was the principal proponent of the gen-
eral policy package, pushing for it dur-
ing the German presidency in 2007 and 
achieving approval of the initial guide-
lines sent on to the European Commis-
sion in March 2007. The UK also ap-
pears to be playing a significant role 
behind the scenes. With the most fully 
developed country position on the policy 
package, in particular on the proposed 
guarantee of origin green certificate 
system (COM[2008] 19 final), the UK 
appears to have exercised considerable 
influence.4 Moreover, individual coun-
tries repeatedly promote positions that 
reflect relative comparative advantages 
in energy production, energy security 
concerns or heavy investment in either 
energy intensive industries or services 
(e.g. the UK, France and other countries 
on the nuclear path, the CEEC’s on 
heavy industry, the UK and Poland on 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), etc.). 
A number of the details of individual 
2020 policy package proposals and 
their related Impact Assessments how-
ever were arrived at in relative obscu-
rity. Transparency is in fact a serious 
problem where the definition of emis-
sions’ targets and the assessment of 
their impact are concerned. As just one 
example, the mathematical models and 
data used for the Commission’s Impact 
Assessment (SEC[2008]85-V2) are pro-
prietary and not readily available either 
to the academic research community or 
to policy makers and their respective 
staff members in the member states. 
This fact alone raises serious questions 
about the overall transparency of the 
consultation and negotiation process. 
Further, it raises serious questions about 
the viability of social scientific assess-
ment of EU climate change policy. If the 
academic and research apparatus be-
hind individual member state govern-
ments are unable to replicate the mod-
els used for making EU-wide policy 
proposals and assessing impact, they 
cannot seriously test, critique or other-
                                                            
4 In this regard, previous Commission papers 
on renewable strategies (see “The Support of 
Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources”, 
SEC[2008]57 and the precursor to this study 
COM[2005]627) strongly favoured the feed-in 
tariff systems employed to great success in 
countries like Germany and Spain. 
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wise assess the proposed policy models 
in a meaningful manner.  
Why such methods and strategies 
have been chosen by the European 
Commission remains unexplained both to 
the scientific and to the political Com-
munity in the member states. Such a 
situation must presumably be considered 
unacceptable and member state gov-
ernments are likely to demand resolu-
tion of this problem. Though there is 
little time left to make these important 
decisions, they should presumably be a 
product of “Community” policy in order 
for them to be supported, approved 
and to garner adequate legitimacy. In 
this regard the PRIMES and other mod-
els (GEM-E3, POLES and PACE, devel-
oped at the E3M lab at the National 
Technical University of Athens and else-
where)5 and their use in the setting of 
burden sharing targets and impact as-
sessments requires re-evaluation. Despite 
the increasing predominance of scientific 
values based on transparency and re-
producibility, the calculations and for-
mulae used are not publically available, 
nor is the database upon which they 
are calculated. Equally troubling, no 
competing research currently offers al-
ternative models and predictions on 
viable and meaningful EU ETS and 
many other targets.  
Hungary (and other new member 
states) filed a legal case against the 
European Commission (T-221/07) before 
the European Court of Justice on June 
26th, 2007 regarding the firm-level CO2 
emission quotas approved for 2008–
2012. The Hungarian case argues the 
Commission failed to consider all avail-
able and relevant information – in par-
ticular the data and information Hun-
gary filed with the Commission in its 
National Allocation Plan – and further 
that the Commission contravened the 
principles of transparency by failing to 
                                                            
5 The POLES model, for example, was devel-
oped at the Institute for the Politics and Eco-
nomics of Energy at the CNRS (Centre National 
de Recherche Scientifique) in France. 
share the data and calculations used to 
arrive at the quotas established for the 
2008–2012 period (see e.g. the Official 
Journal, 25th, 2007).  
Though the problem of transparency 
makes it difficult to divine the structure 
of interests behind various elements of 
the Commission’s climate change policy 
package, the remainder of this paper 
presents at least three ways in which 
powerful divisions across less and more 
advanced states pervade the structure 
of the current 2020 Climate Change 
Package. The following section addresses 
the general problem of economic 
growth and climate change in the EU. 
The second section discusses the prob-
lem of the choice of base year that 
arose with the current distribution of 
the burden for reducing GHG emissions 
by the year 2020. Finally, the third sec-
tion discusses the strategy for reducing 
emissions across ETS sectors. 
1.1. Economic Growth vs. Climate 
Change 
Climate change and economic growth 
challenges were heightened by the 
March 2007 European Council Summit 
commitment to reduce GHG emissions 
by 20 per cent by the year 2020. 
While the new member states achieved 
quite dramatic reductions in their levels 
of CO2 output between the years 1990–
2004 (due to the decline of heavy in-
dustry and many other factors),6 most 
old member states exhibit remarkably 
little success. (See Table 1) Though 
Germany is perhaps the most successful 
OMS, a large share of CO2 reductions 
are the result of economic change in 
the former East Germany. Countries 
such as Sweden and Denmark, the UK 
and to some extent Germany, on the 
                                                            
6 The range of potential explanatory variables 
here is extensive. For a detailed discussion, see 
Ellison (2006b). 
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other hand, deserve high marks for 
their relative ability to reduce CO2 and 
GHG emissions in the face of competing 
concerns and a comparatively high level 
of economic development.7 
The principal question for the less 
developed economies is whether the 
more advanced EU member states are 
able to lead by example rather than by 
command. By their own admission, ten 
EU OMS will achieve their individual 
Kyoto targets primarily by writing Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) investments off 
national-level emissions targets. Only one 
of the NMS (Slovenia) has chosen to 
take advantage of these measures in 
order to meet its target (EEA, 2006:30). 
While the European ETS facilitates envi-
ronmentally beneficial investments in 
those countries and plants that repre-
                                                            
7 The positive performance of some countries is 
marred by the role of nuclear power (France), 
or Germany’s re-unification with East Germany 
(despite considerable progress in the introduc-
tion of renewables). 
sent the greatest potential return on 
investment (both in potential emission 
reductions and the related carbon cred-
its) there are likewise two distinct dis-
advantages to this system. One is the 
postponing of real change in emission 
behaviour, in particular in the more 
advanced states. The second is the fail-
ure to demonstrate, by power of exam-
ple, that future economic growth is 
compatible with reduced emissions. 
Without significant GHG reductions in 
the more advanced states, the pursuit 
of both economic growth and CO2/GHG 
emission reductions may prove incom-
patible. Due in particular to the starting 
points of individual countries, Kyoto 
imposed “ceilings” are likely to impinge 
upon growth and convergence interests. 
As evident in Table I above, the less 
advanced Western states (Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain) contin-
ued their rapid growth in CO2/GHG 
emissions on into the 1990–2005 period 
and show no sign of slowing. Table 2 
represents a rough thumbnail estimate 
Table 2
2012 and 2020 Growth Constraints? 
 
Business as usual estimates 
(Million tons) 2012 Targets 2020 Targets 
 
Estimated BAU GHG 
output 
 (at 2005 avg EU GDP) 
Kyoto target 
GHG output 
(2012) 
Percent over 
Kyoto target
2020 Target 
(ETS+non-ETS, 
option 4) 
Percent over 
2020 target
Bulgaria 225.047 97.433 131 % 77.261 191 % 
Romania 487.851 211.428 131 % 175.277 178 % 
Poland 866.101 502.680 72 % 421.892 105 % 
Latvia 24.241 16.320 49 % 12.587 93 % 
Lithuania 47.223 32.912 43 % 25.329 86 % 
Slovakia 90.731 60.120 51 % 50.353 80 % 
Estonia 37.989 30.152 26 % 21.586 76 % 
Hungary 138.610 103.081 34 % 82.825 67 % 
Portugal 129.328 74.078 75 % 78.917 64 % 
Greece 177.456 137.082 29 % 117.652 51 % 
CzR 213.787 171.530 25 % 145.040 47 % 
Slovenia 26.976 18.678 44 % 19.536 38 % 
Italy 623.751 471.752 32 % 468.419 33 % 
Spain 486.630 276.287 76 % 370.319 31 % 
Source: Own calculations. EU average per capita GDP from Eurostat online database. Individual 
country Kyoto targets are available in EEA (2007). 2020 targets are based on “option 4” in the 
Impact Assessment (SEC[2008]85-V2:58-9). The formula for estimating BAU GHG output is: 
(pcGDPEU-avg/pcGDP2005)*GHG2005 = est. GHG output. 
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of GHG output levels given convergence 
on the 2005 EU average GDP (countries 
already above the average EU GDP have 
been excluded from the table).8 Column 
I calculates the GHG output this would 
represent based on 2005 levels and 
columns III and V compare this number 
to the 2012 and 2020 targets. Signifi-
cant growth constraints arise, suggesting 
the ability of the more advanced states 
to reduce CO2 emissions relative to 
GDP presumably defines future limits to 
economic growth – along with EU cli-
mate policy – for both more and less 
advanced states. 
                                                            
8 This measure is based only on the ratio of 
2005 GDP to the 2005 EU average GDP used 
as a multiplier to estimate future emission asso-
ciated with higher GDP output. This measure 
ignores however potential changes in the struc-
ture of production (e.g. increased size of service 
sector), reductions in energy intensity, general 
improvements with regard to CO2 and GHG 
mitigation and other changes. A more sophisti-
cated measure should take these additional 
factors into account, thereby reducing the esti-
mates in columns III and V. 
The European Commission’s 2008–
2012 strategy for setting emissions tar-
gets provides a meaningful example. 
The Commission required NMSs to scale 
back their national allocation plans for 
the period 2008–20012 by between 12 
and 55 per cent (Table 3). For the 
OMSs, some 90 per cent of CO2 quo-
tas were accepted. As indicated above, 
eight of the ten NMSs have initiated 
legal challenges. Seen against the back-
drop of quite substantial NMS GHG 
and/or CO2 emissions reductions be-
tween 1990 and the present, these 
Commission imposed ceilings are diffi-
Table 3
Comparison of 2006 Verified Emissions with Proposed and Approved Emission Caps  
Imposed by the European Commission for 2008–2012 
 
Country 
Verified CO2 
Emissions 2006 
(Million Tons) 
Proposed Cap 
2008–2012 
Approved Cap 
2008–2012 
Percent Difference 
Between 2006 
Verified Emissions 
and 2008–2012 
Approved Cap 
(%) 
Percent Difference 
Between Proposed 
and Approved 
2008–2012 Caps 
(%) 
Cyprus 5.30 7.1 5.48 3.4 -23.0
Czech Republic 83.60 101.9 86.80 3.8 -14.8
Estonia 12.40 24.6 12.70 2.4 -48.4
Hungary 25.40 30.8 26.90 5.9 -12.7
Latvia 2.90 7.7 3.43 18.3 -55.5
Lithuania 6.70 16.6 8.80 31.3 -47.0
Malta 1.98 3.0 2.10 6.1 -29.1
Poland 215.00 284.6 208.50 -3.0 -26.7
Slovakia 27.20 41.3 30.90 13.6 -25.2
Slovenia 8.84 8.3 8.30 -6.1 0.0
Bulgaria   67.6 42.30   
Romania   95.7 75.90   
Austria 32.40 32.8 30.70 -5.2 -6.4
Belgium 60.00 63.3 58.50 -2.5 -7.6
Denmark 34.20 24.5 22.00 -35.7 -10.2
Finland 45.00 39.6 37.60 -16.4 -5.1
France 128.80 132.8 132.80 3.1 0.0
Germany 488.00 482.0 453.10 -7.2 -6.0
Greece 70.00 75.5 69.10 -1.3 -8.5
Ireland 21.70 22.6 22.30 2.8 -1.3
Italy 227.00 209.0 195.80 -13.7 -6.3
Luxembourg 2.70 4.0 2.70 0.0 -31.6
Netherlands 87.10 90.4 85.80 -1.5 -5.1
Portugal 33.10 37.9 34.30 3.6 -9.5
Spain 185.90 152.7 152.30 -18.1 -0.3
Sweden 21.90 25.2 22.80 4.1 -9.5
UK 284.96 246.2 246.20 -13.6 0.0
Source: own calculations based on annual verified emissions data and targets from the European 
Commission. 
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cult to understand. Moreover, given the 
lackluster performance of most of the 
OMSs reducing GHG and CO2 emis-
sions, many of the Commission goals 
often appear unattainable. Despite the 
objections raised by the NMSs, com-
pared to emissions levels in 2006, the 
Commission’s cap approvals mostly re-
quire significant reductions from the 
OMSs and permit increases in CO2 
emissions in the NMSs. Based on these 
numbers, the NMSs’ position on CO2 
caps is not immediately obvious.  
Two basic problems however lurk 
behind the scenes. For one, CEE requests 
for higher CO2 quotas are in part the 
result of rapid economic growth and 
increasing economic investment. In Hun-
gary, for example, 2006 verified emis-
sions did not include the future emis-
sions of some 5 plants scheduled to 
come online in 2007.9 Thus over the 
period 2008-2012, firms in Hungary – 
in order to create room for new instal-
lations – must find ways to reduce 
emissions. Though little public discussion 
has emerged, quota allocation decisions 
have an effect on future locational in-
vestment decisions and act as potential 
barriers to entry. In this regard, overly 
restrictive quotas may limit future in-
vestment and hinder convergence-related 
economic growth. 
The second basic problem concerns 
the following two key questions: 1) 
whether the more advanced states are 
genuinely able to achieve real CO2 
emissions reductions, and 2) whether or 
not emissions’ targets will act as con-
straints on future economic growth. 
While the European Commission pro-
scribes CO2 reduction targets through 
the mechanism of the ETS and national 
allocation plans, little is really known 
about the limits of potential future CO2 
reductions. As noted above, the more 
advanced states – apart a few notable 
                                                            
9 Interview with representative from the Hun-
garian Ministry of the Environment. 
exceptions – have not achieved signifi-
cant emissions reductions.  
2) GENERAL EVALUATION      
PROBLEMS 
 
2.1. Transparency and      
Methodology 
Transparency is a serious problem in 
the EU’s 2020 Climate Change Package. 
The mathematical models and data used 
for the assessment are proprietary and 
not readily available either to the aca-
demic research community or to policy 
makers and their respective staff mem-
bers in the member states. This fact 
alone raises serious questions about the 
overall transparency of the consultation 
and negotiation process. Moreover, it 
further raises serious questions about 
the viability of social scientific assess-
ment of climate change policy in the 
Community. If the academic and re-
search apparatus behind individual 
member state governments are unable 
to replicate the models used for making 
EU-wide policy proposals, they cannot 
seriously test, critique or otherwise as-
sess the proposed policy models in a 
meaningful manner. Why such methods 
and strategies have been chosen by the 
European Commission remains unex-
plained both to the scientific and to the 
political community in the member 
states. Such a situation must be consid-
ered unacceptable and member state 
governments should demand that this 
situation be immediately resolved. There 
is simply too little time left in which to 
make such important decisions. They 
must be a product of “Community” 
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policy in order for them to be both 
supported and approved. 
The PRIMES and other models (GEM-
E3, POLES and PACE, developed at the 
E3M lab at the National Technical Uni-
versity of Athens and elsewhere)10 and 
their use in Commission estimations for 
burden sharing quotas. Despite the in-
creasing predominance of scientific val-
ues based on transparency and repro-
ducibility, the calculations and precise 
formulae used by the Commission As-
sessment are not public information, 
nor is the database of independent indi-
cators upon which they are calculated. 
By way of example, the US-based Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) requires 
all recipients of its federal research 
grants to ‘promptly submit significant 
research findings for publication’, and 
to “share with other researchers, at no 
more than incremental cost and within 
a reasonable time, the data, samples, 
physical collections and other supporting 
materials created or gathered in the 
course of the work.”11 That an even 
higher standard has not been set for all 
research and data used for the devel-
opment and formulation of EU public 
policy is a cause for great concern. 
Equally troubling, no competing re-
search currently offers alternative mod-
els and predictions on viable EU ETS, 
GHG reduction and renewables targets. 
Hungary has itself (as well as several 
other new member states) filed a legal 
case (#T-221/07) filed before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice on June 26th, 
2007 against the European Commission 
regarding the firm-level CO2 emission 
quotas approved for 2008–2012. The 
Hungarian case argues the Commission 
failed to consider all available and rele-
vant information – in particular the 
data and information filed with the 
Commission in Hungary’s National Allo-
                                                            
10 The POLES model, for example, was devel-
oped at the Institute for the Politics and Eco-
nomics of Energy at the CNRS (Centre National 
de Recherche Scientifique) in France. 
11 NSF General Grant Conditions (2007: p. 27).  
cation Plan – and further that the 
Commission contravened the principles 
of transparency by failing to share the 
data and calculations used to arrive at 
the quotas established for the 2008–
2012 period (see e.g. the Official Jour-
nal, Augustus 25th, 2007).  
Much of the methodology behind the 
EU’s 2020 Climate Change Package and 
in particular the related Impact Assess-
ments is subject to strong criticism. 
Perhaps most importantly, almost none 
of the models presented in the assess-
ments and their presented output pro-
vide evidence of what happens with 
variation in the estimation of individual 
parameters. For example, most models 
used in the assessments attempt to pre-
dict the overall impact on economic 
growth. Many of them depend for ex-
ample on a specific price for the sale 
of carbon credits. Yet virtually no at-
tention is paid in the assessments to 
what happens as a result of potential 
variation in the price of carbon credits 
(as is well known, these have varied 
dramatically over the short period of 
time they have been traded).  
The second major methodological 
flaw is related to the failure to provide 
the relevant parameter estimates and 
related confidence intervals (beta coeffi-
cients, standard errors, possible meas-
ures of robustness or goodness of fit). 
All of these elements of scientific em-
pirical or econometric analysis generally 
help provide evidence of the overall 
degree of reliability, transparency, and 
robustness of the calculations. But abso-
lutely none of these elements are re-
ported in the analysis. Such facts are 
surprising. If this were an academic 
exercise destined for the scientific or 
broader academic community, it would 
be rejected outright.  
Such methodological flaws are par-
ticularly curious since many of the pa-
rameters and their likely future values 
are shrouded in considerable uncer-
tainty:  carbon pricing values, variation 
in types of planned energy capacity, the 
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role of future energy prices and the 
impact of modelling CO2 output based 
solely on energy sector emissions (not 
the broader measure of GHG output or 
the impact of additional economic sec-
tors) or the impact of CCS (an as yet 
untested and undemonstrated technol-
ogy).12  
One possible comparison here is with 
the November 2007 IPCC Synthesis Re-
port. Despite flaws of its own, as an 
academic exercise it is far more flexible 
in its overall analysis and gives a far 
more accurate assessment of the overall 
degree of uncertainty in the calculations 
and estimates provided. Moreover, the 
analysis is forthright about the presence 
of uncertainty and the difficulties in 
attempting to model climate change.  
The European community’s assessment 
of the potential impact of climate 
change policy would benefit dramatically 
from such openness and transparency 
in analyzing the impact of potential 
policy orientations. The provision of in-
dividual parameters and in particular 
beta coefficients and standard errors 
would both introduce a more credible 
element to the potential range of out-
comes related to various strategy goals, 
as well as giving a more accurate sense 
of the impact of individual policy fea-
tures. The explicit advantage of report-
ing parameters such as beta coefficients 
and their related standard errors is that 
policy makers can then more accurately 
estimate the impact of variation in ex-
penditure on individual features of the 
policy toolkit as well as figure out 
which features of the policy toolkit are 
likely to have the greatest impact at the 
least cost.  
                                                            
12 In the Impact Assessment (SEC(2008)85-V2), 
carbon pricing is discussed on p. 101, variation 
in types of planned energy capacity and the use 
of CCS on p. 32, and CO2 output from the 
energy sector on p. 33. 
2.2. Awkward Assumptions and 
Omissions 
A number of awkward assumptions 
and/or exclusions in the Impact As-
sessments are likely to play a significant 
role in estimates of the final impact on 
GDP. Some of these are positive, so 
their inclusion will likely have a positive 
impact on estimates of the GDP impact 
of the EU’s climate change policy. How-
ever, not all of these elements will have 
a positive impact. Variation, for exam-
ple, in the price of carbon credits can 
have either a positive or a negative 
impact on mitigation depending on the 
direction of price movements. 
Some of the excluded features are 
surprising. In particular, the failure to 
model the potential contribution from 
re- or a-forestation (LULUCF, SEC[2008] 
85-V2:36-7) appears a significant gap in 
the assessments. Some researchers have 
noted that in Europe between 1990 and 
2005 the planting of forests in the 
EU27 absorbed an additional 11 per 
cent of continental CO2 emissions.13 
Though SEC(2008)85-V2, for example, 
notes that re- and a-forestation are 
increasingly being regulated in the con-
text of climate mitigation (p. 37), the 
exclusion of this policy element from 
the Assessment may artificially raise the 
estimate of overall GDP costs. The im-
portant point here is that the failure to 
include the planting of forests in the 
green certificate model or in the EU 
ETS models is likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the cost and ease of 
climate mitigation attempts. Presumably, 
the planting of forest represents a rela-
tively low-cost strategy for mitigating 
climate change and is one potential 
element in the overall mitigation strategy 
that should presumably be promoted. 
Further, as noted in the previous sec-
                                                            
13 Saikku, Rautiainen and Kauppi (2008). 
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tion, modelling accurately the impact of 
relevant policy features and providing 
parameter estimates and standard error 
terms for their estimated impact pro-
vides policy makers with valuable in-
formation which is unfortunately lacking 
from this report. 
The failure to model (and thus con-
sider) the role and mitigation efforts 
related to either CO2 or GHG emissions 
from the broad economy is a second 
significant exclusion. SEC(2008)85-V2, 
for example, only tracks CO2 emissions 
from the power sector (p. 33). Though 
it is true that CO2 emissions typically 
track GHG emissions (there is a very 
strong correlation between the two), 
there is nonetheless occasional country-
to-country variation. In the Netherlands, 
for example, in recent years CO2 and 
GHG emissions have moved in opposite 
directions. In the Central and East 
European countries, the share of CO2 
and GHG emissions from other high 
emission sectors, agriculture, transport 
and the public sector are presumably 
higher than in other countries. The sec-
ond crucial problem here is that coun-
tries with higher shares of energy inten-
sive industries (or larger service sectors) 
will also tend to have higher (lower) 
power sector CO2 emissions. Country-to-
country variation on these dimensions is 
likely to have a potentially large impact 
on output related to the “macroeco-
nomic and welfare implications” of allo-
cation targets, carbon values, the role 
of JI/CDM mechanisms and auctioning 
revenues (the features covered by the 
GEM-E3 model (p. 33).  
For the Central and East European 
countries, the share of CO2 and GHG 
emissions from sources other than the 
power producing sector is likely to be 
large compared to other member state 
economies. And this is presumably even 
more strongly the case as the EU’s 
Large Combustion Plant Directive has 
progressively contributed to lower SO2 
and CO2 output in the power produc-
ing sector. Though it is possible to cal-
culate these numbers, this alone would 
not be sufficient to calculate the impact 
on the model outcomes without knowing 
the required formulae and having ac-
cess to the data. Why variation in CO2 
and GHG output related to the above-
noted dimensions is not explored in the 
GEM-E3 model and thus elements of 
SEC(2008)85-V2 is at best curious. This 
is all the more true since relatively reli-
able data on country-wide CO2 and 
GHG output is clearly available. No jus-
tification for this strategy is provided in 
the Assessment. 
Working through the elements of the 
Impact Assessments and attempting to 
figure out what the overall impact is 
likely to be without access either to the 
mathematical formulae or the data used 
is complex. For one, what other fea-
tures are potentially missing from the 
formulae used in the assessments is not 
shared with the reader, nor does the 
reader have sufficient information on 
the individual parameters and standard 
error terms. For another, estimates of 
the impact of this variable are likewise 
related to the choice of policy model.  
In general, the failure to consider 
additional sources of CO2 and GHG 
output is likely to have a negative im-
pact on the side of mitigation costs. 
However, this analysis is complicated by 
the fact that mitigation costs differ 
dramatically both across the different 
sources of CO2 and GHG emissions and 
across the different types of methods 
explored to accomplish their mitigation. 
For example, variation in how mitigation 
is pursued and how it is compensated 
in the EU ETS and non-ETS sectors and 
how carbon allowances are allocated 
across these two sectors will have a 
large and significant effect on cost out-
comes. In Hungary, greatly improving 
energy efficiency, for example, in the 
public sector is likely to be a lost cost 
carbon mitigation strategy compared to 
similar efforts in EU ETS sectors. But 
whether this can be cost efficiently pur-
sued depends also on how the potential 
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allocation of allowances and the auc-
tioning of credits is structured in and 
across the ETS and non-ETS sectors. The 
following section will address potential 
impacts of variation in policy models.  
The final point raised in this section 
concerns the modelling of energy prices 
and their potential impact on mitigation 
costs. Two basic criticisms of the as-
sumptions and data output relative to 
energy costs are addressed. First, 
SEC(2008)85-V2 appears internally con-
tradictory about the impact of rising 
energy costs on overall mitigation costs. 
Page 41 points out that energy costs 
are expected to rise more rapidly in the 
less advanced EU member states (in 
particular in Central and Eastern 
Europe) and page 42 notes that the 
overall mitigation impact of rising en-
ergy costs will be higher in Hungary 
and other Central and East European 
states. On the other hand, section 
5.3.9.5 argues that the impact of rap-
idly rising energy costs (e.g. rapidly 
rising oil costs, to which we should also 
add the possibility of rapidly rising 
natural gas costs due to its relevance to 
the case of Hungary) will ‘reduce the 
costs of meeting the RES and GHG tar-
gets’ (p. 81). Though we are lacking the 
parameter estimates on these variables, 
there appears to be a general contra-
diction between these two observations. 
The second criticism regarding en-
ergy prices concerns the amount of the 
potential rise in energy costs, inade-
quate modelling of this potential rise 
across diverse energy sources and their 
ultimate impact on mitigation costs. 
Hungarian wholesale electricity costs 
have risen quite rapidly in recent years. 
Moreover, some critics14 argue that ar-
gue that wholesale electricity costs in 
Hungary have risen as much as 60 per 
                                                            
14 See, for example, recent comments from the 
CEO of E.ON in Hungary and a representative 
from the Chamber of Commerce. These com-
ments were made at a recent energy conference 
“Az energiapiaci liberalizáció hazai tapasztalatai” 
(Feb. 22nd, 2008). Cite info on participant com-
ments… 
cent over the past year alone. In the 
recent past oil costs have likewise risen 
far beyond expectations (though insuffi-
cient detail is provided on this point in 
the Impact Assessment) and the level of 
Hungarian dependence on natural gas 
threatens to result in similar outcomes. 
To the extent it is accurate to say en-
ergy costs have risen and are rising 
more rapidly than predicted in the as-
sessment, at least two important conclu-
sions can be drawn. For one, energy 
costs in Hungary are likely to continue 
rising and continuously increasing en-
ergy dependence (in particular with 
respect to oil and natural gas) means 
that energy costs will presumably only 
continue to rise in the future. For an-
other and perhaps more importantly, it 
is logical to conclude that the persistent 
rise in current and future energy costs 
in Hungary (and elsewhere) will only 
continue to make a shift to renewables 
and increasing energy efficiency more 
and more attractive. Such observations 
should encourage a rapid shift away 
from fossil fuels toward renewable en-
ergy sources.15 
3) THE LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 
Of the various elements of the policy 
palette proposed as part of the EU’s 
2020 Climate Change Package, this 
analysis focuses primarily only on dis-
cussion of the distribution of burden-
sharing across countries (and in par-
                                                            
15 An important contrast here is the strategy 
currently pursued by some Middle Eastern oil-
producing states. Based on the calculation that 
about 50 years of oil supply remains, these 
countries themselves are already rapidly invest-
ing in alternative energy sources. While the EU’s 
current plan envisions a 50 per cent reduction 
in GHG output by 2050, the Middle Eastern 
plan envisions the more or less complete deple-
tion of oil resources by approximately 2060. 
This would suggest that the EU plan is still far 
too conservative with respect to energy security. 
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ticular the effect of the choice of a 
2005 base year), on possible modifica-
tions of the EU ETS system (in particu-
lar how allowances are allocated and 
credits auctioned across ETS and non-
ETS sectors), and finally a discussion of 
the GO green certificate system (in par-
ticular its general effectiveness as a 
policy tool, its compatibility with na-
tional-level incentive systems, its potential 
impact on both the relative diversity of 
renewable resources and its related im-
pact on the problems of base load 
power, grid load and energy security). 
The final sections of the paper address 
the question of the potential economic 
impact of the policy package on Hun-
gary. The decision to focus on topical 
issues outlined above derives from the 
fact that there is relatively less contro-
versy across countries concerning other 
features of the proposed policy package 
and comparatively less of an impact on 
Hungarian interests. 
3.1. The Individual Pieces of the 
Legislative Package (Directive 
Proposals and Impact          
Assessments):                                                   
(Initial Analysis of COM[2008]11, 
COM[2008]13, COM[2008]18, 
COM[2008]19) 
The analysis of each of the individual 
legislative proposals and impact assess-
ments is organized by topical theme 
rather than by each of the individual 
pieces of legislation and their respective 
impact assessments. The analysis thus 
focuses in particular on those points 
requiring the most urgent attention: the 
base year problem, the strict division 
between ETS and non-ETS sectors (as 
well as the related importance of both 
energy efficiency and transport), and 
discussion of EU and national-level in-
centives systems for promoting the use 
of renewables. 
This notwithstanding, this section 
briefly addresses the other documents 
and topics that make up part of the 
overall 2020 Climate Change Package. 
Some of these documents (e.g. 
COM[2008]11 assessing those National 
Energy Efficiency Action Plans that have 
been submitted by the member states) 
are not of great significance in the 
overall analysis. While the issue of en-
ergy efficiency and the role it could 
play in both the EU and national level 
strategies for emission reductions is 
highly significant, this issue is best 
raised in the context of the discussion 
on the ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
COM(2008)11, in particular because it 
raises no significant or meaningful is-
sues requiring further debate or discus-
sion. This report generally supports the 
overall goal of energy efficiency raised 
in the document and discusses further 
details regarding energy efficiency po-
tential and the division across ETS and 
non-ETS sectors below. 
COM(2008)13 and COM(2008)18 es-
sentially discuss the potential role of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) and 
its research and development in the EU. 
Whether the EU should pursue this 
avenue and how much of the EU’s or 
individual member state resources 
should be spent on it is problematic at 
best. Coal itself represents an abundant 
and comparatively cheap resource in the 
EU and elsewhere. However, as is well 
known, its exploitation is one of the 
principal causes of CO2 output. While 
the CCS theory is compelling, to-date 
there are no real life examples of this 
technological solution. Moreover, its 
development potentially lies so far off in 
the future that it would be virtually 
meaningless to pursue. The MIT (2007) 
study: The Future of Coal remains skep-
tical about CCS potential. While this 
reports support further R&D efforts in 
this area, it is questionable whether 
considerable EU resources should be 
dedicated to such a project at this time 
– especially when other clean technolo-
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gies are currently available. Moreover, 
the CCS strategy is presumably most 
appealing to those states with significant 
coal resources (in particular, the UK, 
Poland and to some extent Germany).16 
Further, some attention must be de-
voted to the discussion of biofuels. 
Though the European Commission has 
devoted considerable attention to biofu-
els and has promoted a 10 per cent 
use of biofuels in the fuel mix (this is 
treated in particular in COM(2008)19 
final on the “Promotion of the Use of 
Energy from Renewable Sources”, biofu-
els have increasingly been attacked from 
virtually all directions. Of particular 
interest was the recent report by the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) 
arguing that the EU should drop this 
goal from its strategy palette.17  
The authors of the current report 
support this general view. Biofuels ap-
pear to represent an insurmountable 
obstacle for a number of reasons. The 
central problem is that demand for bio-
fuel crops raises the price of other ag-
ricultural products, leading to excessive 
inflation of primary foodstuffs (wheat, 
flour, bread, meat, etc.). Moreover, this 
relationship appears to hold even if the 
raw material used for biofuels does not 
itself compete directly with food sector 
products (while corn can be used both 
by the biofuels industry and the food 
sector, other so-called “second-
generation” and “cellulosic” biofuel 
crops are primarily destined for the 
biofuels sector). Even when the biofuel 
raw material is not directly required in 
food production, the raw materials still 
compete for arable land, thus again 
driving up the price of agricultural 
                                                            
16 Oddly the Netherlands, with no meaningful 
coal resources to speak of, has decided to de-
vote considerable research effort to CCS (see 
e.g. Ecofys, 2007: “Making CCS Work: Large-
Scale Carbon Capture and Storage in the Neth-
erlands”). 
17 See  
http://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/suspend-10-
percent-biofuels-target-says-eeas-scientific-
advisory-body  
products. Moreover, further price in-
creases are likely to be propelled by the 
US Energy Bill passed in December 
2008 and which dedicated substantial 
resources to the biofuels industry. In 
addition to the EEA, several other inter-
national organizations have all called 
attention to the problem of rising agri-
cultural prices and the threat this poses 
for the world’s poor – not to mention 
the average consumer in Central and 
Eastern Europe.18 Though other factors 
are also to blame for rising agricultural 
prices (international stock market specu-
lation on commodities, global economic 
growth, changing food habits and rising 
fuel and fertilizer prices), rising demand 
for biofuel raw material appears to 
play a big role. 
In Hungary (and other countries), 
one can also add the problem of rising 
temperatures and thus climate change 
into the overall equation for rising agri-
cultural prices. Overall inflation in 
Hungary has been strongly driven by 
food price inflation which some have 
associated with higher summer tempera-
tures and the resulting decline in agri-
cultural output.19 Since higher summer 
temperatures in Hungary (and else-
where) are generally seen as an out-
come of global warming, one can ex-
pect this situation to repeat itself on a 
somewhat regular basis in Hungary 
(and elsewhere). Although individual 
years may still see abundant crops (e.g. 
at this writing 2008 is predicted to be 
a good year for Hungarian agriculture), 
on average, countries should expect to 
see higher summer temperatures and 
declining agricultural yields. This fact, 
                                                            
18 See, for example, the World Food Programme. 
(http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key
=2820), the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation 
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/10
00826/index.html) and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute  
(http://www.ifpri.org/presentations/20080411jvbfo
odprices.pdf).  
19 See “Summer Sun Seen Scorching Bio-ethanol 
Prospects, Fuelling Inflation in Hungary” (Portfo-
lio.hu, July 27th, 2007). 
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combined with the problems posed by 
demand for biofuel raw material (and 
one should include demand biomass 
material in this discussion), is likely to 
pose significant problems both for fu-
ture Hungarian, European and world 
agricultural prices and raises significant 
questions about “sustainability”.  
For these reasons we predict that the 
EU’s current emphasis on biofuels is not 
sustainable and will soon be abandoned. 
Moreover, it does not appear to be in 
Hungary’s general interest to pursue 
further biofuels production – in particu-
lar at this time. Heavy investment in 
biofuels will turn out to be very costly 
if and when this path is abandoned by 
the European Union. 
One additional issue requires atten-
tion in this section. Though current dis-
cussion of the problems of “black car-
bon” or soot have not yet filtered down 
into the European Union’s climate 
change discussion and policy agenda, 
this issue is likely to be of future sig-
nificance.20 Thus, although the Commis-
sion’s policy package does not mention 
this problem, it should be considered in 
the general context of and climate 
change policies that are ultimately 
adopted. 
Black carbon, or the particulate mat-
ter resulting from the combustion of 
fossil fuels (in particular coal, diesel, 
biomass and biofuels), has been linked 
to global warming and is likely to be 
increasingly emphasized both in aca-
demic research and in the policy arena. 
This point is above all important be-
cause much of the European policy 
agenda is focused on support for diesel 
(and biodiesel) and biomass (whether 
solid or other forms) as future potential 
and either “renewable” or CO2-friendly 
energy sources. In Hungary, for exam-
ple, the principal share of renewable 
electricity production (about 70 per 
cent) is from (solid) biomass and ap-
                                                            
20 See, in particular, Ramanathan and Carmi-
chael (2008). 
proximately 90 per cent of Hungarian 
renewable energy derives from bio-
mass.21 Some of the black carbon out-
put from these various sources can be 
minimized with the installation of filter-
ing devices. This is the case, for exam-
ple, with renewable biomass energy 
production. The installation of filters 
(where these are not already present) 
however will entail additional future 
costs. How this problem can be ad-
dressed for diesel and biodiesel fuels 
remains unclear. 
The remaining Commission documents 
(COM[2008]16, 17, 19 and their respec-
tive Impact Assessments) are treated in 
the context of the thematic discussion 
appearing the following sections.  
4) THE CHOICE OF BASE YEAR 
(1990 OR 2005)? 
The 2020 Climate Change Package in-
corporates a shift from the original 
1990 base year adopted in the Kyoto 
Protocol to a new base year, 2005. As 
illustrated by the country positions re-
ported in Annex A,22 virtually all 
CEEC’s are opposed. None of the Com-
mission documents reviewed either dis-
cuss or justify in meaningful detail the 
shift to a 2005 base year. Though the 
2005 base year is mentioned in the 
European Commission’s Impact Assess-
ment (SEC[2008]85-V2) and other 
documents, the real impact is neither 
revealed nor analyzed, essentially paper-
ing over the potentially large and sig-
nificant impact on the cost of mitigation 
in the CEEC’s and in those few Western 
countries that have already made sig-
                                                            
21 See Hungary’s Renewable Energy Strategy, 
2007–2020. 
22 The Annex includes the positions of the 17 
countries who had posted position papers with 
the European Council’s Consilium website by the 
time of writing.  
30 
nificant progress in reducing GHG emis-
sions. 
For a document that intends to 
measure and weigh the total impact of 
the 2020 Climate Change Package and 
ultimately justify the distribution of 
burden-sharing across countries, this 
fact is shocking. Reference is clearly 
made in the Impact Assessment to the 
need to place less of a burden on the 
less advanced states in order to meet 
the 2020 target goals: “This will require 
developed countries to continue to take 
the lead in cutting their greenhouse gas 
emissions and efforts by developing 
countries to significantly reduce their 
emissions before 2020” (p. 16). The 
choice of the 2005 base year for de-
termining required GHG emission reduc-
tions appears to obliterate these good 
intentions. 
The choice of the 2005 base year for 
the second round of proposed GHG 
emission reductions up through 2020 
sends a rude message to the majority 
of the new member states and to those 
Western states that have likewise man-
aged to make progress in reducing 
emissions. As illustrated in Figure 3, all 
of the CEEC’s (except for Slovenia) and 
a several Western countries (Greece, 
Finland, Sweden, the UK and France) 
are significantly hurt by the choice of 
the 2005 base year. The total gain or 
loss in tons of CO2 equivalent resulting 
from the change in base year is calcu-
lated for individual states. To provide a 
sense of the magnitude, this number is 
then divided by each country’s 1990 
GHG output.  
The findings seem out of keeping 
with the concept of burden sharing. 
Given that the enlargement essentially 
saved Western Europe from having to 
meet its Kyoto targets, there is consid-
erable irony in this outcome. The East-
Figure 3
Change in Total 2020 Target Burden with 2005 Base Year 
(Gain/Loss divided by 1990 GHG Output, Option 4) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UNFCC reported GHG emissions data (UNFCC registry), 2012 Kyoto 
Targets for EU member states (EEA, 2007) and the 2020 targets reported in the Impact Assessment. 
We thank Kornél Varsányi for providing foundational data. 
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ern Enlargement provided Western 
states with a cheap source for purchas-
ing carbon credits, saving them from 
having to make far more considerable 
investments in renewables, energy effi-
ciency and GHG reductions (in whatever 
form; JI/CDM or in the domestic mar-
ket). Setting low emission reduction tar-
gets for the Eastern states and over-
allocating emission credits to domestic 
firms in Western states provided plenti-
ful and cheap solutions to potentially 
costly Kyoto goals. Moreover, those 
countries that made the most progress 
on their Kyoto targets will pay the 
price. 
This point is best represented in Fig-
ure 4, which illustrates a very strong 
correlation between the change in the 
2020 target based on the 2005 base 
year and overall change in GHG emis-
sions between 1990 and 2005. More 
rigorous investigation provides further 
support for these findings even when 
important control variables (per capita 
GDP, energy intensity and a per capita 
target model are added to the regres-
sion analysis.23 Countries that reduced 
emissions received higher targets 
(greater negative burdens) while coun-
tries that raised emissions received 
lower targets (or higher positive bur-
dens). Though the CEECs were “re-
warded” for their progress – they were 
able to sell surplus carbon credits – 
this revenue stream will presumably be 
diminished in the second stage of the 
climate mitigation strategy from 2013-
2020. Though the price has varied 
dramatically, estimates suggest that 
Hungary could take in anywhere from 
0.8 to 1.7 billion euros by 2012 from 
its sale of carbon credits. Most of these 
revenues are spent on energy saving 
investments in the residential sector.24 
                                                            
23 For more detail, see Ellison (2008). 
24 See, for example, “Az EBRD szén-dioxid 
krediteket venne Magyarországtól” (HVG, Mar. 
26th, 2008) and “Nagy a tolongás Magyarország 
szén-dioxid-kvóttájáért” (Magyar Nemzet Online, 
Mar. 26th, 2008). 
Figure 4
Change in Target Due to Base Year Compared to Change in Emissions 
 
Source: change in emissions data from Table 1 and change in target data from Figure 3. 
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With respect to the general EU Cli-
mate Change Package, it is incumbent 
upon the framers of this policy pro-
posal – at the very least – to provide 
adequate analysis and explanation for 
this dramatic shift in policy orientation. 
Moreover, this analysis raises important 
questions about the potential impact of 
the 2020 targets on the future eco-
nomic growth and convergence aspira-
tions of the less advanced states. Since 
this issue is neither raised nor really 
discussed in the Impact Assessment, it 
seems unlikely its overall impact on 
future economic growth is adequately 
modelled or even measured. 
At least part of this shift to the 
2005 base year is driven by external 
considerations. In the broader interna-
tional negotiations over a new Kyoto 
package, in particular for a broad 
range of less developed countries, 2005 
data is considered more reliable than 
1990 data.25 However, given that the 
EU has the necessary institutional setting 
with which to make more reasonable 
allocations of the GHG burden across 
states, it makes little sense to reward 
past poor performers. It is possible 
however to opt for the 2005 base year 
and to make reasonable adjustments to 
individual country targets that provide 
for a more equitable distribution of the 
burden across EU member states. 
                                                            
25 Interview with the Hungarian Ministry of the 
Economy. Ministry representatives make the 
argument that, due to problems of measurement 
and data reliability in earlier years, a 1990 
base year will be unacceptable in international 
negotiations. 
5) THE ALLOCATION AND           
AUCTIONING OF CREDITS ACROSS 
ETS SECTORS, NON-ETS SECTORS 
AND STATES                                              
(ANALYSIS OF COM[2008]16,  
SEC[2008]52 AND 
SEC[2008]85-V2) 
As expressed in individual member state 
positions on the 2020 Climate Change 
Package, several countries would like to 
see more flexibility across EU ETS and 
non-ETS sectors. For the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, such flexi-
bility could represent a potential asset. 
This is above all the case since im-
provements in energy efficiency are 
likely to bring a far greater return in 
non-ETS sectors than in ETS sectors. 
This does not mean there are no firms 
that could produce significant returns 
on investments in energy efficiency and 
reducing CO2 emissions. But since the 
crucial issue in the Impact Assessment 
(SEC[2008]85-V2) is the cost efficiency 
of mitigation efforts and their overall 
impact on GDP, it is obviously more 
advantageous to make energy saving 
and emissions’ reducing investments 
where they will have the biggest impact 
and largest marginal return. 
While there is a definable logic to 
the current ETS system, it is question-
able whether this is the best strategy 
for the Central and East European 
countries. For one, these countries have 
already made quite drastic cuts in their 
overall emissions, including CO2 and 
GHG emissions. For another, in per cap-
ita terms, Central and East European 
emissions levels on average are far be-
low Western levels. While the energy 
intensity of GDP in Central and Eastern 
Europe remains well above Western 
levels, we know substantially less about 
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how different levels of inefficiency are 
distributed across different sectors of 
the public and private economy. Ex-
pressed in simple terms, there is a sub-
stantially large and growing new seg-
ment of the economy that for the most 
part is likely to use energy compara-
tively efficiently. Western investors in 
particular have installed new plants and 
physical capital in Hungary and else-
where in Central and Eastern Europe 
that, on average, is far more efficient 
than remaining segments of the econ-
omy. However, due to the introduction 
of market principles, the rapid rise of 
energy costs in Hungary has led many 
domestic firms to make energy saving 
investments. 
In the public sector however, in part 
because of the lack of both foreign and 
domestic investment, there has been far 
less change. Studies of the potential 
opportunities for investments in energy 
efficiency in the building sector in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe suggest that 
energy use per square meter is consid-
erably higher than in Western Europe 
(ECOFYS, 2006). As illustrated in Table 
4, though the non-ETS sector contributes 
significantly to total GHG output, under 
the option 1 allocation of ETS sector 
targets (SEC[2008]85-V2:58), only the 
Table 4
Share of Non-ETS Sectors in Total CO2 Emissions,  
Non-ETS 2020 Targets and Services as a Share of GDP 
(per cent) 
 
 
Size of Services Sector 
(Share of GDP in 2005) 
Non-ETS Share of  
Total CO2 Output (2005) Non-ETS 2020 Target 
Denmark 74.0 58.6 -20 
Ireland 60.0 67.9 -20 
Luxembourg 82.7 79.6 -20 
Sweden 70.5 71.1 -17 
Austria 67.8 64.2 -16 
Finland 66.7 52.2 -16 
Netherlands 74.0 62.1 -16 
United Kingdom 73.7 63.1 -16 
Belgium 74.2 61.5 -15 
France 76.3 76.3 -14 
Germany 69.8 52.6 -14 
Italy 70.2 61.1 -13 
Spain 67.3 58.3 -10 
Cyprus na 49.0 -5 
Greece 73.1 48.8 -4 
Portugal 71.7 57.4 1 
Slovenia 62.4 57.0 4 
Malta na 41.0 5 
Czech Republic 59.3 43.4 9 
Hungary 65.1 67.5 10 
Estonia 66.9 39.7 11 
Slovakia 66.7 47.3 13 
Poland 64.0 49.3 14 
Lithuania 61.5 70.7 15 
Latvia 73.3 73.4 17 
Romania 50.7 53.9 19 
Bulgaria 58.0 42.0 20 
Source: Service sector data from the World Development Indicators online database, remaining data 
based on data presented in the Impact Assessment. We thank Kornél Varsányi for providing foun-
dational data. 
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Western states are required (or able) to 
make significant improvements in energy 
efficiency in the non-ETS sector. For the 
Central and East European countries, 
this strategy ultimately means that all of 
their GHG reduction efforts must be 
concentrated on the ETS sectors. In light 
of the above discussion, this makes little 
sense. For Hungary, the non-ETS sector 
represents almost 70 per cent of GHG 
output. Moreover, the requirement of 
putting all of Hungary’s efforts into 
reducing GHG output in the ETS sectors 
means that all efforts are focused on 
an increasingly small share of the econ-
omy. 
The strategy of imposing a strict di-
vision between ETS and non-ETS sectors 
seems ill-suited to the pursuit of cost-
efficient strategies for reducing GHG 
emissions and achieving the general 
2020 Climate Change Package targets. 
Moreover, given the very rudimentary 
data presented herein, it again seems 
highly unlikely that the various options 
presented in the Impact Assessment rep-
resent the best possible and most cost 
efficient strategies for individual coun-
tries to pursue – in particular the Cen-
tral and East European countries. Even 
though one can expect the service sec-
tor to grow in size in Central and 
Eastern Europe in coming years (assum-
ing these countries follow similar devel-
opment trajectories to those in Western 
Europe), this does not mean that great 
improvements in energy efficiency can-
not be achieved in the non-ETS sector. 
Moreover, placing all the emphasis on 
emission reductions in the ETS sectors 
will likely diminish attempts to improve 
energy efficiency since these are not 
directly rewarded by the structure of 
the proposed policy approach. 
Most disconcerting is the fact that 
the Impact Assessments ultimately do 
not consider or assess a sufficient range 
of alternative models (SEC[2008]85-
V2:56). As proposed by at least a cou-
ple of member states (see the respective 
country position table, Appendix A), a 
system of free allocation and/or auc-
tioning across ETS and non-ETS sectors 
would give individual states more flexi-
bility to promote emission reductions 
wherever they are the most cost effec-
tive. Moreover, the ability to sell (auc-
tion) carbon credits across states could 
potentially provide more incentive to 
undertake such investments. Precisely 
why such rigidity across ETS and non-
ETS sectors should be introduced, or 
why states should not be immediately 
able to auction carbon credits is not 
immediately clear from the assessment. 
Moreover, such “rigidity” seems likely 
to cause significant problems where 
“new installations” and the emergence 
of potential “growth constraints” are 
possible outcomes. Though the interest 
in documenting “verifiable” emissions’ 
reductions is an important issue, it is 
possible that this problem can be re-
solved in other ways. 
5.1. On the Role and               
Importance of Energy Efficiency, 
Buildings, the Non-ETS Sector 
and Energy Security 
Before entering into a discussion of 
energy efficiency, we propose a reor-
ganization of the typical strategy for 
breaking down sectors by the share of 
their contribution to GHG emissions. 
Most work (see, for example, EK, 2008 
submitted as a supplement to this re-
port) typically organizes the breakdown 
of contributors to GHG emissions in 
terms of industry, transport, residential, 
trade and commerce, agriculture and 
other sources (Diagram 2). Given the 
different ways in which emissions are 
generated, however, it is potentially 
more meaningful to think about emis-
sions in terms of production process-
related emissions (hereafter process 
emissions) and emissions that are related 
to the maintenance and upkeep of 
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buildings (hereafter building-related 
emissions), in particular heating, lighting 
and hot water. In the first category – 
process emissions – the EU has divided 
up production processes into ETS and 
non-ETS processes, i.e. those that are 
CO2 or GHG intensive and those that 
are not.  
In the second category – building-
related emissions – there is a common 
tendency to focus most attention on 
residential buildings (apartments and 
single-family households). However, this 
report argues that the “building sector” 
should generally be conceived broadly 
to include all building types. Thus, in 
this second category (building-related 
emissions), buildings can be divided up 
into several types; industrial and com-
mercial (the manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail sector), public use (hospitals, 
schools, municipalities) and residential 
(for the most part, single family house-
holds and apartment buildings).26 
                                                            
26 Another common typology, that between end-
users and those who produce the energy, is not 
entirely compatible with the typology generated 
Though much of the literature on po-
tential energy efficiency often clouds 
over or confuses these distinctions, one 
must realize that the discussion of 
buildings and energy efficiency com-
prises a much larger sphere than just 
the “residential” or “household” sector. 
All buildings – whether commercial, 
public use or residential – use energy 
and thus are responsible for CO2 and 
GHG emissions. Thus, the promotion of 
energy efficiency in buildings must con-
front the broad range of commercial, 
public use and residential buildings. 
Two basic problems with the EU 
strategy immediately emerge from this 
categorization of the relevant emission 
categories. First, the typologies of proc-
ess and building-related emissions cut 
across the EU ETS and non-ETS catego-
ries in ways that may have relevance 
                                                                                        
above. But more importantly, it typically makes 
the mistake of separating the concept of use 
from that of direct on-site emissions. While this 
is true for a large share of emissions – electric-
ity-generation and electricity-use are effectively 
separated in this way – this does not apply to 
natural gas use. 
Diagram 1
Household Energy Use by Type 
 
 
Source: from the EK supplement (2008: p. 15), our translation. 
Heating; 5940%
Hot water (incl. 
pre-heating); 840%
Cooking; 560%
Refridgeration; 
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Lighting; 54%
PC, video, 
audio; 45% Dishwashers, Washing machines; 
67%
Other electronic 
appliances; 191%
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for policy-making and the development 
of meaningful strategies of climate miti-
gation. The way the ETS system is cur-
rently set up, only process-related en-
ergy efficiency is directly addressed. 
Building-related energy efficiency is only 
indirectly affected by the ETS system: 
rising energy costs associated with the 
impact of the ETS on electricity prices 
should motivate both individuals and 
producers to improve building-related 
energy efficiency. In the ETS sector it-
self, however, producers will presuma-
bly face stronger incentives to invest in 
process-related efficiency, since this will 
have the greatest direct and immediate 
impact on total emissions and thus the 
required share of allowances they will 
have to purchase on the open market. 
Second, while EU policy essentially 
focuses on process-related emissions 
related to the ETS sector, it essentially 
fails to address the second category of 
building-related emissions. Though, as 
noted above, the category of build-
related emissions cuts across the EU ETS 
and non-ETS categories, the vast major-
ity of building related emissions lie out-
side the ETS sector. Yet, with some ca-
veats raised below, the Commission’s 
2020 Climate Change Package essentially 
ignores the potential importance of the 
non-ETS sector. 
Building-related emissions should be 
considered more seriously in the Com-
mission’s 2020 Climate Change Package 
for two basic reasons: for one, tremen-
dous GHG reduction potential is avail-
able in the non-ETS sector and for an-
other a comparatively small share of the 
total GHG reduction potential affects the 
demand for electricity. As is immediately 
clear from EnergiaKlub’s Diagram 1, a 
very large share of energy use is re-
lated to heating and hot water (ap-
proximately 87 per cent), most of which 
depends on the use of natural gas 
(though a much smaller share still de-
pends on wood-burning, coal and to 
some extent the electricity use associated 
with small space heaters and the like). 
According to Novikova and Ürge-
Vorsatz, some 94 per cent of residential 
heating in Hungary is based on natural 
gas (2007:37).27 At the same time, some 
caution is necessary in considering the 
diagram below. For one, as noted in 
the source information, the data repre-
sented is based on a wider reference 
area than Hungary. But more impor-
tantly, as noted above, the building sec-
tor is ultimately much larger than just 
the household or residential sector.28 
Ideally data providing us with a clear 
sense of energy reduction potential 
across the entire building sector as de-
fined above would be preferable. 
                                                            
27 Some caution is necessary with respect to this 
figure. The Hungarian Meteorological Office, 
for example, reports that; “In the structure of 
communal energy use natural gas represents 
67.4 per cent. 70 per cent of households and 
institutions are supplied with natural gas” 
(OMSZ, 2008:36). Finally, though district heating 
is responsible for a significant share of heating 
in Hungary, most district heating is again based 
on natural gas (see e.g. the relevant documenta-
tion from the Hungarian Energia Hivatal). Note 
also that not all EU member states are the same 
in this regard. In Finland and Sweden, heating 
is generally based on electricity rather than 
natural gas (Eurostat, 2007:116). 
28 While the EnergiaKlub study attached as a 
supplement to this report does provide similar 
data for the tertiary or services sector, no such 
diagrams or corresponding building-related data 
are provided for the transport or manufactur-
ing sectors. This does not appear to be an 
uncommon omission in studies of this type. 
Despite the fact that the Novikova and Ürge-
Vorsatz paper, cited as one of the principal 
sources in the EnergiaKlub study, focuses pri-
marily on energy efficiency and CO2/GHG emis-
sion reductions related to buildings, it oddly 
discusses only the residential sector.  
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The significance of the above obser-
vations is complex. For one, the biggest 
returns on reduction in energy use de-
pend significantly on the type of energy 
use affected. Thus, for example, CO2 
and GHG emissions’ reductions are 
likely to be higher where these result 
from the production of coal or oil-
based electricity generation. While re-
ducing the use of natural gas likewise 
has an impact on CO2 and GHG emis-
sions’ reductions, targeting electricity 
generation (especially where the mix of 
coal and oil-based electricity generation 
is greater) will have a significantly 
greater impact on overall CO2 and 
GHG emissions. This is clearly expressed 
in Table 5. Assuming that the carbon 
content of coal and natural gas does 
not differ dramatically across the US 
and Europe, the carbon content coeffi-
cient of coal, for example, results in 
the fact that (averaging across the 4 
different coal varieties: 26.635/16.99 
=1.57) approximately one and a half 
times more CO2 output is produced 
per energy unit of coal than per energy 
unit of natural gas. 
Table 5
Conversion Factors to Energy Units (Heat Equivalents)  
Heat Contents and Carbon Content Coefficients of Various Fuel Types 
 
Fuel Type Heat Content 
Carbon Content 
Coefficients 
(Tg Carbon/QBtu) 
Fraction Oxidized 
Solid Fuels Million Btu/Short Ton  
Anthracite Coal 22.57 28.26 0.99
Bituminous Coal 23.89 25.49 0.99
Sub-bituminous Coal 17.14 26.48 0.99
Lignite 12.87 26.30 0.99
Coke 24.80 31.00 0.99
Unspecified 25.00 25.34 0.99
Gas Fuels Btu/Cubic Foot  
Natural Gas 1,030 14.47 0.995
Liquid Fuels Million Btu/Barrel  
Crude Oil 5.80 20.33 0.99
Natural Gas Liquids and LRGs 3.72 16.99 0.995
Motor Gasoline 5.22 19.33 1.00*
Aviation Gasoline 5.05 18.87 0.99
Kerosene 5.67 19.72 0.99
Jet Fuel 5.67 19.33 0.99
Distillate Fuel 5.83 19.95 0.99
Residual Fuel  6.29 21.49 0.99
Naphiha for Petrofeed 5.25 18.14 0.99
Petroleum Coke 6.02 27.85 0.99
Other Oil for Petrofeed 5.83 19.95 0.99
Special Naphihas 5.25 19.86 0.99
Lubricants 6.07 20.24 0.99
Waxes 5.54 19.81 0.99
Asphalt & Road Oil 6.64 20.62 0.99
Still Gas 6.00 17.51 0.99
Misc. Products 5.80 20.33 0.99
Note: For fuels with variable heat comments and carbon content coefficients, 2004 U.S. average 
values are presented. All factors are presented in gross calorific values (GCV) (i.e. higher heating 
values). 
* Fraction oxidized for motor gasoline is 1.00 in the transportation sector, 0.99 in other sectors. 
Source: U.S. EPA, “The US Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emission Sinks: Fast Facts” (April 2006). 
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On the other hand, Hungary has a 
comparatively high input of nuclear 
power in the energy mix along with 
significant shares of natural gas, a fair 
amount of goal and some solid biomass 
and oil. In 2005, for example, some 
73.7 per cent of Hungarian electricity 
was produced using nuclear power and 
natural gas (Table 6). Only a much 
smaller share (19.6 per cent) was pro-
duced using coal as the principal en-
ergy source. This ultimately means that 
electricity generation is less carbon in-
tensive in Hungary than the use of 
natural gas alone.29 Looking at the data 
presented in Table 6, this assumption 
turns out to be true. Compared to elec-
tricity, the use of natural gas is ap-
proximately (16.99/11.43=1.49) 1.49 
times as carbon intensive as electricity 
use. Using the OMSZ numbers, one 
arrives at similar results (56.1/41.11 
=1.36). Natural gas use in Hungary is 
1.36 times as carbon intensive as elec-
tricity use. This point is particular im-
portant, since perhaps the most com-
mon perception when talking about in-
creasing energy efficiency or reducing 
energy use is that this involves reduced 
electricity use. Few will think first of 
focusing on the reduction of natural 
gas use and certainly not as the princi-
pal strategy. 
As pointed out in Table 6 below, EU 
member states vary dramatically with 
respect to the cumulative average de-
gree of carbon intensity of electricity 
generation. Though the numbers noted 
in Table 6 neglect both the relative 
“thermal efficiency” of electricity gen-
eration and “life-cycle emissions”, the 
general point is that an emphasis on 
building-related energy efficiency and 
the reduction of natural gas use in 
particular could have a potentially sig-
nificant impact on reducing overall GHG 
                                                            
29 This is likely to be true in other countries as 
well, in particular those that have significant 
shares of either nuclear power, hydro or re-
newable electricity generation. However, no 
calculations concerning other countries have 
been undertaken for this study. 
emissions in some countries, in particu-
lar those at the lower end of the scale 
of the cumulative average carbon inten-
sity of electricity generation. In addition, 
as illustrated in Table 7, Hungary uses 
a higher share of natural gas in the 
national energy mix than almost any 
other EU member state except the Neth-
erlands (43.3 per cent and 43.6 per 
cent respectively). Though the share of 
natural gas use is on the rise across 
the EU, the EU 27 average share of 
natural gas in the energy mix is 24.5 
per cent. 
Though relative thermal efficiency 
certainly matters, two points must be 
emphasized here. For one, relative ther-
mal efficiency matters much less than 
the potential to introduce big changes 
in relative thermal efficiency with up-
date technology (whether these occur in 
electricity generation, ETS sector firms, 
or in building-related energy use). For 
Hungary, apart from the recent phe-
nomenon of increasing use of co-
generation, much of this potential to 
introduce big changes lies in building-
related energy use. For another, the 
role of life-cycle emissions is potentially 
important. Fritsche for example notes 
that in Germany, Russian natural gas 
use, due presumably to long transport 
routes and aging technology, is ap-
proximately 7 times more carbon inten-
sive than domestic natural gas re-
sources. 
The third point requiring clarification 
concerns the relative importance of en-
ergy security. While there are strong 
incentives, due to the related reduction 
in CO2 output,30 to shift energy pro-
duction from coal and oil to natural 
gas, the shift to natural gas likewise 
raises the level of energy dependence. 
In Hungary, both the relative share of  
 
                                                            
30 One meaningful way of understanding this 
point is that the shift from a coal-burning to a 
gas burning power plant results in an ap-
proximately 50 per cent reduction in total CO2 
output. 
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Table 6 
Cumulative Average Carbon Intensity of Electricity Generation, Selected Countries 
(1990-2005) 
 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
 
France 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
EPA 
Carbon 
Content 
Coefficient 
(tC02/QBTU)
OMSZ 
Carbon 
Content 
Coefficient 
(tC02/TJ) 
Coal (% TWh) 1.2% l.6% 1.1% 0.4% Coal (% TWh) 7.5% 4.9% 5.1% 4.8% 26.6 104.7
Oil (% TWh) 0.8% 2.7% 1.2% 0.9% Oil (% TWh) 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 20.3 73.34
Gas (% TWh) 0.3% 0.9% 1.0% 0.8% Gas (% TWh) 1.7% 1.2% 2.8% 4.5% 17.0 56.1
Nuclear (% TWh) 46.4% 47.1% 39.4% 45.7% Nuclear (% TWh) 74.6% 76.4% 76.7% 78.4% 0.0 0.0
Renewables (% TWh) 50.8% 47.6% 57.2% 51.8% Renewables (% TWh) 13.2% 15.3% 13.2% 10.1% 0.0 0.0
Other (% Wh) 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% Other (% TWh) I.0% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 0.0 0.0
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
0.53 1.13 0.71 0.43 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
2.69 1.83 2.10 2.32  
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ) 1.99 4.18 2.59 1.53 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ) 10.27 6.97 7.85 8.55  
 
Hungary 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 EU 27 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
Coal (%TWh) 30.0% 26.6% 27.3% 19.6% Coal (% TWh) 35.9% 34.7% 30.6% 28.4%
Oil (% TWh) 4.7% 15.5% 12.5% 1.3% Oil (% TWh) 8.3% 8.2% 6.0% 4.2%
Gas (% TWh) 16.3% 16.0% 19.1% 35.0% Gas (% TWh) 8.4% 10.8% 17.0% 21.0%
Nuclear (% TWh) 48.2% 41.1% 40.3% 38.7% Nuclear (% TWh) 30.8% 32.3% 31.3% 30.2%
Renewables (% TWh) 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 5.4% Renewables (% TWh) 12.0% 13.0% 14.0% 14.0%
Other (% TWh) 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% Other (% TWh) 4.7% 1.0% 1.2% 2.3%
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
11.72 12.96 13.05 11.43 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
48.38 48.38 45.95 44.57 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ) 44.04 48.22 48.44 41.11 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ)     
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Poland 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
Estonia 
 
Elec. Generation (source) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
Coal (% TWh) 95.6% 94.7% 93.6% 91.4% Coal (% TWh) 86.8% 96.4% 90.2% 91.2%
Oil (% TWh) 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% Oil (% TWh) 8.4% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3%
Gas (% TWh) 0.6% 1.1% 1.9% 3.2% Gas (% TWh) 4.8% 2.3% 8.9% 7.4%
Nuclear (% TWh)   Nuclear (% TWh)
Renewables (% TWh) 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 2.7% Renewables (% TWh) 0.1% 0.2% 1.0%
Other (% TWh) 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.3% Other (% TWh) 0.1%
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
25.81 25.65 25.51 25.19 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (US 
EPA) 
25.65 26.31 25.67 25.61 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ) 101.30 100.64 100.01 98.58 
Relative Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Production (OMSZ) 99.75 103.11 99.92 99.84 
Source: own calculations based on TWh data from the European Energy Commission, carbon content coefficients from the US. EPA data in Table 5 above and Hun-
garian OMSZ carbon content coefficients (2008:45, Table 3.4, a copy of this table is included in Appendix B). 
Notes: Two caveats are necessary: First, the carbon content coefficient ignores both the relative thermal efficiency of the electricity generation process, as well as any 
carbon emitted in plant construction or in ancillary processes (so-called life-cycle emissions). Second, for the category “other”, the relative carbon content coefficient 
is unknown. Since the relative share of electricity generation in this category is very small (varying between 0-0.6 per cent), the carbon content coefficient has been 
set to zero (even if one assumes a carbon content coefficient of 20 for the US EPA model. For Hungary, for example, this only changes the relative carbon intensity 
by a maximum value of +0.6 in 1998). 
Relative Carbon Intensity is defined as the cumulative average carbon intensity weighted by the relative share in electricity generation across electricity generation 
fuel types. 
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natural gas use in the domestic energy 
mix (as noted above) and the level of 
natural gas related energy dependence 
(as for many EU member states,31 for 
Hungary about 80 per cent in 200432) 
are quite high. According to the Hun-
garian Energy Agency (EH), the figures 
for 2007 were about the same. This 
third point is important for two rea-
sons. For one, there is limited potential 
                                                            
31 Despite the common perception that Hungary 
is one of the most natural gas dependent coun-
tries in the EU, 14 member states exhibited 
dependency levels over 90 per cent in 2004. 
32 Data from Eurostat’s Energy, Transport and 
Environment Indicators, 2006 Edition (pp. 26–7). 
for moving more energy production to 
natural gas (though there is consider-
able potential for moving toward more 
renewable energy production), and for 
another there are strong incentives – 
quite apart concerns over global warm-
ing and climate change – to move in 
the direction of greater energy inde-
pendence.33 
Finally, the fourth point requiring 
clarification concerns the important dif-
                                                            
33 It is presumably not necessary here to enter 
into a discussion of all of the problems associ-
ated with the many hotly debated and potential 
future “streams” of natural gas supply in Hun-
gary and Europe more generally. 
Table 7
 
 Solid Fuels Oil Natural Gas Nuclear Renewables Other 
EU27 (2005, Mtoe) 319.98 669.80 445.45 257.36 120.75 2.80 
Share in % 17.6% 36.9% 24.5% 14.2% 6.6% 0.2%
Belgium 9.2% 41.7% 23.9% 20.8% 3.3% 1.1%
Bulgaria 34.7% 24.4% 14.1% 24.2% 5.6% -3.0%
Czech Republic 44.9% 21.8% 17.2% 14.2% 4.1% -2.1%
Denmark 19.0% 41.6% 22.5% 16.2% 0.6%
Germany 24.0% 35.7% 23.4% 12.2% 4.8% -0.1%
Estonia 57.4% 19.6% 14.4% 11.2% -2.5%
Ireland 17.8% 55.5% 22.9% 2.6% 1.2%
Greece 28.7% 57.5% 7.5% 5.2% 1.1%
Spain 14.4% 48.4% 20.8% 10.3% 6.1% -0.1%
France 5.2% 33.4% 14.9% 42.3% 6.1% -1.9%
Italy 8.8% 44.5% 37.8% 6.5% 2.3%
Cyprus 1.5% 96.5% 2.0% 0.0%
Latvia 1.7% 29.0% 28.8% 36.4% 4.0%
Lithuania 2.3% 32.0% 28.8% 31.0% 8.8% -3.0%
Luxembourg 1.7% 65.6% 25.1% 1.6% 6.0%
Hungary 11.1% 26.6% 43.3% 12.8% 4.2% 2.0%
Malta  100.0%  
Netherlands 10.1% 39.6% 43.6% 1.3% 3.5% 1.9%
Austria 11.9% 42.0% 24.0% 20.5% 1.6%
Poland 58.7% 24.0% 13.0% 4.8% -0.5%
Portugal 12.5% 57.8% 14.1% 13.4% 2.2%
Romania 22.4% 26.0% 35.6% 3.7% 12.8% -0.4%
Slovenia 21.1% 35.0% 12.7% 20.8% 10.6% -0.2%
Slovakia 22.1% 20.8% 30.5% 23.6% 4.3% -1.3%
Finland 14.3% 30.4% 10.4% 17.4% 23.2% 4.4%
Sweden 5.1% 28.4% 1.6% 36.2% 29.8% -1.2%
UK 16.4% 35.5% 36.8% 9.0% 1.7% 0.5%
Source: data downloaded from the website of the European Commission: Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport (DG TREN). 
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ferences in the way that electrical en-
ergy and natural gas based energy are 
treated. Natural gas suppliers, despite 
the important role of natural gas in 
CO2 emissions, are not part of the ETS. 
It would not matter of course if they 
were, since the principal source of 
emissions occurs with end-users. What 
follows from recognizing this is the re-
alization that only electricity use is ulti-
mately affected by the imposition of a 
carbon price. Since natural gas provid-
ers and distributors do not emit mean-
ingful amounts of CO2 or GHG emis-
sions, they do not require carbon al-
lowances and the output prices resulting 
from their activities do not and cannot 
reflect the imposition of a mechanically 
introduced carbon price. 
Such a policy strategy however is 
likely to result in very significant and 
potentially perverse incentives. As the 
system is currently structured, higher 
prices in the electricity sector created 
by the imposition of a carbon price on 
electricity producers will ultimately fa-
vour electricity-saving energy efficiency 
investments over those affecting natural 
gas use. While rising energy prices – 
including rising natural gas prices – 
are also driven by market scarcity fac-
tors, in the long run some equivalence 
between incentives to use either of these 
energy sources is presumably advisable. 
In fact, incentives favouring electricity 
use over natural gas use (i.e. incentives 
raising the price of natural gas relative 
to electricity) should ultimately be more 
advantageous – at least in countries like 
Hungary with higher shares of nuclear 
power in the energy mix – in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. 
Since there are relatively few com-
plementarities or substitution effects 
across electricity and gas use, it is not 
likely energy efficiency investments shift-
ing usage from electricity to natural 
gas (due to lower prices) would result 
in higher overall emissions.34 Potential 
                                                            
34 Some substitution effects do exist. For exam-
ple, one can heat using both electricity and 
inefficiencies in energy saving investment 
however do result from the likely 
stronger incentives to invest in electric-
ity-saving energy efficiency. In general, 
without some kind of comparable 
mechanism affecting natural gas prices, 
the ETS sector mechanism – as cur-
rently proposed – will potentially drive 
inefficient investments in electricity-
related energy efficiency. 
Together, the above four points pro-
vide a strong logical foundation (1) for 
insisting that the far more attention 
than heretofore be dedicated to promot-
ing energy efficiency in building use 
(including of course all three segments 
of the building sector: commercial, pub-
lic use and residential) – in particular 
where this concerns natural gas use, 
and (2) for insisting that far more at-
tention should be dedicated at the 
European policy level to energy effi-
ciency and the reduction of energy use 
in the non-ETS sector. For Hungary 
(and presumably for many other coun-
tries, including in particular those in 
Central and Eastern Europe), these 
points pose a serious dilemma. In the 
EU policy framework, the ETS sector 
and that segment of the renewables 
industry that is focused on the produc-
tion of electricity (not e.g. the replace-
ment of natural gas using geothermal 
heat pumps) is the principal focus. 
However, in Hungary, and potentially 
for many other EU countries, it is not 
clear this represents the best strategy.  
Ultimately, a strategy that focuses 
first on energy efficiency and, in par-
ticular reducing the use of natural gas 
in the building sector, could potentially 
bring far greater returns. At the very 
least, as proposed above, a strategy 
that attempts to unify or more strongly 
integrate the goals of the ETS and non-
                                                                                        
natural gas and many especially older hot wa-
ter heaters are electricity based. However, elec-
tricity-based heat is rare in Hungary (except 
for space heaters) and on-demand natural gas-
based hot water heaters are presumably still far 
more energy- and carbon dioxide-efficient than 
their “always on” electricity-based counterparts. 
43 
ETS sectors. This does not mean of 
course that one should not focus on 
reduction in electricity use. There are of 
course highly significant potential re-
turns, for example, associated with the 
decommissioning or retro-fitting of 
Hungary’s remaining coal-burning 
power plants. But the failure to recog-
nize the advantages of reducing natural 
gas use – in particular in buildings 
where this can most easily be achieved 
using such technologies as passive solar, 
thermal insulation and geothermal heat 
pumps (and requiring such features in 
building codes) – represents a serious 
policy failure. 
This last point is particularly true in 
the Central and East European context 
and further underlines the problems 
that arise for these countries with the 
EU’s general climate change approach 
and, in particular, the 2020 Climate 
Change Package. As pointed out, for 
example, by Novikova and Ürge-
Vorsatz, the relative effectiveness of 
energy efficiency investments depends on 
what has already be done in the past. 
If, as they point out, insulation has 
been added to the outside of a build-
ing, introducing an efficient furnace will 
have less of an impact than had there 
been no insulation at all (2007:10).  
This analogy can of course be ex-
tended. In Hungary and many of the 
other Central and East European coun-
tries, the ETS system has been in place 
since 2005. Moreover, CO2 and GHG 
emissions have been radically reduced 
even before this as a result of reducing 
other emissions (e.g. SO2, CO, the re-
duction of fertilizer use, etc.).35 In this 
sense, most of the EU effort is focused 
on a sector that has already witnessed 
significant emission reductions resulting 
                                                            
35 While these emissions are not themselves the 
source of carbon dioxide or other GHG’s, they 
are contained in energy sources (such as coal, 
oil, vehicle fuels, etc.) that are also typically 
high emitters of CO2 and GHG’s. Thus reducing 
SO2 output in Western and Central and Eastern 
Europe, for example, had a significant impact 
on overall CO2 output. 
in significant diminishing returns (and 
rising costs) regarding further efforts. 
This point is likewise argued in the 
Hungarian government’s energy effi-
ciency action plan (GKM, 2007:10). As 
pointed out in the section on the ETS 
and non-ETS sectors, the larger and far 
more untouched problem – in particular 
in Central and Eastern Europe – tends 
to be the relative energy use efficiency 
of buildings, in particular since this was 
not typically a concern with heavily 
subsidized communist era energy re-
sources. For Western Europe of course, 
the story is not quite the same. Western 
consumers have faced far higher energy 
prices for a considerable number of 
years and end-user energy efficiency 
has been promoted for a long time. In 
both this regard and in other areas of 
the EU 2020 Climate Change Package, 
Western interests appear to be far 
more strongly reflected than Hungarian 
and potentially Central and East Euro-
pean interests.  
By pointing this out however, we do 
not wish to claim that no significant 
reductions in CO2 or GHG output can 
be achieved in the electricity-generating 
or broader ETS sectors. By shifting 
more coal-based power production to 
either natural gas or, ideally, renewable 
sources, significant progress is possible. 
And such a strategy would – due to 
the differences in the carbon coefficients 
– have a significant impact on overall 
CO2 and GHG emissions. But for gov-
ernment policy regarding energy end-
users or consumers, the focus should 
clearly be on other strategies – in par-
ticular the reduction of energy use in 
buildings (and also vehicles/transport). 
Thus this report supports the general 
ETS sector cap and trade approach to 
reducing GHG emissions. But a far 
more flexible policy structure that both 
motivates and incentivizes emission re-
ductions across the much broader range 
of ETS and non-ETS sectors would be 
advisable. 
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5.2. Unifying the General ETS 
Framework across ETS and     
non-ETS sectors 
As expressed in individual member state 
positions on the 2020 Climate Change 
Package, several countries would like to 
see more flexibility across EU ETS and 
non-ETS sectors As outlined above, it is 
crucial for the success of EU community 
policy that national (and/or municipal) 
governments be “incentivized” to under-
take investments in energy efficiency 
and reduced energy use. Under the 
current ETS model proposed in 
COM(2008)16, investments in energy 
efficiency that translate into reduced 
energy use likewise translate directly 
into lower requirements for purchasing 
carbon credits (since all power sector 
carbon credits will be auctioned) and 
thus also an increased potential to sell 
unallocated carbon credits. On the sur-
face, this sounds like an advantageous 
setting. However, the principal catch is 
that emission reductions in the non-ETS 
sector do not in and of themselves lead 
to an increased potential to sell carbon 
credits on the open marketplace. Only 
ETS sector emission reductions qualify. 
The incentive of the European model 
is to promote energy efficiency invest-
ments that affect electricity demand 
(since power producers are directly 
part of the ETS). The consequence is 
that while ETS member firms face in-
centives to reduce emissions (this re-
duces the costs imposed by the ETS 
system), governments themselves cannot 
reap the benefits of their actions where 
these do not have a direct impact on 
ETS and in particular power sector 
emissions. More importantly, as noted 
above and despite the important role of 
natural gas in CO2 emissions, natural 
gas suppliers are not part of the ETS, 
though of course it would not matter if 
they were, since the principal source of 
emissions occurs with end-users. Suc-
cessful attempts at reducing energy 
consumption only result in carbon cred-
its that can then be sold on the open 
EU market if they also result explicitly 
in reduced electricity demand. 
 
  
Diagram 2
End-User Emissions in Hungary by Sector, 2004  
 
 
Source: from EK supplement (2008, p. 14). 
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Unused surplus carbon allowances in 
the non-ETS sectors cannot be sold on 
the market. In this sense, having “room 
to grow” (the positive non-ETS sector 
carbon allowances offered to the less 
developed economies) appears to be 
more of a burden than a benefit. Un-
used allowances can neither be sold on 
the open market nor can they be 
shifted from the non-ETS sector to the 
ETS sector. Moreover, the effect of an 
extra “cushion” in the non-ETS sector 
ultimately means extra pressure or 
higher imposed costs on the ETS sector, 
where most of the efforts at emission 
reductions will thus have to be focused. 
As noted above, the impact of the non-
ETS sector on total emissions is far 
greater than that of the ETS sector. As 
in Diagram 2 above, industry in Hun-
gary only makes up 21 per cent of 
total CO2 emissions. Moreover, ETS 
sector emissions represent a smaller 
share of this total.  
Though it is argued throughout the 
European Commission’s documentation 
that the structure of the current ETS 
sector and full auctioning in the power 
sector represents the most cost-efficient 
strategy for reducing GHG output and 
produces the most level playing field, 
this ignores a number of factors. First, 
the so-called “efficiency approach” for 
determining ETS and non-ETS sector 
targets outlined in SEC(2008)52 is de-
fined by the, “equilibrium of marginal 
abatement costs of the trading and non-
trading sectors” (p. 98). While it re-
mains unclear from the text of these 
two Impact Assessments, presumably – 
there is unfortunately no way to deter-
mine this36 – the numbers generated by 
this method determine the targets ap-
                                                            
36 There appears to be no way to reconcile the 
strategies outlined for determining ETS and non-
ETS sector targets (in particular those appearing 
in SEC[2008]52: p. 98) on the one hand, and 
those appearing in (SEC[2008]85-V2:58) on the 
other. No guide for drawing a correspondence 
chart across these two documents is provided 
and it appears virtually impossible to re-create 
one from the information provided. 
pearing in particular in “option 4” 
(SEC[2008]85-V2:58), the distribution of 
ETS sector targets that most closely ap-
pears to resemble the Commission’s pre-
ferred strategy. 
However, whether as argued in the 
text any of the different options out-
lined in SEC(2008)52 (p. 98) represent 
an equilibrium choice based on the 
abatement costs of trading and non-
trading sectors, (and whether these bear 
any resemblance to the different options 
outlined SEC[2008]85-V2 p. 58), is im-
possible to determine. For one, the rele-
vant calculations are not made available 
in these Impact Assessments. For an-
other and more importantly, the above 
analysis suggests the opposite is more 
likely to be true. Investments in energy 
efficiency have potentially much higher 
returns (in terms of GHG reductions) in 
the non-ETS sector. Both the GKM in its 
Action Plan on energy efficiency (July 
2007) and the EnergiaKlub (2008) in 
the supplementary report attached to 
this report come to similar conclusions. 
The overwhelming majority of the room 
for improvement appears to lie in other 
sectors (in particular the transport, 
residential, public and services sectors). 
Very little room for improvement is 
available in the manufacturing or ETS 
sectors (e.g. EK, 2008: Table 7, p. 23). 
Moreover as outlined above, most of 
the room for emissions’ reductions lies 
in energy efficiency improvements across 
these sectors (including the ETS sector), 
those again this type of investment is 
less likely to have a direct impact on 
non power-related ETS sector GHG 
emissions. 
As a result of this fact, perhaps the 
biggest challenge posed by the 2020 
Climate Change Package and its prede-
cessor is to find a method of unifying 
or integrating the ETS and non-ETS 
sectors in such a way that investments 
in energy efficiency are incentivized in 
the same way that ETS sector CO2 and 
GHG emission reductions are. Though 
this idea is not entirely new to the gen-
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eral discussion of Kyoto and EU goals 
(see in particular Bertoldi, Rezessy and 
Ürge-Vorsatz, 2005), the 2020 Climate 
Change Package still suffers from the 
lack of a model of integrating these 
two sectors. 
As suggested above, there are of 
course strong reasons for being con-
cerned about the possible integration of 
the ETS and non-ETS sectors. As out-
lined clearly also in the Commission’s 
proposal for a directive extending the 
ETS, “The emissions trading system 
should only be extended to emissions 
which are capable of being monitored, 
reported and verified with the same 
level of accuracy as applies under the 
monitoring, reporting and verification 
requirements currently applicable under 
the Directive” (COM(2008)16:8). The 
advantage of the ETS sector as cur-
rently defined (and especially with the 
proposed exclusion of small-scale facili-
ties under 10,000 tCO2/yr, from the 
ETS sector), is that it is comparatively 
easy to monitor and verify actual emis-
sion reductions. Identifying changes in 
actual energy consumption related to 
energy efficiency investments is far 
more complicated. Temperatures and 
thus energy use vary on a daily basis, 
as do household, commercial or public 
use building electricity needs. Thus the 
general criterion of monitoring, report-
ing and verification is particularly diffi-
cult to satisfy. 
The “white certificate” model pro-
posed in Bertoldi, Rezessy and Ürge-
Vorsatz (2005) represents an important 
step in proposing strategies for integrat-
ing the ETS and non-ETS sectors. How-
ever, it raises a number of difficulties. 
For one, while the concept of issuing 
white certificates to individuals who 
invest in household renewables or en-
ergy saving technologies is compelling, 
the difficulty lies setting meaningful 
prices for such certificates (energy sav-
ing investments are likely to yield differ-
ing results in different settings) and in 
being able to verify whether emissions 
are actually reduced as a result. For 
another, serious questions arise over 
who should manage and administrate 
such a system. The authors, for exam-
ple, argue that energy distributors (such 
as E.ON in Hungary) are perhaps best 
positioned to do this. However, as the 
authors themselves note, energy distribu-
tors could potentially exploit such 
strategies to favour their own interests. 
Energy distributors of course want to 
sell power and under the proposed ETS 
system for 2013–2020, energy produc-
ers gain little from reducing energy use 
(though they can gain from reducing 
the CO2/GHG content of their related 
emissions). Moreover, as argued below, 
much of the potential for increased en-
ergy efficiency/reduced energy use in 
Hungary concerns natural gas.  
This of course raises important ques-
tions about which “energy distributors” 
should be responsible for such a pro-
gram and whether this raises further 
insurmountable obstacles to such a 
strategy. The requirement of having 
another EU and/or national-level institu-
tion responsible for monitoring and is-
suing white certificates seems an unnec-
essary complication given current pro-
posals for similar institutional require-
ments to manage GO green certificates 
and the ETS. Moreover, it is not clear 
that the European level of administra-
tion is necessary in order to introduce 
a broad range of national-level policies 
promoting energy efficiency (such as 
energy labelling on appliances, energy 
efficiency standards, rebates, tax incen-
tives and other programs to encourage 
household adoption).37 
On the other hand, the monitoring 
and verification of emissions at the na-
tional level have improved over time. As 
indicated for example by the Hungarian 
Meteorological Service’s National Inven-
tory Report for 1985–2006, the poten-
tial range of uncertainty in GHG-related 
                                                            
37 Some of these examples have been drawn 
from Bertoldi, Rezessy and Ürge-Vorsatz 
(2005:966). 
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estimates was the following: CO2 +/-2-4 
per cent, CH4 +/-15-25 per cent, and 
N2O +/-80-90 per cent. Due to the 
relatively low share of CH4, N2O and 
fluoride gases in total emissions, total 
uncertainty was estimated at +/-5 per 
cent and trend uncertainty at +/-2.4 
per cent (OMSZ, 2008:27). Based on 
data from the individual member states, 
the most recent European Environment 
Agency’s UNFCC report suggests that 
for the EU15, uncertainty regarding 
levels is +/-4-8 per cent, while trend 
uncertainty is smaller (+/-1-2 per cent) 
(EEA, 2007:61). 
Given the above, a more appealing 
proposal is potentially one that incentiv-
izes the role of the state rather than 
that of power producers and/or dis-
tributors. Moreover, even if one did 
hand over the task to power producers 
and/or distributors, some degree of 
state legislation would presumably be 
required. But the only incentives would 
be provided by the requirement of 
meeting the EU targets. Given the exis-
tence of the EU ETS system and the 
fact that it explicitly incentivizes states 
by giving them the right to allocate and 
sell carbon allowances, adding reduc-
tions in non-ETS sector emissions would 
presumably not pose any serious admin-
istrative obstacles. No new institutions 
would be required. And the explicit 
advantage would be the incentivizing of 
the state who could then sell surplus 
non-ETS sector carbon allowances to 
other states or firms (or perhaps even 
re-allocate them to new firms in the 
ETS sector). 
The point is that in order for the 
state to be adequately incentivized to 
promote and encourage energy effi-
ciency and reduced energy use it would 
be helpful for the state to be able to 
draw some explicit advantage or re-
ward from the policies it introduces. 
Moreover, given that there are signifi-
cant costs associated with many energy 
efficiency policies, the ability to garner 
some sort of return in the form of the 
ability to sell carbon credits means that 
states might be more likely to pursue 
important energy efficiency strategies. 
While uncertainty and the ability to 
monitor accurately remain a concern, 
the lack of strong incentives for states 
to engage in significant efforts to pro-
mote energy efficiency is presumably one 
obstacle toward meeting these goals. 
In important ways, this model simply 
reinstates a piece of the Kyoto frame-
work that – at least without a new 
Kyoto II agreement – will not be avail-
able to EU member states. The model 
builds upon the existing Kyoto I 
framework which allows countries to 
sell unused emission or carbon allow-
ances to other countries (so-called 
AAU’s or Assigned Amount Units).38 
Introducing such a model for the EU 
framework and further allowing trans-
ferability of unused carbon allowances 
across ETS and non-ETS sectors would 
introduce strong incentives to engage in 
energy saving investments. With the 
reduction of so-called “hot-air” or large 
cushions for further growth – in par-
ticular through the models strict appli-
cation only to the EU area – such a 
model is far less likely to result in a 
dramatic reduction of carbon prices. 
Moreover, adapting a pre-existing 
model greatly facilitates the ease of 
transition. The only additional modifica-
tion of the existing ETS system required 
is the definition of some kind of annual 
increment or reduction for the non-ETS 
sector (such as the annual reduction of 
1.74 per cent currently proposed for 
the ETS sector), so that states can sell 
unused emissions on an annual or bi-
annual basis. Without such a model 
and with small cushions available in the 
non-ETS sector, states face only very 
weak incentives to comply. 
                                                            
38 See, for example, the discussion in Ürge-
Vorsatz, Novikova and Stoyanova (2007). 
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5.3. On Energy Efficiency     
Potential 
Just how much energy efficiency should 
ultimately be pursued and of what 
type(s) is no simple estimation. EU Di-
rective 2006/32/EC provides an indica-
tive target: an annual 1 per cent of 
energy savings over a period of 9 
years. The Hungarian Ministry of the 
Economy and Transport (GKM) esti-
mates that over the period 2007-2013, 
this amounts to approximately 5.97/year 
PJ in energy use reductions, or a total 
of 41.8 PJ across the entire period 
(2007:14). Assuming the same potential 
across the period 2013–2020, Hungary 
could potentially achieve energy reduc-
tions totalling 83.58 PJ. 
Energy efficiency potential is of 
course a problematic term. EnergiaKlub, 
for example estimates there is a sub-
stantially larger potential for reductions 
in energy use in Hungary than those 
that have been proposed by the GKM 
(see the EK, 2008 supplement, 9–23, 
and Table 7:23). The authors of EK 
(2008) argue that at least 144 PJ could 
be saved by 2020 compared to the 
GKM study. But the definition of “po-
tential” here is not very clear. For the 
most part, potential is defined as an 
average of previous energy efficiency 
improvements across the different sec-
tors considered. After all, one could 
define “potential” in more dramatic 
terms, e.g. based on just how much 
energy reduction can be achieved in an 
individual residence or public building. 
In this regard, with passive energy de-
sign39 or the right mix of passive solar, 
geothermal, solar cells, adequate ther-
mal insulation and perhaps other low 
                                                            
39 See  
http://www.passivhaustagung.de/Passive_House_E
/passivehouse.html. 
energy use features,40 the zero emission 
residence or public use building is al-
ready imaginable. 
In some senses, in attempting to de-
fine energy efficiency potential, the ap-
propriate question is presumably not 
“how much can be achieved”, but 
rather what is feasible within the con-
text of the available resources (in par-
ticular financial resources – especially 
since the technological resources are 
clearly available). This however is per-
haps an even more complicated number 
to calculate. The EnergiaKlub study, 
citing the Novikova and Ürge-Vorsatz 
(2007, 2008) study, for example, pro-
vides estimates of the total costs related 
to different kinds of energy efficiency 
measures (p. 16). The GKM (2007) pa-
per on the action plan only provides 
estimates of total expenditures from 
2000–2006 and otherwise holds to the 
prescriptions provided in the EU energy 
efficiency directive (Directive 2006/32/EC). 
But all of the above calculations avoid 
the more important question of what 
role cost plays in determining total an-
nual energy efficiency potential. Thus, 
ultimately one has little sense of 
whether the proposed or potential tar-
gets fall within the means of available 
government support.  
Estimates of the total cost of energy 
efficiency investments are sparse. In an 
earlier document, for example, Energi-
aKlub estimates that 1 PJ of energy effi-
ciency costs approximately 3 billion HUF 
(2007:6). Based on the numbers avail-
able for 2000–2006 from the Ministry 
of the Economy and Transport’s Action 
Plan, 1 PJ of energy efficiency costs 
somewhere between 2.275 and 3.520 
billion HUF depending on whether or 
not one considers the cost of “soft 
loans” (40.2/17.67=2.275 billion HUF, 
or 62.2/17.67=3.52 billion HUF if one 
                                                            
40 A number of other potentially valuable 
strategies include compact fluorescents, water 
saving devices and low energy use household 
appliances, programmable thermostats (e.g. No-
vikova and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007:4). 
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adds in “soft loans”, 2007:9). Novikova 
and Ürge-Vorsatz on the other hand 
provide estimates of total expenditure 
costs relative to various categories of 
energy efficiency investments. These 
numbers are reported in the EK sup-
plement (2008: p. 16). Slightly more 
detailed numbers are reported by No-
vikova and Ürge-Vorsatz (2008:5). 
The two questions that seem the most 
important, however, in the general dis-
cussion of energy efficiency strategies 
are not really answered by any of these 
reports and numbers. The first question 
is how much the Hungarian government 
can reasonably expect to spend on 
overall energy efficiency. Thus energy 
efficiency potential is definded here in 
terms of the total potential cost expen-
diture on either an annual or multi-
year basis. The second question is what 
the overall impact of such expenditure 
is likely to be on economic perform-
ance. Thus, for example, should one 
think of these expenditures as a nega-
tive or a positive weight on overall eco-
nomic growth? 
These calculations are not yet far 
enough advanced to be able to provide 
adequate numbers. However, based on 
the assumption that the total cost per PJ 
of increased energy efficiency (or re-
duced energy use) is somewhere be-
tween the larger GKM estimate and the 
EnergiaKlub estimate (3.25 billion HUF 
per PJ), Table 8 provides rough esti-
mates of the total cost given different 
potential energy efficiency and GHG 
reduction target levels. Thus, the EU 
directive-based target of approximately 
5 PJ per year would cost about 16.25 
billion HUF per year, or about 0.12 per 
cent of the total government budget 
(based on 2007 values). Of course, 
based on the potential level of comfort 
or as change in the perception of the 
desirable target, annual expenditure 
could be much higher. A total of ap-
proximately 20 PJ in annual energy 
efficiency improvements would cost 
about 65 billion HUF, or about 0.5 per 
cent of the total government budget. 
Of course, the biggest obstacle to 
overall expenditure levels and improved 
energy efficiency in Hungary has little 
to do with EU goals and far more to 
do with the current Hungary budgetary 
problems and the general state of the 
world economy. Finding additional room 
for energy efficiency expenditure is a 
considerable challenge in a situation 
where reduced budgetary expenditure is 
Table 8
 
PJ Energy Savings 
As Share of 
Total 2007 
Budget 
Cost
(Billions of 
Forint) 
Likely CO2 Re-
duction (Mtons)
 1 0.025% 3.25 0.09
 5 0.123% 16.25 0.45
 10 0.247% 32.50 0.90
 15 0.370% 48.75 1.35
 20 0.493% 65.00 1.80
 25 0.616% 81.25 2.25
 30 0.740% 97.50 2.70
Total Government Exp. (2007, Billion Forint) 13,180  
Estimated Cost per PJ (Billion Forint) 3.25  
Source: Total government expenditure figures are from the Ministry of Finance (Jan. 2008). The 
estimated cost per PJ of energy efficiency is based on the average of the GKM (2007) and EK 
(2007) estimates.  
Notes: Estimates of the total CO2 mitigation potential is based on the TPES metric of 90kt/PJ. 
However, this method does not take into account relative variation in the carbon intensity and 
thermal efficiency of the targeted installations. 
The total reported budget exceeds government revenues. The figures do not take the resulting 
budget deficit 1,291.4 Billion Forint into account. 
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one of the principal considerations. This 
situation is not likely to change in the 
immediate future and is rendered more 
difficult due to the desire to join the 
European Monetary Union as soon as 
possible. 
At the same time, while energy sav-
ing investments are primarily thought of 
in terms of their cost impact, they also 
represent potential gains in overall eco-
nomic efficiency. Though this point is 
frequently lost on discussions of the 
“cost of meeting EU goals” or the 
“costs of mitigating climate change”, 
one must recognize that there are ulti-
mately very real economic and efficiency 
related returns to energy saving invest-
ments.41 While for some policy expendi-
tures there are very real questions 
about the potential return on invest-
ment, in this case real investments typi-
cally bring real gains in terms of in-
creased economic activity, job promo-
tion, improved productivity, lower prices 
and ultimately improved economic com-
petitiveness. In the long run, greater 
efficiency in the allocation of resources 
and increased consumption expenditure 
are reasonable expectations of the out-
come of government expenditure on 
energy efficiency. Moreover, if energy 
efficiency policy goals can be linked to 
a more effective EU-level strategy inte-
grating the ETS and non-ETS sectors 
that incentivizes governments, the moti-
vation to sell carbon credits could bring 
even greater rewards.  
Energy efficiency investments in Hun-
gary – as represented in the EK’s sup-
plementary document (2008: p. 26, Fig-
ure 7) – have declined significantly in 
recent years. Not only does this place 
Hungary in danger of failing to meet 
the EU guidelines established in the en-
ergy efficiency directive and extended 
with the 2020 Climate Change Package, 
                                                            
41 Generally these returns are calculated in 
terms of how many years it takes for energy 
saving investments to pay for themselves. For 
most of the available technologies, such returns 
are significant. 
it likewise means that valuable opportu-
nities for improvement in overall eco-
nomic efficiency are being missed.  
To what extent this is specifically re-
lated to government policy and to what 
extent this is a function of current 
Hungarian habits and customs requires 
further research. At least some of the 
problem is presumably related to the 
current structure of government incen-
tives to invest in energy efficiency. For 
example, 20 per cent rebates on total 
costs represent very weak incentives 
when the black market economy fre-
quently offers better terms. Moreover 
the structure of rebates and tax incen-
tives could presumably be improved. For 
example, while geothermal heat pumps 
represent a meaningful strategy for 
reducing natural gas use (significantly 
reducing CO2 output and reducing 
natural gas dependence), their cost ap-
pears somewhat elevated in Hungary (e.g. 
Novikova and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2008:49–50). 
Moreover, this is not an uncommon 
problem for many of the renewable and 
energy efficiency technologies. On the 
other hand, adequate government incen-
tives to promote the use of these tech-
nologies should likewise have the knock-
on effect of raising demand and ulti-
mately lowering price (assuming a re-
lated increase in supply). Missing in all 
of this is a clearly defined strategy of 
public action campaigns and the public 
provision of clear price information to 
prevent price gouging and boost renew-
able investment. 
In general, the current state of re-
search on energy efficiency potential 
and strategies – in particular with re-
spect to Hungary – could be signifi-
cantly improved. Despite interesting and 
helpful recent studies, further research 
could help fill important gaps. For ex-
ample, one of the most meaningful en-
ergy efficiency strategies “passive solar” 
– in particular because it is low cost 
and high impact – is rarely if ever dis-
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cussed.42 This strategy is particularly 
meaningful since with a simple orienta-
tion of houses toward the sun – some-
thing that should be required where 
possible in all building codes (e.g. 
commercial, residential, public use) – 
yields impressive results through the 
medium of solar gain. More impor-
tantly, since passive solar only requires 
that new construction be oriented to-
ward the position of highest exposure 
to the winter sun, it is virtually without 
cost. 
Moreover, some of the recommended 
energy saving strategies – despite the 
fact that they reportedly take into ac-
count carbon intensity factors – often 
place electricity saving strategies before 
natural gas saving strategies. For exam-
ple, the Novikova and Ürge-Vorsatz 
(2007, 2008) study appears to favour 
such strategies as the replacement of 
incandescent light bulbs with compact 
fluorescents, low energy use appliances 
and water saving devices over strategies 
that affect the use of natural gas. Since 
such strategies are comparatively low 
cost, they should of course be vigor-
ously pursued. But the problem begins 
with measurements of the potential CO2 
savings resulting from the different 
strategies analyzed. It is difficult to un-
derstand, for example, how the poten-
tial CO2 savings from geothermal heat 
pumps could be less than that from the 
installation of on-demand natural gas 
based hot water and heating furnaces. 
Heat pumps require no natural gas 
(though they do require moderate 
amounts of electricity), while on-demand 
furnaces of course use natural gas. 
Many other discrepancies also arise. 
Finally, it is also difficult to understand 
why such technologies as photovoltaic 
(PV) solar cells are not considered.43  
                                                            
42 While the Novikova and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007, 
2008) paper notes the potential importance of 
passive energy design, it skips over or neglects 
passive solar. 
43 As discussed in some detail below, incentives 
for investing in PV solar are highly important 
for reducing GHG-intensive energy use and 
As noted above, there is only very 
limited knowledge and data available in 
Hungary on the relative thermal effi-
ciency of those installations (heat gener-
ating furnaces and the like) currently in 
use.44 Such data, as should be obvious 
from the above discussion, is tremen-
dously important. A new and improved 
strategy for the promotion of GHG 
emission reductions in building-related 
energy use should focus public policy in 
particular on those strategies that will 
produce the greatest gain in overall 
carbon efficiency.  
Whether these should be pursued at 
the lowest potential cost is more prob-
lematic. Where significant improvements 
in overall energy efficiency will bring 
significant economic returns, it is im-
portant to weigh whether public expen-
diture in the form of tax incentives or 
rebates is genuinely necessary. In many 
cases, an intensive public awareness 
campaign may well be equally effective 
if the eventual outcome is a significant 
return on one’s investment and such 
investments do not involve significant 
(i.e. potentially prohibitive) upfront costs. 
Thus for example it may be possible to 
persuade individuals to invest in com-
pact fluorescent light bulbs if: (1) in-
candescent bulbs are outlawed, and (2) 
an excess of public information points 
out the long-term advantages of com-
pact fluorescents. 
                                                                                        
overall demand on the energy transmission net-
work or grid. Though the cost of PV solar is 
frequently seen as an obstacle in Hungary, 
several arguments are provided below for why 
this should not result in the exclusion of PV 
solar as a renewable option. 
44 In Hungary, the relative lack of knowledge 
of the average thermal efficiency of building-
related energy use is a matter of concern. The 
former Ministry of the Economy and Transport 
(GKM) noted in a preliminary report preparing 
the groundwork for Hungary’s Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan that: “Hungary has officially re-
quested a temporary derogation of three years 
for performing the other two tasks [outlined in 
the Community’s Energy Efficiency Directive], 
that is, for introducing the certification process 
and for starting the assessment of furnaces, 
boilers and air-conditioning installations” (GKM, 
2007:7, our emphasis). 
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The point is that, in general, public 
expenditure – based at least on a mar-
ket failure approach to government 
intervention – should ultimately be re-
served for those strategies that market-
place investors might not pursue with-
out state aid but that could potentially 
have a significant impact on GHG emis-
sion reductions. Thus for example, pub-
lic expenditure should target technolo-
gies such as household and larger scale 
geothermal use, insulation, the replace-
ment of outdated windows and PV so-
lar installations, that have significant 
upfront costs but that also are likely to 
have a significant impact on increased 
energy efficiency and/or GHG emission 
reductions. In terms of the required 
expenditure levels indicated in Table 8 
and their potential impact on GHG 
emissions reductions, this report has 
essentially argued that targeting certain 
types of investments will have a much 
larger impact on the relative carbon 
intensity of energy use. If successful, 
the result should ultimately be a larger 
impact on overall GHG emission reduc-
tions per unit of expenditure. 
Finally, the potential range of build-
ings where a strategy focusing on en-
ergy efficiency more generally and re-
duced natural gas use in particular 
could be tremendously effective in re-
ducing total GHG output is large. As 
noted above, this extends across all 
types of buildings (industrial and com-
mercial, public use and residential).45 
The failure to consider this point in a 
more flexible ETS and non-ETS sector 
arrangement ultimately means that in-
centives will not promote investment in 
the most GHG reducing technologies. In 
the ETS sector, this will happen because 
firms are currently incentivized to pro-
mote the reduction of direct process-
related GHG emissions over building-
                                                            
45 In this regard, for example, Hungary’s cur-
rent Energy Efficiency Action Plan (GKM, 2007) 
focuses primarily on residential energy efficiency 
and generally misses a discussion of the broad 
range of building-related energy use and emis-
sions. 
related GHG emissions. With regard the 
public use building and residential seg-
ments, without more direct incentives 
motivating states to promote energy 
efficiency investments across the broad 
range of non-ETS sector buildings, 
fewer of these types of investments will 
take place. 
In general, the EU policy focus on 
the ETS sector – and in particular elec-
tricity use – does not seem well-suited 
to efficiency in the reduction of GHG 
emissions. In particular, too much of an 
emphasis is likely to be placed on the 
reduction of electricity use and some-
what perverse incentives to use more 
natural gas will likely result from the 
lack of a carbon price attached to this 
fossil fuel. This is further likely to have 
repercussions throughout the mitigation 
strategy network, since consumers and 
producers are likely to shift their en-
ergy saving strategies accordingly. While 
geothermal heat pumps, for example, 
represent an excellent CO2 mitigation 
strategy, in particular in the Hungarian 
context: they greatly reduce natural gas 
use and cause a small shift to electricity 
use. 
In general however, the costs related 
to energy efficiency investments will 
presumably have a positive long-term 
impact on economic growth. Thus, gov-
ernment policies in this area, no matter 
how aggressive, are likely to have posi-
tive and significant long-term implica-
tions for future economic growth and 
convergence prospects. An aggressive 
and well-structured strategy for improv-
ing energy efficiency should ultimately 
improve Hungarian prospects for im-
proved economic growth, economic con-
vergence and overall competitiveness. 
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6) THE GO GREEN CERTIFICATE 
SYSTEM VS. NATIONAL-LEVEL 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS                                                 
(ANALYSIS OF COM[2008]19, 
SEC[2008]57 AND 
SEC[2008]85-V2) 
As the comparatively small degree of 
support for the current form of the 
proposed EU-wide GO green certificate 
system suggests (see the Table of coun-
try positions in Appendix A), there are 
significant concerns about the ability of 
the proposed system to promote advan-
tageous trade in renewables across 
countries. Though there are several rea-
sons why the GO green certificate sys-
tem, in its current form, is ill-suited to 
solving this problem, the most important 
of these is that countries strongly fear 
the potential for negative competition 
between national level incentive systems 
and the EU-wide system. The primary 
reason there is likely to be strong com-
petition between these two systems is 
that the GO system green certificates 
will be sold at one price for one unit 
of energy. In order to promote the 
broad diversity of potential renewable 
sources at the domestic level however, 
significant variation is required in the 
level of subsidy paid to different forms 
of renewable energy (solar, wind, tidal, 
geothermal, etc.). 
Germany and Spain are the most 
outspoken countries on the need to pro-
tect national level incentive systems. Both 
of these countries currently employ 
feed-in tariff type systems to promote 
renewable energy and offer varied tar-
iffs depending on the type of renewable 
energy. While predictions of what the 
likely price for GO green certificates 
would ultimately be (some argue they 
will be priced too high, others too low), 
the likely impact of this would be to 
drive producers who want to benefit 
from the ability to sell green certificates 
toward the lowest priced alternative. 
Generally it is believed that wind power 
would be the principal and perhaps 
only form of renewable energy pursued 
as a result of introducing the GO sys-
tem. Even if GO green certificates were 
sold at one high price, wind would still 
be far more favourable to produce than 
other forms of renewables. 
The problem of GO certificates vs. 
national level incentive systems should 
however been seen in terms of the re-
lated problems of energy security and 
overall electricity base and grid load. 
Though the assessment essentially leaves 
such issues outside the framework of 
the analysis, energy security in particu-
lar is becoming an increasing problem 
(for Hungary and for other countries). 
The increasing importance of energy 
security and the related problem of 
energy dependence require more com-
plex approaches to the promotion of 
renewables than would be possible by 
introducing the GO certificate system 
and promoting primarily wind power. 
Feed-in tariffs (FIT) have one major 
advantage over green certificates. First, 
by promoting a broad range of renew-
able energy sources, FIT systems have a 
more significant impact on reducing 
overall grid load: households or com-
mercial enterprises outfitted with solar 
installations not only feed energy back 
into the electrical grid, they likewise 
reduce overall demand on the electrical 
grid, thus reducing demand for the 
fossil fuel sources used to produce elec-
trical power. In addition, more compre-
hensive national-level incentive systems 
focusing on a wider range of renew-
ables can have an even broader impact 
on reducing energy dependence.  In 
particular improvements in energy effi-
ciency and the use of household geo-
thermal can have a considerable impact 
on reduced natural gas dependence. 
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The problem of base load likewise 
suggests that countries should favour 
national-level incentives systems over the 
proposed EU-wide GO system. The basic 
problem in this regard is that excessive 
inputs from renewable sources that 
produce fluctuations in the total amount 
of power available on the energy grid 
(in particular wind and solar) create 
balancing problems for transmission 
networks. As the Spanish position on its 
renewable energy share makes clear, 
these are significant problems that re-
quire efforts to balance fluctuating en-
ergy sources with comparatively con-
stant base load sources. This is appar-
ently also already a problem for Hun-
gary.46 While this can be done with 
fossil fuel-based or nuclear power, it is 
wise to promote as much renewable 
energy use as possible. Hydropower, 
tidal energy, geothermal power produc-
tion and biomass are all renewable 
sources of base load power. Hungary, 
in particular has great untapped capac-
ity in the use of geothermal for the 
production of power as well as for 
household and commercial heating. 
Moreover, the example of Iceland 
clearly suggests that countries can rap-
idly exploit geothermal for the purposes 
of power production, having dramati-
cally increased the share of geothermal 
power production in the 1980’s and 
again since about 1999. As of 2006, 
26.5 per cent of Iceland’s electrical 
power needs were supplied by geother-
mal plants. Providing national-level in-
centives for the more extensive use of 
these power sources are important ways 
of diminishing the base load problem 
and increasing the degree of energy 
independence. 
Great care should be taken in inter-
preting statements in the Assessment 
concerning the efficiency of GO green 
                                                            
46 While companies have applied to install up to 
1750 MW’s of wind power in Hungary, the 
MVM has set a limit of only 330 additional 
MW’s based on estimates of how much wind 
power it can effectively balance. 
certificate systems relative to other in-
centive systems. As pointed out, for 
example, in the German position, the 
European Commission itself argues in at 
least two additional papers that feed-in 
tariffs are more efficient at introducing 
renewable technologies, introduce a 
wider range of renewable technologies 
(not just wind power) and are more 
cost-effective.47 There are several rea-
sons why green certificate systems are 
likely to be more expensive that could 
be detailed in a more lengthy report. 
The important point is that while GO 
green certificate systems are in theory 
more cost efficient, in practice the op-
posite has been true.48 
Finally, while some countries may 
wish to rely on the GO green certificate 
system where they consider it impossible 
or difficult to sufficiently increase the 
share of renewable energy, there are a 
number of additional problems associ-
ated with such strategies. For one, little 
or nothing is known about how such a 
system would actually work. As noted 
in the assessment itself, the green cer-
tificate system being proposed is “ex-
perimental”. The EU has no or only 
limited experience with such a system 
at a broader cross national EU level. 
There are only models of “how such a 
system could work” (p. 98). For an-
other, there is little certainty concerning 
the future price of green certificates. 
No precise estimates of the future price 
of green certificates are provided in the 
assessment. The assessment only indi-
cates that; “PRIMES modelling suggests 
                                                            
47 See eg “The Support of Electricity from Re-
newable Energy Sources”, SEC(2008)57 and the 
precursor to this more recent study 
COM(2005)627. For other references making 
the same argument, see Lipp (2007) and Meyer 
(2007). For very brief introductions to the ad-
vantages of feed-in systems see Mendonca 
(2007) and NRP (2008). 
48 In addition to the previous footnote, see Van 
Der Linden et al (2005). Research on the role 
of certificate systems frequently ignores or ne-
glects the issue of diversity in renewables, argu-
ing that the incentive system should be “tech-
nology neutral” (see e.g. Söderholm, 2008). 
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… revenues from selling GOs in some 
member states could reach several bil-
lion Euros per year by 2020, and thus 
help considerably with encouraging and 
financing the development of renew-
ables” (p. 101). The flipside of this ob-
servation of course is that the green 
certificates could ultimately represent 
very costly methods for achieving the 
renewable targets. 
Uncertainty over the future price of 
green certificates should give countries 
pause. Several scenarios not outlined in 
the assessment appear possible. On the 
one hand – and especially if a signifi-
cant number of countries opt to rely on 
the purchase of green certificates – it is 
possible that their price will be driven 
too high by relative undersupply.  On 
the other hand, given the free choice 
over whether to make the GO system 
available at the national level or not, it 
is possible that this could potentially 
create a 2-tiered system with countries 
that promote national level incentive FIT 
systems and countries that adopt GO 
green certificates. Currently only a small 
number of EU countries use green cer-
tificates (7 do while 18 currently do 
not). If this possibility results in limited 
flexibility across the two systems, this 
again could radically drive up the price 
of green certificates. Additionally, inade-
quate cross-country infrastructure is also 
a related problem. Countries are likely 
to be preoccupied with the domestic 
electricity framework until EU intercon-
nectedness becomes a fact of life. 
6.1. An Alternative GO Green                   
Certificate Proposal 
As noted above, the biggest drawback 
concerning the GO Green Certificate 
model is the fact that – in its current 
form – it fails to respond adequately to 
two basic concerns: 1) the definition of 
one certificate as equal to one price for 
1 MW of electricity ignores the diversity 
of renewable sources and variation in 
their relative price for the production 
of 1 MW of electricity;. 2) as repre-
sented in the individual country posi-
tions, a significant number of countries 
(in particular those that already employ 
a feed-in tariff model at the domestic 
level) are concerned about the potential 
for cross national trade in GO green 
certificates to undermine domestic level 
incentive programs. On the other hand, 
has noted above, most countries express 
interest in the potential for trading re-
newables certificates across borders. 
Thus one principal objective of a re-
vised model would be to find a form 
and structure that is (1) compatible 
with domestic incentive systems and (2) 
allows for more diversity in the use of 
renewable resources. One relatively sim-
ple way to do this is to define the 
price of one green certificate as equal 
to a range of amounts of energy and 
prices for individual renewable sources. 
For example, the price of one green 
certificate could be set equal to the 
following amounts (for the purposes of 
simplicity, this example is based on cur-
rent German feed-in tariffs, see example 
below).  
In this model, the price of 1 green 
certificate is set at 0.32 euros/Kwh. In 
order to be able to sell 1 green certifi-
cate, a company or private individual 
would have to produce either 1.88 Kwh 
of geothermal power, 2.56 Kwh of 
wind power or 0.737 Kwh of solar 
power. Such a model is of course per-
fectly scalable to the MW level. More-
over, such a model can easily be ad-
justed to correspond to European as 
opposed to German prices and could 
also be weighted according to purchas-
ing power parities in individual coun-
tries (to adjust for cost differences due 
to variation in levels of economic devel-
opment). In addition, like the German 
system, one could also weight tariffs in 
order to promote greater renewables 
investment in less developed regions. 
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Such a model has a number of pos-
sible advantages over the current pro-
posal. For one, this model provides 
greater assurances that multiple forms 
of renewable energy would be pursued. 
For another, such a system would not 
threaten to undermine national level 
incentive systems but should rather 
complement them. Finally, using this 
model, one could also dispense with the 
need for each country to reach a cer-
tain threshold level of renewable energy 
production before being permitted to 
sell green certificates on the open mar-
ket.  
Finally, in this way it would also be 
possible to establish one European regis-
try for the sale of green certificates 
(similar to having one registry that sells 
carbon credits). Hypothetically one could 
even integrate these two institutions, 
though of course this would not be a 
requirement of the policy. One advan-
tage of introducing a single European 
registry for the sale of green certificates 
is that individual producers could either 
sell renewable power to the local feed-
in tariff market or to the single Euro-
pean green certificate registry. For 
countries that raise concerns about hav-
ing to for foreign investments in domes-
tic feed-in tariff programs, this model 
could likewise provide a meaningful 
solution. Moreover, this might further 
allow greater flexibility in cross-border 
investments in renewable energy – in 
particular in regions providing com-
parative advantage in specific kinds of 
renewable energy production. 
One possible problem with this model 
is that the relative price of feed-in tar-
iffs and green certificates should ulti-
mately move in opposite directions over 
time. Since the goal is ultimately to en-
courage all states to introduce as much 
renewable energy use as possible, over 
time it should become more and more 
expensive to purchase green certificates 
on the open market. For feed-in tariffs, 
however, the reverse should ultimately 
be true. As in the German system, re-
wards should be higher for early inves-
tors and the value of feed-in tariffs that 
can be contracted in later years should 
decline along with changes in the mar-
ginal cost of renewable technologies. 
This feature could be achieved by in-
troducing a graduated multiple in the 
value of green certificates. Over time, 
this would ultimately make it more at-
tractive for individual investors to sell 
to the European green certificate market 
rather than to the domestic feed-in tar-
iff program (assuming buyers remain).49 
                                                            
49 This may introduce the additional problem 
that the green certificate cannot become so 
valuable that it becomes attractive for investors 
to postpone investments until later years. As in 
the German case, feed-in tariffs are set at rela-
tively high levels for early years and include a 
commitment to reduce future feed-in tariffs 
over time. The intention is to promote renew-
able investments early on when they are most 
needed and to reward investors who are willing 
to take the related risks. As time passes and, in 
particular as costs decline, feed-in tariffs are 
also supposed to decline in value. Those who 
commit early, however, are guaranteed high 
feed-in tariff rates for extended, fixed periods 
of time (20 years). 
1 green certificate = median renewable tariff (0.32 euros/Kwh) 
Total amounts (in Kwh’s) to be eligible to receive/sell 1 green certificate: 
For hydro = 3.299 Kwh (median tariff = 0.097/Kwh) (.32/.097) 
For geothermal = 1.88 Kwh (tariff = 0.17/Kwh) (.32/0.17) 
For wind = 2.56 Kwh (median tariff = 0.125/Kwh) (.32/0.125) 
For PV solar = 0.737 Kwh (median tariff = 0.434/Kwh) (.32/.434) 
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6.2. On the Role of the MVM, 
Energy Sector Liberalization and 
the RES/Energy Efficiency Chal-
lenge 
The goal of auctioning all carbon cred-
its given to power producers might – 
under very different circumstances – 
seem like a meaningful and potentially 
effective strategy for reducing CO2 and 
GHG output. The threat of increased 
costs to energy producers (resulting 
from the carbon credit purchasing re-
quirement) – especially where the ability 
of producers to pass increased costs on 
to consumers is limited (either by the 
role of competition across energy pro-
ducers and potentially across countries 
or by the less favoured model of regu-
lated energy prices) – is likely to have 
a significant impact on the efficiency of 
energy producers and ultimately on the 
overall energy mix purchased by trans-
mission network operators. Moreover, 
additional incentives to reduce CO2 and 
GHG output could be furthered by im-
posing the requirement that transmission 
network operators first purchase energy 
from renewable producers, and then 
second from other power producers. 
This of course is the ideal model. In 
a completely integrated and liberalized 
European energy marketplace where 
infrastructure transmission lines both 
within countries and across borders 
permit pure competition in power pro-
duction and sale, the above mechanism 
introduced with the European ETS 
should effectively help reduce CO2 and 
GHG output. However, in Hungary, 
everything is different. For one, there is 
no real competition on the energy mar-
ket and the free movement of power 
across borders is limited for various 
reasons. Moreover, and more impor-
tantly, there is no free market in the 
purchase of power. Hungary’s energy 
producers have, for many years now, 
enjoyed long term power purchasing 
agreements (PPAs)50 that fix the profit 
margin on energy production and re-
quire that the government purchase all 
available energy they produce. If other 
cheaper energy producers exist on the 
market (either through other available 
domestic capacity, imports, or the con-
struction of new capacity), MVM is still 
bound by the obligation to purchase 
energy from those producers with 
whom it has long term PPAs.  
The preferential agreements signed by 
Hungary ultimately bound the MVM to 
pay more to electricity producers than 
the sale price to consumers and remain 
valid for some 20-25 years from the 
date of signing (approximately 1997). 
MVM (i.e. the Hungarian government 
and Hungarian citizens) will have to 
compensate significant losses in the en-
ergy sector for some years (2017–2023) 
(Bakos, 2001). Complete liberalization of 
the Energy sector may lower energy 
supply prices, having a further impact 
on related costs to the Hungarian gov-
ernment (and presumably the Hungarian 
tax-payer). Bakos estimated potential 
losses at 300 billion HUF (2001:1129). 
Moreover, made prior to 2001, Bakos’ 
estimate fails to account for the costs 
of energy sector liberalization in 2004 
and 2007, suggesting the total loss will 
be much higher.  
With regard to the EU’s 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package, the Hungarian 
electricity sector configuration represents 
an explicit obstacle. Despite the fact 
that the electricity producing sector is 
directly exposed to the ETS regime and 
will be obliged to purchase all its car-
bon allowances on the open market, 
this is not likely to have a significant 
effect on incentives to improve efficiency 
or reduce CO2/GHG output. For one, 
due to the PPAs all costs can easily be 
passed onto consumers or onto the 
                                                            
50 On PPAs (or what some refer to as long-
term agreements, or LTAs), see Bakos (2001) 
and Domina (2007). 
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MVM (which will have to bear the in-
creased costs as a loss and burden on 
the public deficit). For another, the lack 
of a real regional electricity market in 
Central and Eastern Europe means that 
price competition will have little or no 
effect either on electricity prices in 
Hungary or on the mix of CO2/GHG 
output. Moreover, increased competition 
ultimately only means that either con-
sumers or the government have to as-
sume the costs of any increases in the 
MVM deficit.  
Finally, and what is perhaps most 
perplexing about the Hungarian case, 
little or no incentive is created by these 
interactions to purchase or produce 
more renewable energy. Though domes-
tic fossil fuel energy production will 
increase in price as a result of the ob-
ligation to purchase carbon allowances, 
the obligation to purchase energy from 
its PPA clientele means the MVM faces 
powerful incentives to reduce or keep 
to a minimum any and all competing 
energy production – especially where 
this is attached to a purchasing com-
mitment. Thus for example, although 
the Hungarian Electricity Act (86/200) 
contains a requirement to purchase en-
ergy produced from renewables, the 
MVM has limited the total wind power 
contribution to 330 MWs. Though this 
limitation on the potential contribution 
of wind power is explained away with 
reference to the total “balancing capac-
ity” of the Hungarian transmission net-
work, this ceiling is somewhat hotly 
contested. 
Without entering too deeply into the 
thick of this argument,51 without an 
adequate liberalization of the Hungarian 
energy market – in particular without 
dissolution of the PPAs, – the MVM 
faces very strong incentives to limit the 
share of energy provided by competing 
producers and, in particular, the re-
                                                            
51 See, for example, the EK study provided as a 
supplement to this report. See also Power Con-
sult’s (2007) report prepared for the Hungarian 
Ministry of the Environment and Water.  
newables sector. The lack of adequate 
infrastructure to deal with both the 
high and low fluctuations produced by 
wind power and the relative cost of 
updating simply provide a further ex-
cuse not to raise the ceiling beyond 330 
MWs. Further, though Austria’s total 
electricity-generating capacity is only 
1.84 times that of Hungary, its current 
wind energy generating capacity in 
2007 (982 MWs) was approximately 
three times more than Hungary’s cur-
rent limit in wind power.52 And Austria 
– in particular the Verbund power 
company still plans to extend its wind 
power generating capacity. In Germany, 
the Schleswig-Holstein managed to in-
crease its wind power capacity by 30 
per cent in 2007 and now produces 40 
per cent of its electricity needs from 
wind. Further extensions of Schleswig-
Holstein’s wind capacity are planned.53 
There appear to be at least two pos-
sible solutions to this general problem. 
One is the privatization of the MVM. 
While some note that privatization is 
not equivalent with removing or “un-
bundling” the monopoly control of the 
MVM,54 it would have the benefit of 
potentially removing or limiting the “soft 
budget constraint” the MVM currently 
faces. This ultimately would mean that 
a privatized MVM would be more 
strongly required to encourage power 
production from cheaper producers and 
to put more pressure on PPA produc-
                                                            
52 Data on total electricity generating capacity 
comes from the European Energy and Transport 
Commission (DG TREN). In 2005, Hungary’s 
total electricity-generating capacity was 35.76 
TWs while Austria’s was 65.7 TWs. Data on 
total installed wind-generating capacity is from 
the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA: 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/assets/doc
uments/story/2008/windmap-08g.pdf). 
53 See the press release from the Schleswig-
Holstein Ministry for Science, Economy and 
Transport: “Schleswig-Holstein deckt 40 Prozent 
des Strombedarfs durch Windenergie” (February 
12th, 2008). 
54 Péter Kaderják made this comment at a re-
cent energy conference in Budapest. 
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ers.55 However, privatization alone may 
ultimately not be enough unless the 
government is also willing to dissolve 
the existing PPAs through buyout 
agreements with each of the individual 
power producers. Only in this way can 
Hungary hope to free itself from the 
constraint of paying for more highly 
priced energy, thereby allowing for 
greater competition in the domestic 
marketplace. But ultimately it will also 
be necessary to make good on the EU’s 
project of real energy sector liberaliza-
tion – which includes a consistent build-
ing up of international cross-border 
transmission networks. Though this 
commitment and obligation is already 
present in the energy liberalization di-
rectives and the commitments of the 
March 2002 Barcelona Summit, little 
progress has been made.56   
The cost of these factors of course is 
not well modelled in the European 
Commission’s Impact Assessment (IA) 
studies (in particular SEC[2008]85-V2). 
In particular, the Impact Assessment 
argues that increases in the prices of 
fossil fuels (e.g. oil or natural gas) are 
likely to drive further investment in 
renewables, since this then become 
cheaper in relative terms. However, 
given the above discussion, the Hungar-
ian situation does not appear to fit well 
with the IA analysis. Increased fossil 
fuel and carbon allowance prices are 
simply likely to result in higher energy 
prices. Moreover, the MVM is likely to 
                                                            
55 Privatization might also have the added bene-
fit of distancing the MVM from Paks, further 
promoting real competition in the Hungarian 
energy sector. 
56 See for example CapGemini (2007): the re-
port argues essentially that; “The interconnection 
levels, particularly in Western Europe, remain 
below the level of 10 per cent that was agreed 
upon at the Barcelona European Council of 
March 15 and 16, 2002. Since then only a little 
progress has been made, and most of the 
physical bottlenecks still exist. Consequently the 
list of priority projects has not changed much 
since 2002, even if the EU has tried to acceler-
ate market integration by financing electricity 
transmission projects of European interest”(p. 
63). 
maintain its grip on ceilings to wind 
power and possibly also feed-in tariffs. 
Finally, some attention should be paid 
to who chooses the relative power mix. 
At this writing, it is unclear how much 
leeway power grid or transmission net-
work operators have in choosing the 
mix of power. Though they also do not 
benefit directly from lower emissions or 
higher levels of unused allowances, the 
proximity between such organizations as 
Paks and MVM, for example, is likely 
to produce potentially dangerous con-
stellations. The incentive provided by the 
ETS is to rely as much as possible on 
GHG-free power production. In Hungary 
that could potentially be primarily nu-
clear. Further, if Hungary actually suc-
ceeds in cutting its connections with the 
LTAs, it can likewise sever itself from 
the commitment to buy power strictly 
from the related companies. This would 
then make it possible for them to 
“choose” to use more power from fa-
voured suppliers. Moreover, the poten-
tial to boost government revenues 
through the sale of carbon credits will 
further promote these ties, especially in 
a context where the government is oth-
erwise required to carry the balance of 
MVM losses. 
Such a constellation is unhealthy and 
not likely to promote the use of renew-
ables in a meaningful way. As sug-
gested in an earlier communication with 
the Ministry of the Economy and 
Transport, the EU goal of complete en-
ergy sector liberalization provides an 
opportunity rather than a constraint for 
Hungary. In this regard, EU legislation 
provides incentives both for the privati-
zation of the MVM and for the com-
plete liberalization of the energy sector 
and energy sector trade with other 
countries. Moreover, the 2020 climate 
package likewise provides an additional 
incentive for the government to further 
pursue these goals. 
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6.3. Meeting and Surpassing the 
RES Target – 13 per cent+  
Despite the concern that the 13 per 
cent Hungarian RES target raises, the 
current authors believe that – with 
adequate planning – a 13 per cent RES 
target should be relatively easy to meet. 
However, a number of pre-conditions 
need to be fulfilled before this forecast 
could likely be fulfilled. First, as argued 
above, it is presumably necessary to 
conclude the privatization of MVM, the 
dissolution of existing PPAs and the 
unbundling of MVM, Paks and state 
control. As already noted, without a 
more flexible and competitive domestic 
and cross-border environment in elec-
tricity production, it is unlikely that 
enough responsiveness to renewable en-
ergy production can be generated in 
order to attract long-term investors in 
Hungary.  
A second precondition concerns the 
recognition that the diversity of renew-
able energy production and renewable 
use is at least as important as (if not 
more important than) the relative cost 
of energy production. As outlined in 
detail above, a number of problems 
arise from concentrating RES efforts on 
single sources of renewable energy (in 
particular wind power). For one, as 
noted above, the problems of balancing 
the use of wind (and solar) energy ar-
gue against the logic of exploiting sin-
gle renewable resources. In a wide ex-
panse of the renewables literature, in-
adequate attention is paid to problems 
associated with fluctuating and base 
load power sources. For another, 
greater variation in the instruments 
used to promote renewable energy use 
means that one can have an impact 
both on the production of energy for 
the grid as well as demand for energy 
(both demand on the electricity grid 
and on other forms of energy use, in 
particular natural gas). 
The general perception in Hungary 
appears to be that cost is the principal 
factor inhibiting the spread of renew-
ables and rendering even the 13 per 
cent target difficult for some to imag-
ine. However, a significant share of the 
problem of cost can be addressed with 
the appropriate incentives and related 
policy strategies. For example, when 
presented with geothermal power plants 
and residential heat pumps or house-
hold solar panels as possible solutions 
to improved use of renewables, the 
typical response is that high cost pro-
hibits their use – in particular in less 
developed economies such as Hungary’s. 
However, most of the development costs 
of geothermal, solar and other renew-
ables result from the activities of pri-
vate investors. For another, even where 
the cost of some installations appears 
prohibitive (e.g. household geothermal 
heat pump installations are currently 
several times more expensive in Hun-
gary than elsewhere), the introduction 
of adequate incentives can encourage 
both demand and supply, reducing 
fixed investment costs.  
Introducing an adequate incentive 
and policy structure will have a signifi-
cant impact on the diversity of renew-
able resources. In this regard, Hun-
gary’s feed-in tariff structure is consid-
erably under-developed. It offers one 
flat tariff for all types of renewable 
energy and fails to differentiate by 
price across energy types (though there 
is some variation according to the size 
of the installation). This is above all a 
problem because it favours a monocul-
ture of wind energy production. The 
tariff is apparently set high enough to 
still be attractive for geothermal power 
and district heating installations (see 
section on geothermal in Hungary). 
However, at least one clear casualty of 
the current feed-in tariff structure is 
that private individuals and firms face 
few incentives to install solar power (as 
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noted in the discussion of a hypothetical 
green certificate model, this is the more 
expensive form of renewable energy). At 
26.46 HUF (approximately 0.106 euros) 
for solar and wind energy (29.56 HUF 
or 0.119 euros for other renewables), 
the January 1st, 2008 regulation pro-
vides the most “differentiated” feed-in 
tariff structure to-date (additional cate-
gories for energy generated from waste 
incinerators, hydropower installations 
and various installation sizes). But com-
pared for example to the German tariff 
of 0.434 euros/Kwh, private individuals 
face few incentives to install this tech-
nology. 
Some might argue that the ETS sys-
tem and the carbon price it creates is 
enough to drive investors toward re-
newables and away from fossil fuels. As 
the carbon price rises, so does the rela-
tive attractiveness of renewables. This 
effect is similar to the role of the GO 
green certificate, since the GO green 
certificate lowers the price of renew-
ables compared to fossil fuels and 
raises their attractiveness. However, as 
with the GO green certificate system, 
the basic problem with thinking of car-
bon price as sufficient incentive to 
promote renewable use is related to its 
inability to differentiate across the price 
of different renewable technologies. In 
this regard, differentiated feed-in tariffs 
appear to be the only currently used 
mechanism for promoting broad-based 
and diverse renewable use. 
Though as noted above the principal 
inhibiting factor – in particular where 
photovoltaic (PV) solar power is con-
cerned – is the perception of cost, the 
German feed-in tariff system has oddly 
not been terribly expensive (Table 9). In 
general, based on the report from 
which the above data was taken, Ger-
many produced about 10.4 per cent of 
its electricity needs from renewable 
sources in 2005 (compared to Hun-
gary’s 4.3 per cent). Of the costs re-
lated to the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (which sets the feed-in tariffs), the 
additional cost of electricity consumption 
was about 1.84 euros/month, or 3.4 per 
cent of the total cost. More importantly 
perhaps from the perspective of less 
advanced countries worried about the 
total cost of investing in renewables, the 
price differential created by the German 
feed-in tariffs generated 7 billion euros 
worth of investments in 2005 alone. At 
the current rate, the report cited below 
predicts that by 2020, Germany will 
produce approximately 25 per cent of 
its total electricity needs from renew-
ables. Given the current price of elec-
tricity in Hungary, the additional price 
of renewable energy should be even 
smaller than in the German case. 
Table 9
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Electricity bill (EUR/month) 49,15 48,2 40,66 41,76 46,99 50,14 52,38 54,36
Renewable Energy Sources Act 0,?3 0,28 0,58 0,7 1,02 1,23 1,58 1,84
Heat-Power Cogeneration Act 0 0 0,38 0,58 0,76 0,90 0,85 0,43
Electrivity tax (eco-tax) 0 2,25 3,73 4,45 5,22 5,97 5,97 5,97
Concession charge 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22
Generation, transmission, market-
ing 37,6 33,8 25,15 25,05 28,29 29,9 31,52 32,90
Value-added tax 6,90 6,65 5,60 5,75 6,48 6,92 7,24 7,50
Cent per kWh 17,1 16,5 13,9 14,3 16,1 17,2 18,0 18,6
Electricity bill in prices from 2000 50,97 48,88 40,66 40,94 45,44 47,98 49,32 54,14
Source: copies from the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nu-
clear Safety’s report; “What Electricity from Renewable Energies Costs” (January 2007). 
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The above discussion of the cost of 
photovoltaic solar further ignores more 
recent innovations in the structure of 
PV investments: the rapid increase of 
commercial PV solar use and the recent 
emergence of companies using so-called 
“power purchasing agreements” as a 
strategy to encourage consumer adop-
tion of the technology. PV solar in par-
ticular has suffered from the relatively 
high initial fixed investment costs. While 
high fixed costs have often prohibited 
private individuals from investing in PV 
solar, in particular for household use, 
the two above-noted innovations are 
likely to have a significant impact on 
the rate of range of PV solar adoption. 
With respect to the first big innovation, 
due to size differences, commercial en-
terprises are more easily able to make 
large initial investments. Due also to the 
declining costs of PV solar power – but 
also sometimes to incentives like feed-in 
tariffs – such installations are rapidly 
becoming attractive for commercial in-
stallations. In the US for example, there 
is a rapidly increasing and lengthy list 
of such investors, including such thrifty 
spenders as Wal-Mart’s (along with 
many other corporate giants like 
Macy’s, Home Depot, Google, Safeway, 
HP [note that both the HP and the 
Wal-Mart programs extend to suppliers] 
and now Best Buy, Toyota, Agilent, 
etc.). 
The second big innovation concerns 
PPAs. Many of the investments now 
taking place both at the commercial 
and the residential level are financed by 
PPA agreements that leave ownership 
and the initial fixed investment costs for 
PV solar installations in the hands of 
investors, while private individuals or 
companies agree to buy the energy 
produced over some fixed contract pe-
riod. While these agreements vary, they 
sometimes include the right to purchase 
the solar installation at a reduced price 
at the end of the contract period. Gen-
eral Electric Energy Financial Services, 
SunPower and Sun Run are examples 
of firms engaged in this type of venture 
in the US.57 
While such examples remain un-
known in Hungary for the time-being, 
in the US, commercial solar use is now 
one of the fastest growing segments of 
the PV solar market.58 The innovation 
of PPAs will presumably accelerate this 
phenomenon, as well as accelerating 
household use. Given the comparatively 
high price of electricity in Hungary,59 
such innovations could presumably be 
promoted and ultimately accelerated 
with the introduction of adequate incen-
tives. Moreover, such a strategy could 
presumably help resolve some of the 
problems Hungary currently faces due 
to rising energy and, in particular, ris-
ing electricity prices. Such factors not 
only threaten consumers, they likewise 
threaten future investment prospects.60 
In this general context, an interesting 
cost comparison is provided by current 
discussion of extending the Paks nuclear 
power plant, something which even the 
current Minister of the Environment 
(Szabó Imre) has suggested Hungary 
must seriously consider. The cost of 
                                                            
57 See www.Reuters.com: GE Unit Partners with 
SunPower on California Solar Projects” (January 
7, 2008). SunPower, for example, installed an 
eight-megawatt solar power system for Macy's 
26 California stores, resulting in an estimated 
40-percent reduction in utility-provided energy 
use. This will reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
by more than 195 million pounds "over the 
lifetime of the (solar) systems". The article ar-
gues this is equivalent to removing 1,144 cars 
from California's highways each year. (PIA Press 
Release, in PIA Daily News Reader, 2007/07/31). 
58 See in particular the report from the SEIA 
and the Prometheus Institute, “US Solar Industry 
Year in Review, 2006” (p. 4). 
59 See the recent reports of the REKK  
(http://www.rekk.eu/pdf/epb2008-1.pdf, 
http://www.rekk.eu/pdf/epb2008-2.pdf). 
60 See “Power Prices Threaten Hungarian Pro-
ject” (Financial Times, October 11, 2007). The 
article notes that 6 of Hungary’s big electricity 
consumers lobbied the government to resolve the 
threat of potential power shortages and rising 
prices. As BorsodChem and others claim, rising 
energy prices and the lack of adequate supply 
threaten future investments in Hungary and 
thus ultimately threaten economic competitive-
ness. 
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extending Paks would certainly mount 
into the hundreds of billions of forints.61 
At the same time, at least 1750 MWs 
of wind power have been proposed in 
Hungary. Though this far exceeds the 
330 MW ceiling set by the MVM, if 
appropriately balanced by other forms 
of base load renewable energy – in 
particular geothermal power plants and 
(bearing in mind the reservations ex-
pressed elsewhere in this document) 
perhaps also biomass – this additional 
renewable capacity could easily equal 
the existing capacity of Paks (1760 
MW, or 40 per cent of Hungary’s cur-
rent electricity demand).62 More impor-
tantly however, most of the investment 
in wind power, geothermal and biomass 
could easily be covered by foreign in-
vestment as long as the appropriate 
incentive structure remains in place. 
Paying for the extension of Paks, how-
ever, would primarily come out of the 
MVM and ultimately government budget 
(and thus ultimately the taxpayer’s 
pocket). Finally, the degree of overlap-
ping interests across the three major 
actors (Paks, MVM and the govern-
ment) is this single factor most likely to 
influence which way the decision goes. 
As proposed above, a potentially 
more meaningful strategy is the privati-
zation of the MVM and the unwinding 
of the existing LTAs with domestic 
power producers. While unwinding the 
LTAs is a potentially costly venture, 
having done this provides the opportu-
nity to privatize the MVM, which in 
turn would generate substantial reve-
nues for the Hungarian state. More-
over, the potential reduction of the ex-
penditure on MVM deficits represents 
                                                            
61 As a first measure, according to EK, simply 
the planned renovation of Paks was estimated at 
some 170 billion HUF (EK, 2007:5). 
62 In a pinch, one could also effectively balance 
wind energy with more natural gas-fuelled 
power plants. However, energy security con-
cerns should presumably lead one to favour 
renewable options, the cost of which is set to 
decline while that of natural gas will continue 
to rise. 
an opportunity to improve the govern-
ment’s current account balance. More-
over, assuming adequate regulation is in 
place requiring that all new power 
producers be connected to the energy 
grid and that renewable energy produc-
tion purchase agreements are put into 
place guaranteeing a 100 per cent 
power purchase requirement on the 
part of the MVM, it is possible electric-
ity prices could be significantly reduced 
in Hungary in the longer term. 
The one issue on which there is ab-
solutely no consensus is just how much 
future energy capacity in Europe will 
result from renewables vs. how much 
future capacity will result from fossil 
fuels. Predictions from Capgemini 
(2007), the European Commission 
(2007) and the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2007: Ch.1) all tend to 
suggest the role of fossil fuels will be 
quite large making up some 80 per 
cent of new capacity through 2020 or 
2030. These predictions are mirrored in 
particular by companies involved in the 
energy business that also frequently 
predict a strong role for fossil fuels.  
On the other hand, reports from or-
ganizations representing the renewables 
industry frequently present a somewhat 
different picture of future potential en-
ergy capacity. According to the Euro-
pean Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 
in 2007 Europe installed 8,504 MWs of 
wind capacity, 8,226 MWs of natural 
gas-based electricity and decommissioned 
750 MWs of coal-based and 1,203 
MWs of nuclear-based electricity gener-
ating capacity.63 If additional capacity 
from PV solar and other sources is 
added to these numbers, the contribu-
tion of renewables in Europe in 2007 
begins to look more and more substan-
tial. In 2006, Europe added some 966 
MWs of grid-connected rooftop solar 
and presumably added more in 2007 
(the data are not yet available). The use 
                                                            
63 See “Wind Energy Leads EU Power Installa-
tions in 2007, but National Growth is Inconsis-
tent” (EWEA New Release, Feb. 4th, 2008). 
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of geothermal power plants is likewise 
beginning to increase rapidly in Europe 
and elsewhere. 
The performance of individual coun-
tries in the addition of new renewable 
capacity is quite dramatic. While Ger-
many is typically far and away the 
European leader in adding new renew-
able capacity, Spain surpassed Germany 
as the country with the largest and 
most rapidly growing share of wind 
power in 2007, adding 3,552 MWs in 
one year (more than twice Germany’s 
1,667 MWs). Spain is likewise one of 
the fastest growing solar energy mar-
kets, in particular with respect to con-
centrated solar power (CSP). Perhaps 
the most stunning potential example to-
date arises from Norway’s consideration 
of a plan to build 5,000 to 8,000 
MWs of offshore wind power capacity 
and become one of Europe’s principal 
renewable energy providers (represent-
ing the potential generating capacity 
equal to seven or eight nuclear power 
plants).64  
This laundry list of successful at-
tempts to promote renewable energy 
could be extended. The point however 
is the sharp contrast it provides with 
the predictions of Capgemini, the Euro-
pean Commission and the IEA. While 
these organizations predict that some 80 
per cent of added capacity up through 
2020 will stem from fossil fuel sources, 
the data on added capacity from 2007 
are contradictory. Moreover, all expec-
tations are that the rate of growth of 
renewables in Europe and elsewhere in 
2008 will outpace growth in 2007. Ul-
timately, very little is known about the 
likely composition of the future energy 
mix in Europe and/or Hungary.   
With regard to Hungary, most ana-
lysts appear to underestimate its real 
renewable potential. Why this happens 
is not entirely clear. On the one hand, 
                                                            
64 See the Energi21 report: “A Collective R&D 
Strategy for the Energy Sector”.  
(http://www.energi21.no/index.php?page_id=17). 
many analysts appear to argue that the 
cost of renewable energy is an inhibit-
ing factor. As argued above, however, 
with a little creative thinking, it is pos-
sible to imagine ways of financing addi-
tional renewable energy potential at 
relatively limited expense. More differ-
entiated feed-in tariffs that encourage in 
particular the development of geother-
mal power plants and PV solar in 
households, public use buildings and 
across commercial establishments are at 
least one mechanism that could be more 
vigorously pursued. Moreover, feed-in 
tariffs may trigger other factors such as 
the pursuit of large scale commercial 
PV solar and the development of PPA 
schemes such as those outlined above.  
A second objection is that Hungary 
has no real potential in renewable en-
ergy. However, as noted above, bids to 
provide up to 1750 MWs of wind 
power argue against this notion. More-
over, investors in the geothermal power 
sector (as discussed in the supplement 
provided on geothermal) are likewise 
going ahead with small scale invest-
ments. In fact, for geothermal, estimates 
suggest this segment will provide more 
added capacity by 2013 than EK (2008) 
forecasts for the year 2020. Moreover, 
geothermal industry representatives point 
out that the extent of their investments 
will increase as the prices of competing 
fuels (in particular natural gas) in-
creases. Feed-in tariffs, if appropriately 
structured, can be used as a mecha-
nism to promote such investments at an 
earlier point in time.  
Complementary measures however 
are required to introduce further re-
newable use in the broad range of 
building uses noted above (commercial, 
public use and residential). While feed-
in tariffs can be used to promote PV 
solar, this model is not applicable for 
promoting far broader scale use of 
geothermal heat pumps. Moreover, 
though far broader scale use of this 
particular renewable resource would be 
particularly advantageous in Hungary – 
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since it significantly reduces natural gas 
use and only marginally increases elec-
tricity consumption, thus making the 
most efficient use of Hungary’s carbon 
intensity factors – it remains inade-
quately promoted by public policy 
measures. Measures that provide sub-
stantial rebates, low interest loans, are 
accompanied by significant public 
awareness campaigns and efforts at 
providing adequate public information 
on cost are basic requirements for the 
success of policy efforts. Finally, though 
the output of such resources as geo-
thermal heat pumps are recognized by 
the European Commission’s Proposal for a 
Directive on renewable resources in Arti-
cle 5, Paragraph 1(b) (COM[2008]19:23), 
it is not clear this has been adequately 
recognized by government strategies. 
In conclusion, the overall cost (and 
thus impact on GDP) of having to meet 
the RES target of 13 per cent+ need 
not be that high. In fact, with the cor-
rect choice of tools and strategies, sig-
nificantly more than this is both possible 
and highly desirable in the Hungarian 
context. Moreover, such targets can 
presumably be achieved at minimal cost 
to the government budget and even the 
consumer. In fact, some of these strate-
gies could ultimately reduce end-user 
costs to consumers. However, as out-
lined above in some detail, setting up 
the appropriate conditions under which 
this goal and be achieved in Hungary is 
no simple matter. 
7) ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC       
IMPACT OF THE 2020 PACKAGE 
 
7.1. Analysis of Macroeconomic 
and Industry Branch-Level      
Impact 
Though all eyes are fixed on the poten-
tial economic impact of responding to 
the climate challenge, this is presumably 
the most difficult aspect to predict. 
Moreover, studies attempting to predict 
this impact arrive at wildly different 
conclusions. The recent OECD Environ-
mental Outlook to 2030, for example, 
estimates that only 3 per cent of total 
economic growth up to 2030 would be 
lost if countries were to respond (or 
0.03 per cent per year, OECD, 
2008:24).65 The Gazdaságkutató Zrt. 
(herein GKI), on the other hand, esti-
mates that under a business as usual 
model (BAU), Hungarian GDP can be 
expected to grow by 60 per cent by 
the year 2020 and to increase energy 
use by some 127 PJ, or approximately 
11.4 million tons CO2 equivalent.66 
Based on the very crude calculations 
presented above, without any further 
technological change or energy efficiency 
improvements, Hungary could potentially 
see an increase of GHG emissions by 
some 67 per cent, overshooting its 
                                                            
65 The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy 
Information Administration recently predicted 
that, with the potential introduction of the Lie-
ber-Warner cap and trade bill (S.2191), eco-
nomic growth would be 0.2 per cent to 0.6 per 
cent less than anticipated levels by 2030 (DOE-
EIA, 2008:xi). The Lieberman-Warner cap and 
trade bill failed to pass in the US Senate in July 
2008. 
66 Based on private communication with the GKI 
and the GKI’s preliminary report (2008: 28). 
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2020 target by approximately 55-56 
million tons CO2 equivalent (Table 2). 
In this regard, the implied costs of ful-
filling the EU’s 2020 target criteria are 
potentially substantial. However, this 
estimate is presumably on the high side, 
while that of the GKI is potentially on 
the low side. With effective mitigation 
strategies however, this number should 
ultimately be much smaller, potentially 
even below the EU 2020 target. 
Despite the wide array of available 
cost estimates (in addition to the above, 
the following should also be mentioned: 
the Stern Review, the IMF’s Climate 
Change and the Global Economy, the 
Commission Joint Research Center’s 
2030 and Beyond, and of course the 
Commission multiple Impact Assessments 
in the context of the 2020 Climate 
Change Package),67  there is relatively 
little consensus either on the best 
strategies to choose or even their poten-
tial cost in real economic terms. 
In general, the predicted size of the 
potential economic impact associated 
with responding to climate change is 
very small. In Hungary and potentially 
elsewhere, other factors, such as chang-
ing oil prices, budgetary imbalances 
associated with election year spending, 
austerity policies linked to the drive for 
EMU, mismanagement of the electricity 
market, etc. may potentially have far 
greater impacts on overall GDP and 
competitiveness. Moreover, as should be 
clear from the above analysis, a very 
significant amount of the impact de-
pends on the structure of the EU policy 
approach. As argued above, without 
significant changes in the European-level 
policy approach, in particular with re-
gard to improving flexibility across the 
ETS and non-ETS sectors, with the cur-
rent approach to the GO green certifi-
cate system and with the choice of base 
year, the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package could have comparatively nega-
                                                            
67 There are likewise numerous studies of the 
potential costs for individual countries and eco-
nomic sectors. 
tive consequences for Hungary. If some 
of the alternative approaches discussed 
above are chosen, the impact could 
ultimately be far more favourable. As a 
result of these factors in particular, it 
is exceedingly difficult to provide ade-
quate predictions of the overall impact 
on Hungarian GDP. 
At the same time, much also depends 
on the choices Hungary makes. Estima-
tions of the cost of mitigation greatly 
depend on the assortment of climate 
mitigation strategies governments choose. 
Countries can, for example, opt for 
relatively low cost strategies (e.g. intro-
ducing passive solar considerations into 
building codes, planting more forests) – 
and allow for incentive-based strategies 
(e.g. feed-in tariffs and other methods 
that encourage both industry and pri-
vate individuals to undertake much of 
the required investment), or they can 
opt for higher cost strategies (direct 
state and/or public sector investment in 
plant and mitigation technologies). 
Finally, one additional reason there is 
variation in estimates of the economic 
impact of mitigation strategies can be 
explained by the failure to include the 
multiplier effects resulting from public 
expenditure. In this regard, the “costs” 
imposed by mitigation requirements also 
represent “salaries” and potential future 
consumption. One of the best examples 
of this is provided by Germany’s esti-
mates of the cost of its feed-in tariff 
policies. Alongside the numbers on elec-
tricity generation from renewable 
sources, the last column of data pre-
sents numbers on increases in employ-
ment in the renewables industry (Ap-
pendix C). In fact, many countries re-
port very positive employment effects 
from the growth of and support for the 
renewables sector. 
The basic economic impact of climate 
mitigation strategies will be passed onto 
consumers through three basic channels: 
first, through increased energy costs 
(due to the ETS imposition of carbon-
related costs), second through increased 
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product costs (both through increased 
energy costs and the cost of mitigation 
or purchasing carbon credits in the ETS 
sector), and third through the cost of 
increased government expenditure, in 
particular that additional expenditure 
not compensated by reduced spending 
in other budgetary sectors. Most 
changes in government expenditure will 
result either from increased support to 
individuals, households and firms (e.g. 
for energy efficiency investments, 
through rebates, tax incentives and 
other programs), increased infrastruc-
ture costs, transmission network invest-
ments and increased investments in pub-
lic sector buildings. 
At the same time, the positive spinoff 
effects of such expenditure should gen-
erally be expected to be beneficial for 
the Hungarian economy. As argued 
above, assuming the right policies are 
pursued, renewables investments should 
be broadly manageable and energy effi-
ciency investments should ultimately 
have the effect of promoting a better 
allocation of resources and overall eco-
nomic competitiveness.  
7.2. The Industry and                
ETS Sector Impact 
For ETS sector power plants and branch 
industries, the initial and even long-term 
impact of the 2020 Climate Change 
Package is potentially more problematic 
and ultimately depends substantially on 
the final shape the package will take. 
As argued above, there are several sig-
nificant deficiencies in the general pack-
age, several of which will have a sig-
nificant impact on ETS sector firms. 
First, the lack of flexibility in current 
proposals across ETS and non-ETS sec-
tors means that gains in the non-ETS 
sector cannot be made available to the 
ETS sector. Second, the current policy 
structure imposes most of the emission 
reducing burden on the ETS sector 
alone – in particular in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (including 
Hungary). This imposes potentially sig-
nificant costs on the ETS sector and 
ignores potentially more cost-efficient 
emission reductions in the non-ETS sec-
tor. Third, current proposals create 
powerful incentives to engage in energy 
saving investments related to electricity 
(and not to natural gas). Where reduc-
tions in natural gas use are potentially 
more cost-efficient, unless they have an 
impact on the reduction of direct (on-
site) emissions, they will have no impact 
on the potential to sell ETS sector car-
bon credits. This incentive makes no 
sense since, in Hungary at least, natural 
gas use is more carbon intensive than 
electricity use. Moreover, for ETS sector 
firms, this incentive may artificially re-
strict the range of potential energy sav-
ing choices.  
None of these issues are raised in 
the current proposals introduced by the 
European Commission on January 23rd, 
2008. As a consequence, none of these 
options are ever considered or analyzed 
in the several different Impact Assess-
ment documents (in particular 
SEC[2008]52 and SEC[2008]85-V2) pro-
vided by the Commission. This fact 
greatly complicates the analysis of the 
real impact of EU policies and possible 
alternative scenarios on industry 
branches. As argued throughout above, 
it would ultimately be preferable for the 
EU to adopt a number of alternative 
strategies or modifications of the exist-
ing plans. As argued above, these alter-
native scenarios represent potentially 
more efficient strategies than the ones 
currently proposed and they would 
typically have a far better impact on 
ETS industry branches and the power 
sector. 
Much more work, however, could 
still be done to measure adequately the 
potential impact on the industry 
branches. Just how much GHG reducing 
potential there currently is in each of 
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the ETS sector branches and firms is 
not very clear (and thus it is also not 
very clear what a 20 per cent purchas-
ing requirement on carbon allowances 
with 1.74 per cent annual digressivity 
over the period 2013–2020 really means 
for each of the branches and firms). 
The industry surveys presented below 
provide some information on this point. 
However this analysis could go much 
further. 
Moreover, as argued in this docu-
ment, it would be advisable to have a 
clear picture of the different types of 
GHG emissions in the ETS sector (and 
how accurately they are measured). In 
particular, data on direct on-site GHG 
emissions would be helpful (with some 
indication of whether these are produc-
tion process related or the result of 
building use – i.e. heating and cooling) 
and data on indirect GHG emissions 
(e.g. those related to electricity con-
sumption or building use that is poten-
tially not measured in ETS sector build-
ing use-related emissions). Without this 
data, it is difficult to provide a more 
detailed response about the ideal, most 
cost-efficient and GHG-reducing strate-
gies ETS sector branches and firms 
might pursue. Moreover, it is difficult 
to adequately measure the impact of 
distortions of the current proposed EU 
policy framework.  
The following section analyzes the 
impact of the Climate Change Package 
on the individual industry branches.68 
                                                            
68 For the most part, the documentation used 
for the industrial branch analysis was produced 
by the GKI (Gazdaságkutató Zrt.). Thanks go in 
particular to Judit Barta for making this docu-
mentation available. Where this report does not 
draw from GKI documentation, it relies on 
formal interviews conducted with individual 
branches or on documentation supplied by indi-
vidual branches. Thus the information supplied 
in this analysis, for the most part, reflects the 
views of the industrial branches. Only rarely 
were additional supplementary materials called 
upon to counter the views of the industrial 
branches. 
7.3. The Brick and Ceramics In-
dustry 
The production of brick and ceramic 
products requires an extraordinary 
amount of energy. Thus these industries 
play an important role in carbon diox-
ide emissions. Brick production is pri-
marily a local industry. Producers typi-
cally transport their products no more 
than 200 kilometres from the original 
place of production. Thus this industry 
typically does not compete with the 
products of distant countries. On the 
other hand, this also makes it impossi-
ble for those domestically produced 
goods to reach a market that would 
ensure increased growth potential (in-
cluding the Chinese marketplace). Thus 
the increased costs resulting from the 
EU Climate package only represent a 
potential competitive disadvantage with 
respect to countries bordering the EU. 
The globally competitive position of 
the ceramics industry, on the other 
hand, is very different. Both sanitary 
products and the tile-producing industry 
still measure up to global competition. 
China, however, has broken into this 
sector in a big way. China’s share of 
the world market in 1998 was 16.6 per 
cent and increased to 40 per cent in 
2006. Thus import-competition is strong 
in this segment. In the domestic (and 
the EU) sanitary and tile-producing sec-
tors, the increasing costs incurred from 
carbon trading create real competitive 
disadvantages with respect to the global 
marketplace. 
The characteristics of these two in-
dustries in Hungary are that small, me-
dium and large enterprises all exist. For 
the most part, the SME’s are primarily 
under Hungarian ownership, are capital 
poor and do not really develop their 
own products or production processes. 
In general, larger firms are typically 
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foreign-owned and affiliated with capi-
tal-rich firms or production plants. Far 
more R&D-type activities occur in these 
firms and they likewise exhibit a 
greater capacity to bear financial bur-
dens. 
Concerning energy efficiency, these 
branches have progressed significantly 
with respect to their ability to precisely 
control temperature changes in the pro-
duction process. For the most part, this 
was the result of a change in the 
source of fuel. After the 1980’s, various 
firms shifted from using coal to using 
natural gas. One reason for this was 
that the coal mines closed their doors 
after the system change. However, an-
other reason was that the rising quality 
of the products required more precise 
temperature control. In the production 
of tiles, a temperature of 1000 degrees 
Celsius is necessary. Deviations from this 
temperature cannot range beyond plus 
or minus 1 degree. With coal, it was 
impossible to fulfill this requirement. 
This problem was resolved with the 
introduction of natural gas. This switch 
also led to a significant reduction in the 
sector’s emission of damaging sub-
stances. Due to the technological re-
quirements, a shift to either electricity 
or natural gas use is not likely. 
Understandably, this sector emits a 
considerable amount of wasted heat. 
The large, capital-rich firms for the 
most part re-use this heat energy. How-
ever the SME’s in general are not able 
to re-use this energy source, in part 
because of the related financial obsta-
cles. By re-using wasted heat (e.g. for 
the pre-heating of basic materials), these 
firms could reduce their use of primary 
energy resources by some 30 per cent. 
Another method for reducing the en-
ergy bill would be for these firms to 
produce a share of their own energy 
and to pursue this in the form of “co-
generation”. For the time-being, this 
possibility remains only a distant vision. 
Though for some of the more capital-
rich firms this is a real option, it also 
poses serious constraints. In general 
however, there are not very many large 
firms in this sector and most firms lo-
cate relatively near sources of primary 
materials. Thus generally, the sector is 
not very concentrated. The construction 
of plant-specific energy production fa-
cilities in general would not produce 
significant returns. Even where relatively 
large producers are concerned, produc-
tion is in general so dispersed in multi-
ple plants that it is generally not worth 
building a stand-alone energy generating 
facility. Moreover, co-generation facilities 
imposed significant financial obstacles 
not only for SME’s but also for larger 
firms. 
The presence of consumer associa-
tions however introduces new possibili-
ties. In this case, several large consum-
ers (for example factories, schools and 
other public institutions) can form asso-
ciations and build their own power 
plants. In this case, in could be profit-
able to build one’s own power plant. 
Transferring costs on to consumers 
however is difficult to do. For example 
for bricks, substitute products exist 
such as construction materials for light-
frame houses. An additional problem is 
that the current fall in domestic growth 
weighs in particular upon the construc-
tion industry and those construction 
material suppliers who are linked to 
them. The decline in real incomes re-
duces the number of residential renova-
tions which has a dampening effect on 
the demand for tiles and sanitary prod-
ucts. Brick production, on the other 
hand, is closely linked to the construc-
tion of new houses. This sector would 
have found it easier to bear the burden 
of the environmental challenges if GDP 
had been increasing at the same time. 
Rising costs in the ceramic tile sector 
also have a constraining effect on im-
provements in the concrete and steel-
based tile sector. 
As a result of being included in the 
ETS sector, some SME’s will finally be 
forced to close down. For these firms, 
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the possibility of re-locating production 
beyond Hungary’s borders is generally 
not an option. Many of these firms are 
frequently small-scale family or commu-
nity-based operations. For larger firms, 
it is likely that the least efficient plants 
will be forced to shut down. 
Joint implementation (JI) and clean 
development mechanism (CDM) invest-
ments remain a possibility for the larger 
firms. Some of these types of invest-
ments have already been undertaken in 
the Ukraine, Poland and Russia. The 
fact that more and more former CIS 
states are interested in efficient brick 
and ceramic industry technologies pre-
sents additional opportunities. 
During the first ETS period (2005–
2007), most of the brick industry was 
able to sell carbon quotas and few 
firms in the ceramic industry were re-
quired to purchase additional carbon 
allowances. 
Concerning brick production, it is 
important to emphasize that energy use 
is not the only source of carbon diox-
ide: so-called “technical emissions” are 
also a source. One of the basic materi-
als added to bricks – intended to im-
prove insulation capacity – results in 
the release of carbon dioxide during 
firing. This type of emission can even 
amount to 30-40 per cent of total 
emissions. In order to reduce these 
emissions, it would be necessary either 
to reduce production or to reduce the 
use of these insulating materials. How-
ever, this would also have the effect of 
reducing the insulating capacity of the 
bricks. Thus there does not appear to 
be any convenient or easy way of re-
ducing these emissions. One possible 
solution however would be to switch 
over to a straw or some other agricul-
tural waste product. Because materials 
of this type are incinerated during fir-
ing, they can reduce the use of natural 
gas. Switching to biomass as a fuel 
source is also possible, but runs into 
problems due to the availability of sup-
ply. 
Potential future energy efficiency in-
vestments could include such measures 
as bio-solar drying, but would also re-
quire more labour resources. Future 
investments will not likely to be carried 
out due to the uncertainties in the fu-
ture business climate. 
7.4. Cement and Lime               
Production 
Restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions 
are a cause of great concern to the 
cement producing industry. Nonetheless, 
this branch was able to stay within its 
quotas. But from 2008, this branch will 
become a net-purchaser of quotas. 
Though the share of technical emis-
sions varies substantially based on the 
type of production, they are a specific 
problem for this branch (in 2005 they 
amounted to 58.4 per cent of total 
emissions). Oddly, this share has de-
clined in recent years and is likely to 
continue to decline in the near future. 
Though not all cement producing firms 
have done this, the principal reason is 
that the cement industry is gradually 
shifting over to new fuel sources. Due 
to persistently increasing natural gas 
prices, many firms have switched from 
natural gas to coal and coke. These 
energy sources however are significantly 
more carbon intensive. 
There are several possible ways of 
reducing technical emissions in this sec-
tor: 
(1) One can modify the composition of 
the raw materials that end up in 
the furnace with different additives. 
Though related attempts have been 
successful, their impact has not 
been significant. Additional problems 
arise from the fact that the price of 
these additives (slag compounds) has 
risen due to rising demand and the 
increasing uncertainty regarding a 
predictable, long-term and cheap 
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future supply. Thus far, many pro-
duction plants have been using 
biomass. But the future of this en-
ergy source and the technology re-
quirements create significant obsta-
cles. 
(2) One can improve overall energy 
efficiency. Significant developments 
emerged in this sector after the sys-
tem change and energy use has 
consistently been reduced. Producers 
are now using best available tech-
nology and the Hungarian cement 
industry is the 10th most efficient in 
Europe. Even waste heat is now 
used in this sector. 
(3) The share of additives in the slag 
compounds could be increased. 
However, this ultimately does not 
depend on the producer but rather 
on the consumer and in any event 
is limited by the role of market 
demand. However, when used for 
the construction of bridges, builders 
require cement with high slag-
content. Thus this method does not 
offer a significant option for reduc-
ing emissions. 
The cement industry is suitable for 
burning waste as the atoms in the ma-
terials are broken down by the high 
temperatures and the particularly dam-
aging elements are not absorbed into 
the atmosphere.  
Although rising energy prices have 
already posed a significant challenge to 
actors in this sector, carbon quota 
regulations raise their costs even higher. 
The requirement of buying even small 
amounts of carbon allowances already 
unequivocally results in the destruction 
of their competitive advantage, in par-
ticular with regard to Slovakian, 
Ukrainian and Croatian producers. Do-
mestic demand for cement is covered 
approximately 80-85 per cent by do-
mestic Hungarian firms and the re-
mainder is imported. Due to high 
transport costs, the sector is not ex-
posed to global competition. Currently 
Ukrainian and Croatian producers are 
not burdened by the ETS regulation. 
Slovakian producers, on the other hand, 
received a much higher quota than nec-
essary and thus production can con-
tinue to increase there.  
Even accepting the fact that the firms 
in the sector received their initial quota 
free-of-charge and are only required to 
purchase carbon allowances for emis-
sions that surpass the original quota, 
the ETS regulation causes such a sig-
nificantly high rise in costs for this sec-
tor that already at the price of 20 eu-
ros per ton of CO2, firms produce at 
a loss. 
The increasing rigorousness of GHG 
regulations also affects firms attempting 
to procure slag. Quota costs also weigh 
on slag producers and these costs 
trickle down through supply costs to 
cement producers, further exacerbating 
producer costs. 
Due to the very high share of tech-
nical emissions in the cement industry, 
emission reductions of 21 per cent are 
not realistic. Thus all surplus emissions 
will require the purchase of additional 
carbon allowances. Emissions could be 
drastically reduced if producers shifted 
back to natural gas use, but this option 
is made difficult by the rising price of 
natural gas. 
Similar problems confront the pro-
duction of lime. Technical emissions are 
significant, there are few potential ways 
to reduce them and the plants have 
already employed BAT-technologies. De-
spite the stagnation of product prices, 
supply costs have risen some 60-70 per 
cent. 
7.5. Steel and Iron Production 
In the first ETS trading period, most 
steel producers were able to remain 
within their allotted quotas and many 
were able to sell unused carbon allow-
ances. In fact, due to the initial free 
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distribution of carbon allowances, many 
firms were able to take advantage of 
remaining production capacity without 
being required to purchase additional 
carbon allowances. Though many of the 
interviewed firms expect their produc-
tion to rise in the future, none of them 
were willing to admit they will able to 
meet the 2020 CO2 emission targets 
without having to purchase additional 
carbon credits.  
In general, the firms in this sector 
use developed technologies. Thus, the 
potential for achieving additional emis-
sion reductions is relatively small. 
Among these possibilities, shifting to and 
modernizing existing natural gas burn-
ers will not yield significant emission 
reductions. In recent years, including 
the present, firms have carried out sig-
nificant investments in energy efficiency 
thanks to which the reduction of par-
ticularly dangerous emissions has been 
possible. Though many firms already 
make use of waste heat, some energy 
efficiency improvements are still possible 
in this area. Shifting to electricity or 
natural gas use is not a reasonable 
option and renewable resources are also 
not an option due to the high tempera-
ture requirements in the sector. Other 
firms have not initiated the use of re-
newable energy sources due to difficul-
ties in obtaining permits. 
Varying measures of success are 
likely to confront steel sector firms at-
tempting to adjust to the additional 
costs resulting from the ETS system and 
the elimination of free carbon credits 
and to competition in the international 
marketplace. Some steel product catego-
ries have experienced sharply rising 
demand in recent years (e.g. hot-rolled 
products) and thus will likely survive 
these rising costs. For those sub-
categories that exhibit high CO2 emis-
sions or that produce raw materials for 
other segments of the steel industry, it 
is quite possible these firms will move 
beyond the EU’s borders. 
The interviewed firms are not plan-
ning any JI or CDM projects. 
The firms in this sector are seriously 
contemplating the 20 per cent emission 
reduction target and are considering 
different ways to improve energy effi-
ciency. Depending on the firm, where 
there is some potential to reduce emis-
sions this strategy is frequently limited 
by the vertical nature of production in 
the steel and iron sector. Thus most 
firms will be required to purchase car-
bon credits.  
7.6. Aluminum Production 
Things similar to those said about ac-
tors in the iron and steel producing 
sector can also be said about aluminum 
producers. In general, the firms were 
able to stay within the quotas and thus 
there was no significant need to pur-
chase additional carbon allowances. 
The energy efficiency of the sector is 
continuously improving. However, since 
the share of energy represents the larg-
est share of the budget for these firms, 
improving energy efficiency has been 
one of the principal investment con-
cerns. In recent years, energy efficiency 
improving investments have been con-
tinuously pursued and, thanks to these, 
energy use has been significantly re-
duced. Both natural gas and electricity 
are used as energy sources in produc-
tion. Since these are the most suitable 
energy sources, no switching to other 
energy sources is likely. Due to the 
high temperature requirements, renew-
able energy sources can only be used 
in moderation, typically only for heating 
and hot water. Cogeneration is not un-
known in this sector. Companies buy 
power from plants that produce co-
generated electricity. In recent years, 
the construction of biomass-based power 
plants has also been considered. But the 
current price of biomass and the unre-
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liable nature of the future outlook for 
this energy source pose obstacles for 
such plans. 
Reducing emissions from dangerous 
substances is also not a real possibility 
due the technical problems. One solution 
is the substitution of aluminum waste 
for the basic raw materials. This would 
dramatically reduce energy consumption. 
However, this option is limited by the 
availability of aluminum waste. 
A second possible solution involves 
shifting away from those products that 
are most strongly affected by the intro-
duction of carbon quotas and toward 
the production of higher value-added 
products. Transferring increased costs 
on to customers is also a potential solu-
tion.  
7.7. The Chemical Industry 
The EU’s 2020 Climate Change Package 
also affects the European chemical in-
dustry in several ways. Listed below are 
a few of the more important exam-
ples:69 
∗ The European chemical industry is an 
important user of energy: represent-
ing 12 per cent of EU energy de-
mand. 
∗ The EU chemical industry is responsi-
ble for 16 per cent of total CO2 
emissions in the manufacturing sec-
tor. 
∗ In the past 10 years, the EU chemical 
industry has reduced its GHG emis-
sions by 6 per cent. 
∗ The majority of EU chemical sector 
firms are small and medium-sized 
enterprises (totalling 20,000) whose 
GHG emissions are comparatively 
small. 
                                                            
69 The following is based on documentation 
representing the explicit view of the chemical 
industry association. 
∗ The chemical industry is developing 
into an important factor preventing 
climate change. 
∗ Trade in chemical industry products 
is global and international competi-
tion must be considered. 
The impact of the principal plans on 
the chemical sector: 
∗ An increasing share of the carbon 
allowances in this sector will be auc-
tioned in the future and auctioning 
will soon be the principal mechanism 
for distributing carbon allowances. 
However, the EU’s role in auctioning 
carbon allowances imposes a unilat-
eral, EU-specific price burden on 
firms whether they work at maxi-
mum CO2 efficiency or not. More-
over, due to the impossibility of cal-
culating future carbon prices, auc-
tioning results in considerable uncer-
tainty. 
∗ The power of the EU ETS system is 
increasing: 
o The definition of incinerating de-
vices is being broadened such that, 
as a result, more chemical sector 
activities will come under its pur-
view. (In Hungary, this already 
happened previously). 
o The inclusion of new activities: 
? Emissions from aluminum pro-
ducing firms. 
? In the chemical sector eight ac-
tivities: producers of carbon 
from the charring of organic 
materials; nitric acid producers; 
adipin acid producers; produc-
ers of glyoxal or glyoxil acid; 
producers of ammonia; produc-
ers of organic elementary sub-
stances by cracking, reforming; 
producers of hydrogen and syn-
thetic gases by reforming or 
partial oxygenation; producers 
of sodium carbonate and so-
dium hydrogen carbonate. 
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o New GHG-producing substances 
are also being included in addition 
to CO2. N2O in particular pre-
sents a problem for the chemical 
industry. 
∗ Sectors that are placed at risk as a 
consequence of their emissions (for 
those producers who are not able to 
pass on rising prices and are thus 
obliged to move beyond the EU’s 
borders, thus raising global emis-
sions) will be able to receive free 
CO2 allowances based on bench-
marking. By June 30th, 2010, the 
Commission will determine which 
branches are affected and will review 
this decision every three years. 
The most important messages from the 
chemical sector: 
∗ The relocation of firms and technolo-
gies and rising CO2 emissions at the 
global level. 
∗ The current situation is decidedly 
complicated. A working system is 
necessary that would both easily 
monitor and also maintain competi-
tiveness and production within the 
EU’s borders. 
∗ Flexibility is necessary, in addition to 
the ability to exploit the possibilities 
of JI/CDM projects. 
∗ Predictability must be established over 
the long term (thus reviews that oc-
cur every 3 years are not a viable 
option). 
∗ The free distribution of carbon al-
lowances based on the BAT-
benchmark better serves the internal 
market than the auctioning of carbon 
allowances. 
∗ The energy intensive branches are 
particularly exposed (this represents 
a big risk for the chemical sector 
due to its relative complexity, the in-
tegrated structure of its branches 
and the difficulty of protecting it 
against exposure). 
∗ Chemical industry representatives 
suggest that the procedure for the 
eight special branches should be 
based on the free distribution of 
carbon allowances based on the BAT 
benchmark. 
∗ Small firms with relatively low emis-
sions should be excluded. 
∗ Methods for clarifying indirect emis-
sions should be clarified. 
7.7.1. The Opinion of the Chemical 
Sector on the EU ETS 
The Hungarian Chemical Industry Asso-
ciation supports international coopera-
tion against climate change and in this 
regard the general ambition to reduce 
greenhouse gases. In this regard, it 
proposes the elaboration of a new in-
ternational cooperation framework that 
would also incorporate the largest emit-
ting countries. This would make it pos-
sible to pursue a long-term strategy for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
without distorting economic competitive-
ness. 
Unilateral measures cannot guarantee 
the reduction of greenhouse gases at 
the global level and severely threaten 
the competitiveness of European industry 
– in particular that of the energy inten-
sive sectors. Since chemical sector firms 
are substantial energy users and use 
technical processes that emit large 
amounts of GHGs, the chemical sector is 
the most seriously threatened sector. 
Since the chemical sector is exposed to 
strong international competition, if it 
wants to remain competitive, it will not 
able to meet the costs of purchasing 
additional carbon allowances for CO2 
and GHG emissions through the ETS 
system.  According to the chemical in-
dustry, it is unacceptable and techni-
cally unjustifiable that the constraint of 
having to purchase carbon allowances 
should penalize firms that already em-
ploy carbon and energy efficient tech-
nologies.  
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Appropriate amendments are cur-
rently missing from the long-term 2020 
strategy and thus complete uncertainty 
presents significant obstacles to investor 
planning. The chemical industry typically 
plans technology change out over sev-
eral decades. This legal uncertainty in-
evitably leads investors to move devel-
opment plans beyond EU borders. As a 
result, Europe loses jobs and incomes 
while global level emissions are not re-
duced. Rather, they increase (“carbon 
leakage”). 
The interviewed firms did not use up 
their quotas in the first ETS period. 
However, in the second period, some 
firms were required to purchase addi-
tional carbon allowances. Several firms 
have already made efforts to reduce 
their CO2 emissions. Some of them have 
switched from heating oil to natural 
gas, leading to significant emission re-
ductions. Due to intense competition, 
energy efficiency has also been an im-
portant strategy and many firms al-
ready employ BAT technology. The use 
of waste heat is common and most ac-
tors in the chemical industry make use 
of this energy source. Where firms 
produce their own power, cogeneration 
is frequently used. Many energy effi-
ciency improving investments are also 
now underway at the interviewed firms. 
Since the chemical industry is a signifi-
cant electricity-user, the elimination of 
free quotas in the electricity-generating 
sector is likely to raise prices for the 
chemical sector. The chemical sector 
however is not in a position to pass on 
these costs. Thus their competitiveness is 
likely to deteriorate. 
Firms (including the larger ones) in 
the chemical sector have no plans for 
the realization of JI/CDM projects. This 
typically is not part of their general 
profile. Emission reductions are thus 
usually pursued within the firm and the 
2020 targets will most likely be re-
solved by purchasing carbon allowances 
and being obliged to accept the damage 
to their competitive position. 
7.8. The Paper Industry 
Paper production itself does not give 
rise to CO2 emissions. However the 
production process does require a sig-
nificant amount of energy. For the most 
part, paper producers were able to 
abide by their quotas. Few had to pur-
chase additional allowances while most 
firms could sell surplus allowances. 
Domestic paper consumption grows 
at an annual rate of approximately 4-5 
per cent and can be expected to con-
tinue growing over the next 5-7 years. 
Domestic producers fulfill 60-70 per 
cent of domestic demand, the remainder 
is imported. The most significant com-
petitors are in Europe and the Far East. 
Due to the continuous rise in energy 
prices and increasingly intense competi-
tion, Mondi Szolnok Zrt was obliged to 
shut down operations on March 20th, 
2008 due to increasing losses. This pro-
vides a good example of the competitive 
situation in the sector. Actors outside 
the EU (in the US and the Far East) are 
not constrained by the requirement of 
purchasing carbon allowances. Thus the 
profitability and competitive position of 
European producers is deteriorating. 
Rising energy prices have a noticeable 
impact on expenditure and product 
prices are not able to keep up with the 
changes.  
In the last 10 years, firms in this 
sector have significantly improved their 
energy efficiency. The energy required 
to produce one ton of paper (whether 
electricity or steam energy) has been 
reduced by 20-40 per cent. Though 
there is still room for improved effi-
ciency, current Hungarian paper pro-
ducers exhibit a high degree of effi-
ciency. 
Many firms acquire the necessary 
energy directly and in significant 
amounts from the market. Where this is 
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not the case and firms produce their 
own energy, several different energy 
sources are used. Though some firms 
are 100 per cent users of natural gas, 
others use oil and some newly built 
factories also use up to 85 per cent 
coal-based energy. 
Within the sector, it is meaningful to 
distinguish between cellulose and paper 
producers. In one Hungarian cellulose 
plant, 70 per cent of the energy comes 
from biomass and more biomass use is 
planned. In another carton producing 
plant, however, 100 per cent waste 
paper is currently being used.  
Competition is strong in both sectors 
and the branch as a whole competes 
with the global market. 
The respective firms have no plans 
for JI or CDM ventures. 
The paper industry is unanimous in 
its opinion that, as a result of the mod-
ernization process, the past years’ in-
vestments have significantly increased 
their energy efficiency. Future potential 
for improvement in this regard is thus 
relatively limited. Thus energy efficiency 
improvements of 20-40 per cent will 
not likely re-occur in the future. The 
elimination of free quotas in an already 
tight market further damages the prof-
itability of these firms and creates ad-
vantages for producers outside the EU. 
7.9. The Glass Industry 
Glass production results in CO2 emis-
sions from two sources. One source 
arises from the natural gas used to 
heat the smelting furnaces from which 
approximately 70-90 per cent of the 
CO2 emissions arise. The other source 
is the technical emissions that arise 
from the chemical effects of heating the 
raw materials (soda, limestone, dolomite 
and coal). These make up a total of 
10-30 per cent of emissions. 
In order to improve energy effi-
ciency, firms can employ oxygen-
burning technologies. However, this is a 
very expensive process and only results 
in a significant reduction of emissions 
in a small number of cases. The higher 
degree heating potential of natural gas 
does raise overall energy efficiency. The 
use of glass cullet (recycled container 
glass) is also a potential solution, but it 
does not result in a significant reduc-
tion of CO2 emissions. Though domestic 
glass collection for recycling purposes 
fails to provide an adequate supply, 
several firms are able to buy glass cul-
let from the larger Central European 
regional marketplace. 
In general, the energy efficiency of 
the existing smelting furnaces rises 
above the West European average. Thus 
one cannot count on significant potential 
for improvement. 
Most glass industry companies were 
able to stay within their quotas during 
the first ETS period and during the 
second period (2008–2012) few pur-
chases of additional carbon allowances 
are likely. The majority of firms count 
on the stagnation of, or a minimal re-
duction in, CO2 emissions. This will 
result from the gradual aging and re-
placement of smelting furnaces and the 
related rise in efficiency, as well as 
from the use of CO2-reducing technolo-
gies.  
In the past period, there was no 
change with regard to the choice of 
energy sources, thus it is unlikely one 
can count on this in the future periods. 
100 per cent natural gas use has al-
ready been realized in this sector. The 
use of waste heat has been experi-
mented with in a few plants, but has 
not resulted in significant improvements 
in energy efficiency. 
Firms tend to respond very differ-
ently to the elimination of free quotas. 
According to some, this would not 
worsen their competitive position. Some 
think they would even be able to gain 
revenues from this. According to others, 
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however, products coming from the Far 
East are likely to compete more and 
more strongly with European products. 
Thus this would result in a loss of 
profitability. Many regard the consistent 
rise of domestic natural gas and elec-
tricity prices as a real threat. 
According to experts from the Hun-
garian Glass Industry Association, the 
glass sector will not be able to stay 
within the 2020 quotas. Some firms 
think it is conceivable that this will fa-
vour using waste- or recycled glass. 
Firms in the glass sector are not 
planning any JI or CDM-type projects. 
7.10. District Heating 
District heating firms have so far been 
able to stay within their quotas. There 
are many reasons for this: 
∗ They generally received surplus quo-
tas. 
∗ Production has declined (favourable 
weather conditions, consistent pro-
gress with insulating residential build-
ings) 
These firms are not likely to be able 
to remain within their 2020 quotas. On 
the producer side, there are several 
opportunities for improving overall effi-
ciency, such as the use of flue gas or 
geothermal energy (see the geothermal 
supplement). Several firms are thinking 
about the possibility of using renewable 
energy or how they might be able to 
add more co-generation capacity. But 
there is ultimately more potential for 
CO2 emission reductions on the side of 
consumers and reducing the demand 
for heat. These firms are persistently 
investigating the potential for improving 
efficiency. 
In the past 15 years, there has been 
considerable change in the use of en-
ergy sources. Solid fuels and heating oil 
have given way to natural gas use. The 
newest district heating plants typically 
use 100 per cent natural gas.  
Concerning the elimination of free 
quotas, this above all is likely to reduce 
the competitiveness of the larger firms – 
smaller firms are not subject to the ETS 
requirements. Despite the fact that this 
is not a supply-dominated market, the 
increasing costs resulting from the quo-
tas are difficult to pass on to consum-
ers. The renunciation of district heating 
represents the sectors principal barrier 
to raising prices. In particular, subsi-
dized natural gas prices make alterna-
tive heating systems more favourable. 
The persistent rise in natural gas prices 
and the comparatively fixed nature of 
market prices significantly narrows dis-
trict heating profit margins. 
These firms do not currently plan 
any JI/CDM-type investments. However, 
should carbon prices go sky high, they 
will consider this option more carefully. 
7.11. Conclusions based on the 
situation of the industry 
branches 
After the system change, for the most 
part the various sectors of Hungarian 
industry underwent significant privatiza-
tion or simply closed down. The least 
efficient firms completely shut down. 
Those firms that continued operations 
undertook significant developments. 
During the 90s and even up through 
the years following 2000 the types of 
technologies that were imported into the 
country were among the best and the 
most efficient in individual sectors. 
With the rise of energy prices, these 
developments received continued sup-
port. Investments pursuing greater en-
ergy efficiency and reducing the emis-
sion of damaging substances were at 
the top of the agenda. Thanks to these 
investments, the large energy intensive 
sectors are able to compete efficiently 
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with European firms. However, in some 
sectors, the strength of global competi-
tion resulting from the price-competitive 
impact of Far Eastern firms represents 
a significant factor. 
The efficiency of raw material use 
has increased significantly in recent 
years. An evolution of comparable mag-
nitude is not likely by 2020. Industry is 
already an efficient user of raw materi-
als. Thus it is unlikely that the affected 
sectors will be able to attain their tar-
gets and thus remain within their allot-
ted quotas. Thus these firms will be 
required to fulfill these goals by pur-
chasing carbon allowances. Most firms 
do not plan JI or CDM projects. How-
ever this fact could easily change if the 
price of purchasing additional carbon 
allowances goes sky high. On the other 
hand, significant limitations are imposed 
by the fact that JI and CDM type in-
vestments are complicated and often do 
not really fit well into the investment 
plans of individual firms or sectors. 
8) SOME IDEAL CARBON     
MITIGATION STRATEGIES    
EMERGING FROM THIS ANALYSIS 
Since a key element in keeping costs 
and the overall impact on GDP down is 
the pursuit of effective national-level 
strategies, ample attention should be 
paid to the type of strategy most likely 
to reduce overall costs. Some general 
strategies that might be pursued in or-
der to keep costs down are the follow-
ing: 
(1) Introduce building codes that re-
quire attention to/consideration of 
passive solar and other emission re-
ducing features in all buildings (not 
just residential buildings). Other 
emission reducing features include: 
geothermal heat pumps, sun collec-
tors for hot water, high insulation 
factor requirements and other fea-
tures focused in particular on re-
ducing natural gas dependence. 
(2) Aggressively promote energy effi-
ciency investments in private house-
hold, large-scale residential, public 
use, municipal and other public sec-
tor, commercial and industrial 
buildings (factories, warehouses, of-
fice buildings, etc.). 
(3) Aggressively promote low energy 
use appliances (compact fluores-
cents, low energy use TV’s, re-
fridgerators, computers and other 
high efficiency electronic appliances). 
(4) Use the EU energy sector liberaliza-
tion program as a strategy to open 
up access to and break MVM’s 
control of the Hungarian energy 
grid (transmission network) – in 
particular with respect to the devel-
opment of renewables (wind, solar, 
geothermal and biomass). 
(5) Use differentiated feed-in tariffs to 
promote diversity in renewables 
(esp. base load power sources: geo-
thermal power plants, but also 
household use of renewables, in 
particular PV solar).  
(6) Combine a rural development strat-
egy (drawing upon EU rural devel-
opment funding) with a strategy for 
promoting regional and local energy 
independence – in particular by 
promoting local and small scale re-
newable energy production (wind 
turbines and/or small hydro). 
(7) Extensive re-a-forestation. 
9) CONCLUSIONS 
How the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package will fair in the EU legislative 
process remains unclear. Though deci-
sions must be made quickly, both to 
adequately prepare the groundwork for 
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the next round of negotiations over 
Kyoto II and to stem the tide of climate 
change, there is a good chance current 
EU negotiations will encounter substan-
tial resistance. Though the EU potentially 
provides a framework for fairly distrib-
uting the burden of reducing GHG 
emissions, the EU has so far been un-
successful in doing this. To-date, most 
of the “burden” has been transferred to 
the Central and East European new 
member states. While this fact produced 
little resistance for the first Kyoto 
round, current negotiations are likely to 
produce far greater resistance.  
Fairness in burden-sharing presuma-
bly means the more advanced EU mem-
ber states – in particular those with 
higher per capita GHG emissions – 
should bear a significantly higher share 
of the burden. Moreover, the burden 
should presumably be based on a 
measure approximating both fair and 
sustainable usage of the world’s envi-
ronment in the international sense:  i.e. 
an GHG emission level that is directly 
correlated with a state’s share of the 
world population. At the same time 
however, new targets should presumably 
taken into account progress already 
made (or the failure to make progress). 
To-date, the EU experience leaves lit-
tle assurance that such a fair distribu-
tion of the burden can be achieved. For 
one, the lack of transparency behind 
the choice of GHG emission targets and 
the choice of base year make genuine 
consultation and negotiation difficult. As 
an exercise in policy formulation and 
evaluation, this is an excellent example 
of how not to do things. More impor-
tantly, many of the policy proposals 
themselves – as currently formulated – 
seem ill-suited to achieving the impor-
tant goals of climate mitigation. Thus, 
several of the policy proposals, in par-
ticular the choice of a 2005 base year, 
the lack of flexibility across ETS and 
non-ETS sectors and the choice of an 
undifferentiated GO green certificate 
system seem either strongly tilted to-
ward Western interests or simply ill-
suited to the important task of pursuing 
the introduction of diverse renewable 
energy sources, greater GHG reductions 
and high levels of energy efficiency. 
This report notes with some concern 
that these obstacles could potentially 
jeopardize the future of the proposed 
2020 Climate Change Package. 
Given the overall importance of re-
sponding to the challenge of climate 
change, these points require immediate 
resolution. A first step in this regard 
would be to require the release of the 
relevant data and mathematical models 
to public and scientific scrutiny. A sec-
ond step would be to extend the range 
of possible Impact assessment scenarios 
in the manner suggested above. In par-
ticular, considering greater flexibility 
across the EU ETS and non-ETS sectors 
would seem a crucial component to 
adequate analysis of the possible policy 
scenarios – in particular for Hungary. 
A third step is to consider revision of 
the EU-level GO green certificate model. 
A fourth step is to consider alternatives 
to the currently proposed targets – in 
particular one based on per capita 
emissions but set at a level that fairly 
and accurately recognizes past achieve-
ments (as of 1990 or the respective 
base year). Such a strategy is likely to 
facilitate greater intra-EU cooperation 
and may help to eliminate many of the 
current roadblocks to a successful reso-
lution of the EU’s 2020 Climate Change 
Package. 
The consequences of failure to make 
these basic changes in the 2020 Climate 
Change Package are quite serious. For 
one, strict divisions across the ETS and 
non-ETS sector could ultimately have the 
disturbing impact of promoting energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions in-
vestments where they are likely to have 
the weakest, not the strongest, impact. 
Moreover, the failure to adequately in-
centivize the state is likely to mean that 
Hungary (and presumably also other 
countries) will have a far more difficult 
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time obtaining the goals set out in the 
2020 Climate Change Package. For an-
other, the current GO green certificate 
proposal is entirely inadequate for re-
sponding to the goals of diversity in 
renewable energies, the promotion of 
renewable base load power and ulti-
mately the reduction of energy depend-
ence. 
On the other hand, the goals set out 
in the 2020 Climate Change Package 
are important for the survival of man-
kind. In that vein, the intent of the 
2020 Climate Change Package is posi-
tive even if it remains inadequate in 
many of its current details. Thus this 
report strongly recommends that Hun-
gary bargain vigorously with other 
states in the hopes of achieving a more 
efficient and effective climate change 
package. 
 
* * * * * 
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APPENDIX A 
Country Positions on 2020 Climate Package 
 
Problems with Base Year (2005 vs. 1990) 
 
Probably the single most important observation 
is that from all of the countries that have so 
far submitted national positions on the proposed 
2020 Climate package and related Directives, 
the Central and East European countries consis-
tently mention the shift in base year from 1990 
to 2005 as a significant problem. All of the 
CEEC’s clearly prefer 1990 to the proposed 
2005 base year.  Arguments against the 2005 
base year range from the potential loss of 
credit for good performance to lost transpar-
ency in the international Kyoto negotiation 
framework. This clearly appears to be one of 
the key issues for negotiation and is likely to 
create a significant political split across the 
more and less advanced, or the old and new 
EU member states. Countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and Greece do not mention the issue 
of the 1990 base year. This is presumably be-
cause they, like most of the advanced states, 
are explicitly advantaged by the choice of 2005 
as a new base year (i.e. they are forgiven for 
significantly overstepping their early Kyoto tar-
gets). Denmark and Sweden however are likely 
to be big losers from the 2005 base year (since 
they have made the most progress in genuine 
emissions’ reductions) and may be willing to 
support the 1990 base year. 
 
GO Green Certificates and National Level Sup-
port Mechanisms 
 
The second major issue addresses whether or 
not the GO green certificate system proposed by 
the European Commission has sufficient flexibil-
ity to be compatible with national-level support 
mechanisms. Most countries appear to favour 
some form of cross-country trade in renewable 
energy. In general however, respondents argue 
there is likely to be insufficient compatibility 
across the two systems (at least as currently 
defined) and most countries express the concern 
that the GO system represents a significant 
threat to national-level support mechanisms. 
Countries generally favour their national level 
support mechanisms due to the relative flexibil-
ity they offer in promoting different kinds of 
renewable technology. The general fear is that 
one EU-wide green certificate system set at one 
price will undermine national-level support 
mechanisms. The ability to offer different “feed-
in” prices for energy produced from different 
technologies (solar, wind, tidal, etc.) is generally 
seen as an explicit advantage of the national 
support mechanisms.  
There is some disagreement about whether a 
GO system would lead to one high GO certifi-
cate price based on scarcity of supply (Italy’s 
position), or on a price set at the level of the 
most expensive energy source (Germany’s posi-
tion). Both Italy and Germany thus argue that 
the GO system as currently defined would be 
highly inefficient. The other argument repeated 
by some of the other countries who fear their 
national level systems would be undermined 
suggests that one low GO certificate price 
would emerge, making it possible to support 
only the cheapest renewable sources and reduc-
ing the relative diversity of renewable sources. 
Portugal, for example, mentions an interest in 
developing tidal energy sources, but is con-
cerned that the EU-wide GO system would make 
this impractical. 
With respect to the debate over the EU-wide 
GO system versus national-level mechanisms, 
both Spain and Portugal, despite being less 
developed than many other EU member states, 
are strong supporters of national level support 
mechanisms and argue against the GO system 
in its current form.  
Given the very small number of supporters of 
the GO system, it is likely that this element will 
be either strongly modified or eliminated in 
future negotiations. Only the UK seems to be a 
very strong supporter of this model. 
 
ETS and non-ETS Sectors 
 
Additional issues of interest are the support 
from three states (the UK, Estonia and Poland) 
for increased flexibility or the free allocation of 
carbon quotas across national-level ETS and 
non-ETS sectors and mention of concern over 
approaches to energy intensive industries (in 
particular Italy and Romania). On the other 
hand, there were surprisingly few responses in 
this general category given its overall impor-
tance.  
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Energy Efficiency 
 
Though not included as one of the categories 
for comment on the climate change package, a 
few countries noted the failure to treat this 
element of the package here. Germany in par-
ticular argued that energy efficiency should 
have a higher profile (receive more attention) in 
the overall discussions. Italy argued that energy 
efficiency should receive more attention, in par-
ticular because of its importance for the non-EU 
ETS sectors, and noted that countries should not 
be left to deal with energy efficiency issues 
entirely on their own. This report generally 
argues that more flexibility across EU ETS and 
non-EU ETS sectors would be an explicit advan-
tage for Hungary (as argued in the Hungarian 
position). It would be far more advantageous to 
pursue extensive energy efficiency measures, in 
particular in the public sector, if these are 
easily rewarded under the ETS system. One 
problem in this regard however is likely to be 
the degree of verifiability of the resulting GHG 
reductions. 
 
Sustainability (Biofuels and Biomass) 
 
In general, countries support the initiative to 
create sustainability criteria. Very few countries 
argue against establishing these criteria and a 
few even argue in favor of extending the sus-
tainability criteria to include economic and so-
cial criteria in addition to the current environ-
mental criteria. Countries wishing to extend the 
criteria tend to be concerned about the poten-
tial negative impact on food production (rising 
costs) and land use (loss of bio-diversity). 
The greatest amount of conflict in this category 
is likely to come from divisions over how 
strongly the EU should support free trade in 
biofuels (and/or biomass). A few important 
countries (in particular France and Poland) are 
resistant to the introduction of free trade. Most 
countries however support the concept of free 
trade and are likewise usually supportive of 
extending sustainability criteria to the trade 
regime. It may ultimately be possible to get 
countries that oppose free trade to agree with 
the guarantee of imposing strong sustainability 
criteria on both internal EU trade and trade 
with third countries. 
 
CCS 
 
There is typically little or no discussion of CCS 
in the country position papers. There does not 
appear to be strong opposition to this goal. But 
neither is their strong support (if one can in-
terpret the lack of response in this way). In 
general, where CCS is mentioned, there is like-
wise support for further research on the tech-
nology (in particular from the coal-rich states 
Poland and the UK and from the Netherlands 
which has set on a CCS future and has at least 
2 demonstration projects). It is interesting that 
there was little mention of CCS in the Finish 
position paper, since at least one private sector 
project to develop CCS in Finland is known to 
the authors of this report. At the same time 
however, caution against excessive (especially 
financial) support of CCS is warranted. As this 
report mentions, this technology is still under 
development and there have been no successful 
“demonstration projects” to-date. The timeline on 
these projects comes much too late to be helpful 
for meeting the EU’s 2020 target. On the other 
hand, if successful, such a technology could go 
a long way to contributing to GHG reductions 
in 3rd countries (for example China). 
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Table 1 
General Comments 
 
 General Additional comment 
Belgium 
Support but want more flexibility and 
fairer burden-sharing (no detail pro-
vided) 
Need cooperation/participation from other 
developed countries 
Britain Support Higher levels of free allocation, prevent leakage 
Cyprus Emphasize special national circumstances Concern about RES target 
Estonia 1990 as base year for GHG's Clear rules on electricity import (prevent leakage) 
Finland Support   
France Support   
Germany 
Emphasize manufacturing competitive-
ness, proper account of past perform-
ance, fair burden-sharing 
Step up efforts on energy efficiency 
Greece Support   
Hungary Principal emphasis on 1990 base year   
Italy Energy efficiency should be given more 
weight and not left up to states 
RES and GHG targets should be revised in 
light of national potential in non EU ETS 
sectors with due weight to energy efficiency, 
no or inadequate cost-benefit analysis 
Lithuania Should consider progress since 1990 
base year 
States must also ensure energy security, eco-
nomic viability, competitiveness and social 
welfare,  emphasize national circumstances: 
closure of nuclear power plant, 70 per cent 
rise in GHG emissions related to power, 250 
per cent rise in energy prices (with more 
expected) 
Netherlands Support Supports 2005 base year, data from 1990 not as reliable 
Poland Heavy emphasis on competitiveness Concerned about potential leakage 
Portugal Support   
Romania 
Strong objection to 2005 base (instead 
of 1990 or original base year), not 
compensated for 1989-2005 reductions 
Must include 3rd countries (leakage) 
Slovakia 1990 base year 
High relative costs for NMS, concern about 
potential leakage due to domestic GDP im-
portance of energy intensive sectors 
Spain Support 
Subsidiarity should be observed, especially 
concerning national level RES support 
mechanisms 
Sweden Support   
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Table 2 
EU ETS 
 
 Division between ETS sectors and not EU or state-level cap Additional comment 
Belgium       
Britain 
Economy-wide targets (not 
based only on ETS sec-
tors) 
EU-wide   
Cyprus       
Estonia 
No strict division, emission 
reductions easier in non-
ETS sectors 
  
Exclusion of SME's under 10 
ktons (if adopt measures to 
reduce emissions) 
Finland       
France       
Germany       
Greece       
Hungary 
Favours more flexibility at 
the national level to allo-
cate carbon quotas across 
ETS and non-ETS sectors 
    
Italy   
Must determine now (not 
in 2011) what special ar-
rangements will be 
granted to energy inten-
sive industries to prevent 
leakage 
Address energy efficiency 
here, see risk of leakage 
even with international 
agreement 
Lithuania       
Netherlands Approves recognition of CCS in ETS   
Poland 
Favours no strict division, 
more flexibility (potential 
in non ETS sectors) 
    
Portugal       
Romania     
Adopt EU-wide sectoral stan-
dards for energy intensive 
industries 
Slovakia       
Spain       
Sweden       
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Table 3 
CCS 
 
  12 demonstration projects Comment 
Belgium     
Britain Support   
Cyprus     
Estonia Projects should include sequestration in addition to storage, funding from 7th FP   
Finland     
France     
Germany     
Greece     
Hungary     
Italy     
Lithuania     
Netherlands Strong support, Govt has opted for a CCS future 
2 demonstration projects, thinks of as ex-
portable technology (China/India) 
Poland Supports, would host 1-2 projects Geological identification and specification of land & marine storage locations 
Portugal     
Romania     
Slovakia     
Spain     
Sweden     
 
89 
Table 4 
Sustainability Criteria 
 
 Biofuels Biomass Comment 
Belgium 
Want sustainability criteria 
made explicit in Renew-
able Directive and com-
patible with "quality of 
fuels" directive 
  
Want effective system 
for evaluating sustain-
ability criteria 
Britain 
Wider, more challenging 
criteria than currently de-
fined 
    
Cyprus       
Estonia     
Free, unrestricted trade 
with non-EU states 
Finland 
Further sustainability as-
sessment, neutral raw ma-
terial criteria 
Forest-based biomass sustain-
ability criteria should be con-
sistent with existing (nat) cri-
teria 
Wants certified peat 
included when reduces 
GHG by +35 per cent 
France Favours transparent crite-ria   
Appears to favor a 
"French" biofuel plan 
and attention to com-
petitiveness of European 
biofuel industry 
Germany 
Early adoption of mini-
mum requirements, should 
also apply to imports 
Same 
Address cultivation, pro-
tecting natural habitats, 
reduction of GHG's, 
risks to small farmers 
and food production 
Greece 
Taken into account na-
tional level difficulties in 
meeting target 
  
Include ALL renewable 
energy sources in trans-
port in 10 per cent 
Hungary       
Italy 
Binding targets acceptable 
where production is sus-
tainable, 2nd generation 
fuels become available & 
fuel quality directive 
amended appropriately 
Same environmental sustain-
ability criteria should apply 
Criteria must be envi-
ronmental, economic 
and social, with clear 
certification mechanisms 
for imports, no trade-
offs between,  imports 
and 2nd generation bio-
fuels, no import tariffs 
Lithuania 
Express concern that 5 
per cent biofuel mix may 
not be compatible with 
some vehicles 
    
Netherlands Supports sustainability cri-teria, should include trade   
Poland Warns against too rigor-ous criteria 
Wants sustainability criteria 
for biomass (& biofuels), no 
imports 
Opposes import of bio-
fuels (and biomass), 
particularly where sus-
tainability criteria not 
met 
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 Biofuels Biomass Comment 
Portugal 
Already set 10 per cent 
objective for 2010 at na-
tional level, but should 
account for low prices in 
international vegetable oil 
markets 
  
EU criteria may be too 
strict for national pro-
ducers, support mini-
mum 35 per cent GHG 
saving for "final prod-
uct" but not its "com-
ponents" 
Romania Favour easy free trade (in biofuels and biomass)   
Clear, easily quantifiable 
sustainability criteria for 
biofuels & biomass 
Slovakia 
Support sustainability cri-
teria, concerned about 
competition with food 
stock production 
    
Spain 
Support extensive sustain-
ability criteria (strong 
concern for downside ef-
fects of biofuels) 
  
Sustainability criteria 
should reflect social and 
economic considerations, 
impact on food supply 
(in addition to environ-
mental criteria) 
Sweden     
Harmonized, non-trade 
distorting criteria 
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Table 5 
Renewables 
 
 Comment 1 Comment 2 Interim targets 
Belgium 
Directive does not adequately 
guarantee targets will be 
met 
  Early interim targets may be too high for some states 
Britain Clarity on costs, effectiveness   Relax interim targets, in-crease portability of system 
Cyprus 
Targets must take into ac-
count special national cir-
cumstances 
Claim 13 per cent is too 
high and unworkable, say 
9 per cent is possible 
  
Estonia 
Right to apply stabilizing 
measures with renewable 
price fluctuations 
Limit proof origin red 
tape   
Finland 
Problems with dependence 
on wood imports from Rus-
sia (sets external limit to 
renewable adoption?   
Supports interim targets 
France Flexibility     
Germany 
Emphasize importance of 
support system and need to 
insist on country obligations 
    
Greece Support feed-in tariffs, sim-plify licensing 
Concern about national 
potential to meet 18 per 
cent target, support syn-
ergy with environmental 
state aid 
  
Hungary       
Italy 
Targets do no take national 
potential, or previous efforts 
into account, thus no equity 
in proposed targets 
Should be maximum 
flexibility in trade in re-
newables, regret that na-
tional support systems not 
harmonized 
More flexibility required, 
especially regarding non-EU 
ETS sector  
Lithuania Insufficient safeguards? 
If energy consumption 
grows too rapidly (high 
economic growth), may 
not be able to reach RES 
target 
  
Netherlands Supports, has also suggested nuclear fusion   
Poland 
Wants to "verify" Commis-
sion methodology for arriv-
ing at RES target 
More developed states 
should bear more of 
burden 
  
Portugal 
Will surpass 2020 target, 
anticipate 45 per cent by 
2010 (EU target requires 31 
per cent by 2020) 
Want longer reference 
period for hydropower 
criterion (dam project 
could otherwise jeopardize 
viability of target)  
  
Romania 
  
  
Want to revisit interim tar-
gets, requiring heavier in-
vestment in later years 
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 Comment 1 Comment 2 Interim targets 
Slovakia Support RES target 
Want better definition of 
RES in final consumption 
(otherwise possible data 
inconsistencies) 
  
Spain 
Support RES target but em-
phasize importance of sub-
sidiarity (national support 
mechanisms) 
Emphasizes importance of 
cross-border & EU-wide 
"synergies" - require 
cross-border grid connec-
tions amounting to 10 per 
cent of installed capacity 
to manage RES share 
  
Sweden Limit administrative burden     
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Table 6 
GO Green Certificates 
 
 Comment 1 Comment 2 Comment 3 
Belgium 
Expresses strong concerns about 
compatibility of GO system and 
national level mechanisms 
But still favor a stable, liquid 
and open market in certificates 
(if compatible with nation level 
mechanisms) 
  
Britain 
Immediate, free portability of 
certificates 
Can system be used to further 
reduce costs? 
Relax qualifying criteria for 
systems coming online after 
2020 
Cyprus 
Concerned about economic con-
sequences of RES target and 
green certificate system 
Emphasize importance of secu-
rity and reliability of electricity 
networks 
  
Estonia Support national level control 
Only one type of guarantee too 
restrictive for electricity and 
heat markets (favor heat)?   
Finland 
Ensure compatibility of GO 
scheme with national level in-
centives (concerned about this) 
Wants to protect national-level 
incentive systems to encourage 
R&D   
France 
Ensure compatibility of GO 
scheme with national level in-
centives (fear undermining na-
tional level diversity) 
System hinders export of na-
tional level renewable produc-
tion 
  
Germany 
Favours some form of cross 
border transfers, but ultimately 
argues surpluses should be 
transferred at national level 
 Current GO proposal is in-
compatible with the differenti-
ated feed-in tariff system at 
national level (uniform prices 
for green certificates will un-
dermine national-level diversity)  
 GO certificate price would be 
determined by price of most 
expensive energy source, 
thereby creating windfall profits 
for cheaper forms of energy 
(counter-productive and expen-
sive) 
Greece Favour feed-in tariffs 
No single market for electricity, 
hampers GO scheme   
Hungary       
Italy 
Possibility for trading with 3rd 
countries even where facilities 
already exist (encourage tech-
nology transfer, improve effi-
ciency) 
Interim requirement makes sys-
tem impractical, likely shortages 
in the availability of certificates 
will raise their price beyond 
what is efficient  
Incentive schemes should be 
harmonized (fear competition 
among different national incen-
tive systems), GO system only 
possible with harmonization 
Lithuania 
Adequate flexibility and cost-
effective 
Harmonization of national level 
support systems would have 
negative consequences for cur-
rent RES investors 
  
Netherlands Supports trade in certificates 
But notes necessity of preserving 
domestic level incentives systems  
Poland 
Concerned about GO threat to 
national support systems, espe-
cially if implemented at enter-
prise level 
Possible negative impact on RES 
investment at national level 
  
Portugal 
GO system unable to promote 
development of diverse RES 
technologies 
National support systems neces-
sary to promote diverse tech-
nologies (eg tidal energy) 
Must examine consequences of 
GO and national feed-in tariffs 
Romania 
Notes cost to consumers that 
will decline with improve tech-
nologies 
Clarify role of state in having 
sole discretion to sell GO trans-
fers 
  
Slovakia 
Establish clear rules, minimize 
barriers to trade in GO's 
Shared experience on certifica-
tion processes across states 
could help minimize administra-
tive barriers 
  
Spain 
Concern that GO system could 
undermine good results of na-
tional support system 
Feed-in tariffs most effective 
system (compared to GO sys-
tems or market), costs lower 
Propose alternative trade in 
"targets" 
Sweden 
Criticizes lack of flexibility, state 
control, lack of long-term stable 
conditions 
Will conduct more analysis of 
Commission proposal   
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APPENDIX B 
OMSZ Carbon Content Emission Factors 
Fuel type Emission factor(CO2 t/TJ) Oxidation factor 
Coking coal 94.6 0,98 
Other Bituminous Coal  97.4 0.98 
Lignite 112.0 0.98 
BKB 94.6 0.98 
Coke Oven/Gas Coke 108.17 0.98 
Crude Oil 73.34 0.99 
NGL 63.07 0.99 
Gasoline 69.3 0.99 
Jet Kerosene 71.5 0.99 
Gas/Diesel Oil 74.07 0.99 
Residual Fuel Oil 77.37 0.99 
LPG 63.07 0.99 
Bitumen 80.67 0.99 
Petroleum Coke 98.08 0.99 
Other Oil 73.33 0.99 
Natural Gas   56.1  0.995 
Biomass (Solid and Gaseous) 109.63  0.99 
Source: OMSZ (2008:45, Table 3.4). 
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APPENDIX C  
Development of electricity generation from renewable energies and mine gas in 2006 which is remunerated under the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(provisional data, in some cases estimated) [1, 2, 3, 4] 
 
 
Number of 
installed 
plants 
Installed capacity 
(new construction 
2006) 
Electiricity gener-
ated under the 
EEG (change 
against 2004) 
CO2 reduc-
tion7) 
Remuneration 
paid under the 
EEG (change 
against 2004) 
Volume of 
investment
Jobs, including 
areas falling out-
side the scope of 
the EEG 
MW in billion kWh million t € million/a € billions 
Hydropower 
(Article 6 EEG) 
7.5241) 4.700 (-20) 4.9242)
(+6.7%) 
22.522 366.6
(+8.6%) 
0.07 9.4008)
Landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas, mine gas
(Article 7 EEG) 
770 598 2.789
(+7.7%) 
3.303 195.8
(+7.4%) 
of which sewage treatment plant gas 2904) 1234) 0,270 (+1.1%) 0.966
of which landfill gas      3304) 2504) 1.050 (+/-0) 1.143
of which mine gas 150 225(-2)5) 1.469 (+33.5%) (1.194)
Biomass (Article 8 EEG) 5,262 2,331(+598.4) 10.03) 12.706 1,337.4(+163%) 1.35 64,000
of which solid biomass 162 1,091 (+76) 5.423) (+66.8%) 8.300 52,600
of which biogas 3.300 1.000(+335) 4.17(+208.7%) 3.412 10,600
of which liquid biomass 1,800 237 (+177.4) 1.314(+1.606%) 1.075 800
Geothermal energy (Article 9 EEG) 1 0.2 (0) 0.0004 0 0.05 Approx. 50 
Wind energy (Article 10 EEG) 18,658 20,622 (+2,224) 30.71 (+20.4%) 26.47 2,733.8 (+18.3%)
2.9 82,100 of which repowering 280.86) (+140)
of which offshore 0 0 0 0
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Photovoltaics  
(Article 11 EEG) 
approx.
200,000 
2.831
(+950) 2.220 
(-208.6%) 1.516 
1,176.8 
(+316%) 
4.28 26,900 
of which tree-standing 1/1 187.6(+74.6)
1) Plus approx. 155 plants producing electricity which is not remunerated under the EEG; 
2) Plus around 15,749 billion kWh of electricity generated from hydropower which is not remunerated under the EEG;  
3) Plus around 3.6 billion kWh of electricity from the biogenic share of waste and 1.1 billion kWh of electricity from other plants which Is not remunerated under 
the EEG;  
4) 2005 figures: more recent data not available;  
5) In 2006, total installed capacity decreased for the first time;  
6) As recorded for the period 2003–2006;  
7) Including electricity generated from renewable which is not remunerated under the EEG;  
8) Including jobs in those parts of the hydropower sector not receiving remuneration under the EEG.     
Source: copied from BUM (2007:7).  
 
